Examining Enterprise Capacity:
A Participatory Social Assessment in Darfur and Southern Sudan

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based Organization</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Centre</td>
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>Community-driven Reconstruction</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSV</td>
<td>Centre for the Study of Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>DID</td>
<td>Développement international Desjardins</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Darfur Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
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<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Foundation for Mine Action</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GOS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Commission, Government of Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre, Canada</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Office</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>ITDG</td>
<td>Intermediate Technology Development Group</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NS DDR</td>
<td>North Sudan DDR Commission, Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Participative Action Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Popular Defense Forces</td>
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<td>PRA</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Approach</td>
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<td>PSA</td>
<td>Participatory Social Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>Sudanese Dinar</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLEN</td>
<td>Sustainable Local Enterprise Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium-sized Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Sudan Relief &amp; Rehabilitation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>South Sudan Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSLM</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSRRRC</td>
<td>South Sudan Relief &amp; Rehabilitation Commission, Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Umma Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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Key Terms

**Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR):** Disarmament is the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from both combatants and the civilian population. Demobilization is the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the process of transformation into civilian life. Reintegration refers to assistance measures provided to former combatants that increase the potential for the combatants and their families to rejoin civil society both economically and socially (UN DPKP 1999: 15).

**Empowerment:** Empowerment refers to women and men taking control over their lives: setting their own agendas, gaining skills, building self-confidence, solving problems and developing self-reliance. No one can empower another; only the individual can empower herself or himself to make choices or to speak out. However, institutions, including international cooperation agencies, can support processes that can nurture self-empowerment of individuals or groups.

**Enterprise:** Throughout history, the term enterprise has been used in a variety of ways. In the field of management, enterprise often refers to both small or medium-sized businesses (SMEs) and large multi-national corporations (MNCs). Enterprise can be formal (legally registered and tax-paying) or informal. Micro-enterprise is usually the term used for extremely small and informal businesses, and is often used in a developing country context. Entrepreneur is a closely related term, and refers to the individual who starts and operates an enterprise. For the purposes of the Sudan report, taking into consideration the context of IDP communities in Sudan, enterprise refers to businesses which are micro or small and most likely informal.

**Gender:** Gender is a socially construct that encompasses the attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women, men, girls and boys. Gender is context-specific and the meanings of gender shift overtime.

**Gender analysis:** This term refers to the collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated information. Men and women perform different roles in societies and in armed groups and forces. This leads to women and men having different experience, knowledge, talents and needs. Gender analysis explores these differences so that policies, programs and projects can identify and meet the different needs of men and women.

**Gender equality:** Gender equality encompasses the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same, but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, while recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a women’s issue, but should concern and fully engage all of society.

**Gender mainstreaming:** Defined by the 52nd session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1997, gender mainstreaming is “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetrated. The ultimate goal of this strategy is to achieve gender equality” (ECOSOC 1997: ).
Gender-aware policies: Policies are gender-aware if they use gender analysis in their formulation and design and recognize gender differences in terms of needs, interests, priorities, power and roles. They recognize further that both men and women are active development actors for their community.

Gender-responsive DDR programs: Programs are gender-responsive if they are planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated in a gender-responsive manner to meet the different needs of female and male ex-combatants, supporters and dependants.

Grassroots Development: The term grassroots development refers to bottom-up approaches to development. The implication is that control, direction, knowledge and legitimacy are gained from individuals and the communities in which they live and operate.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): According to the 1998 Guiding Principles on International Displacement, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are: “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (United Nations 1998: 5).

Post-war Reconstruction: 'Post-war’ refers to the period after the cessation of war. It is possible for conflict to persist in a post-war period. According to Kumar, the terms ‘reconstruction’, ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘rebuilding’ can be used interchangeably and “refer to the efforts to rebuild political, economic and social structures of war-torn societies” (Kumar 1997: 3).

Peace-building: The term ‘peace-building’ refers to a wide range of processes and approaches required for change from conflict to “more sustainable, peaceful relationships and governance modes and structures” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). This includes “building legal and human rights institutions as well as fair and effective governance and dispute resolution processes and systems” (ibid).

Private Sector Development (PSD): PSD recognizes the role of markets and the private sector in assisting individuals and communities living in poverty in achieving their development goals. PSD refers to the strengthening and creation of enabling conditions for new and existing enterprises and entrepreneurs.

Sustainable Development: The Bruntland Commission defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987: 43). Chambers put forth the idea that development should be people-centred, holistic and dynamic, should build on strengths, form macro-micro linkages and should be sustainable, meaning independent of external support and resilient to external shocks and stresses (Kollmair & Gamper 2002: 4).

Sustainable Livelihoods: Chambers and Conway (1992) state that "a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base" (quoted in Kollmair & St. Gamper 2002: 3).

Sustainable Local Enterprise Networks (SLENs): Sustainable Local Enterprise Networks (SLENs) are collaborative, trust-based networks that deliver human, social, financial and ecological benefits for all participants. They address objectives of sustainable development and poverty alleviation by fostering relationships and building enterprise capacity among various partners, including entrepreneurs, the development sector, investors, local training institutions, community members,
sustainable local business and government. SLENs offer an alternative to traditional development activities that often have a narrow focus and undermine local generation of creativity, capabilities and self-reliance (Wheeler et al. 2005: 36).

Violence Against Women: Violence against women, as defined by the UN General Assembly in the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, is “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private.”
Executive Summary

This study is a component of a larger project, titled Conflict Transformation: Promoting Sustainable Livelihoods and Grassroots Enterprise Development in Darfur and Southern Sudan, which aims to foster self-reliant sustainable livelihoods in post-war Sudan. The project and study are a collaborative partnership between Ahfad University for Women (Sudan) and York University (Canada). The study provides insight into pre-and post-conflict livelihood strategies of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Southern Sudan and Darfur and recommendations for the development of sustainable enterprise in these communities, through a grassroots, private sector development and gendered approach.

The study is based on field work conducted in Southern Sudan and Darfur during the summer of 2006. The research team conducted focus groups with IDP communities and interviews with government officials, NGOs and individuals using qualitative Participatory Social Assessment methods within the realm of Participative Action Research methodology. Techniques such as pile ranking and proportional piling were used to encourage the communities to conduct and present their own analysis to the researchers, who acted as facilitators. Focus groups were conducted through local institutions and with the assistance of local research teams, providing a bridge to overcome diverse language and cultural gaps and helping to form linkages among Sudanese institutions.

The research identified common concerns in both Southern Sudan and Darfur regarding grassroots enterprise development, including: the environment (focusing on resource depletion in conflict areas); gender (especially the marginalization of female IDPs and the lack of mobility of IDP men in Darfur); security and safety; and land tenure and access issues. Unique concerns identified in post-war Southern Sudan include: differentiation between communities and the concept of the jur, or outsider; socio-economic issues (including dependency culture, land mines and property rights); and the status of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. In Darfur, the fragile DPA and the continuation of conflict have led to the following unique concerns: access to traditional livelihood strategies; complex layers of security inside and outside the camps and continual attacks on IDPs; and the lack of representation and participation in decision-making regarding relief, development and the peace process.

Traditional livelihoods in Southern Sudan and Darfur have concentrated on farming, herding, animal husbandry and trade. Despite being removed from many of these traditional livelihood strategies, IDPs in Southern Sudan and Darfur are interested in enterprise development and are, when possible, modestly engaging in limited grassroots enterprise activities that have the potential to be developed in sustainable livelihoods.

Positive themes for the development of sustainable enterprise were identified in both areas. In Southern Sudan, opportunities include: a wealth in natural resources; a strong desire for post-war livelihoods and development; encouragement for the return of displaced by all national and international stakeholders; existing enterprise capacities among IDPs; an active financial sector and the emergence of Southern Sudanese banks and interest in microfinance; enterprise/market activity, although with limited access for IDPs; and engagement of the local private sector in development. Opportunities identified in Darfur include: an entrepreneurial spirit; a strong desire for self-reliance and independence from relief; existing skills applicable to a wide variety of enterprises; understanding of enterprise enablers such as credit and training; and the existence of, and participation in, IDP camp markets.

Two main areas for grassroots enterprise development identified in Southern Sudan are enterprises addressing development needs (such as clean water, health services, de-mining, appropriate building materials, energy and communication in rural areas) and enterprises built around traditional livelihood strategies (such as agriculture and livestock-related enterprise) combined with
participation in markets and the opportunity to take a lead role in the development of their communities. In Southern Sudan, enterprises should be developed that will engage women effectively and safely, yet should not exclude men. Although IDPs and ex-combatants are the intended target for the development of grassroots sustainable enterprise, the communities they will settle in must be equitably included to increase social linkages and opportunities for conflict transformation, instead of aggravating tension and conflict due to segregation and unequal development.

Enterprise development for IDPs in the complex and rapidly-changing Darfur environment will prove to be a challenging but vital undertaking. Areas for grassroots enterprise development identified in Darfur include enterprises addressing the immediate needs of encamped IDPs (including water and foodstuffs); enterprises addressing development needs (such as transportation, building materials, energy and security) and enterprises adaptable to traditional livelihood strategies of trade, agriculture and livestock production with related secondary processing industries.

After displacement, Darfuri women have become involved in camp markets and often have access to urban centres as domestic labourers. As such, Darfuri women are excellent candidates for enterprise development. Men are often restricted due to security measures and thus have fewer enterprise options open to them. Despite this, men must not be excluded from enterprise activities. Initiatives should be careful not to empower specific groups in the IDP camps and instead should be spread among different tribes and groups within the camps. Darfuri communities of non-IDPs located near the camps might also benefit from such initiatives, especially if inclusion will lead to social and economic linkages and facilitate market access and trade.

Development of microfinance capacity for residents of Southern Sudan and Darfur, especially marginalized groups such as IDPs and ex-combatants, will be required as an important enabler of enterprise. To encourage sustainable enterprise development, institutions focused on general training and the teaching of specialized skills are also required and will assist in the reintegration of IDPs, ex-combatants and others affected by the war who want to take part the development of their communities.

Of utmost importance is the increased inclusion of local actors in the development process. Local actors hold valuable knowledge, understanding, experience and linkages to the target community. Strengthening the capacity of local actors can improve the effectiveness of development campaigns, facilitate more sustainable approaches to development and inform policy so that new insights are gained and previous mistakes are not repeated. This is important for all areas of Sudan, and especially in Darfur, where local actors are currently not able to adequately engage in the development process.
Introduction

This study is a component of a larger project, titled Conflict Transformation: Promoting Sustainable Livelihoods and Grassroots Enterprise Development in Darfur and Southern Sudan, which aims to foster self-reliant sustainable livelihoods in post-war Sudan. The study and larger project are the result of a collaborative partnership between Ahfad University for Women (Sudan) and York University (Canada) and provide insight into pre- and post-conflict livelihood strategies of internally displaced person (IDP) communities in Darfur and Southern Sudan. A grassroots and private sector development (PSD) approach to development are central to the study. Thus, sustainable enterprise development becomes a tool for achieving sustainable livelihoods for the target communities.

During the field study, the researchers discovered an emerging debate among international agency staff and local Sudanese organizations regarding the need and the challenges of relief aid versus opportunities for development in Sudan. In many instances, existing capacity for enterprise as a means for post-war reconstruction is overshadowed by ongoing conflict, tense political situations, relief-focused policy and programs and a general lack of experience or local examples for sustainable enterprise among the target communities. A desire to discover and communicate existing capacity among the war-affected communities in Darfur and Southern Sudan is driven by the belief that such capacities do exist and can perhaps play the most important role in Sudan’s post-war reconstruction.

Ongoing conflict in Darfur between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and Darfuri opposition groups and the challenges of implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the GOS and Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) have only worsened the situation of Sudan’s displaced communities. As humanitarian, political and development challenges continue to mount, organizations and communities within Sudan must recognize, utilize and strengthen existing capacities for their own development. Recognizing that this is a complex challenge of immense proportion requiring the effort of all levels of Sudanese society, this report puts forth the first known baseline study which directly investigates the existing capacity of, and provides recommendations for, the development of sustainable enterprise among IDPs in Darfur and Southern Sudan.

The main objective of the study is to inform the discussion of post-war reconstruction from a grassroots enterprise development and gendered perspective, specifically for the return and resettlement of IDPs from Darfur and Southern Sudan and the demilitarization and reintegration of ex-combatants from Southern Sudan as part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. To enhance and ensure sustainable peace, the basic needs of communities marginalized by conflict must be met. Examining the post-war development plans of the various governments in Sudan and international and local non-government organizations (NGOs), as well as assessing the existing capacity of target communities for PSD (including skills, infrastructure and preparedness) is critical to the study.

It is the hope of the researchers and the author of this study that its findings will inform policy makers (GOSS, GOS, donor agencies and the local and international development community) with regards to PSD and sustainable enterprise development as a tool for achieving sustainable livelihoods and conflict transformation, as part of the greater post-war reconstruction effort in Sudan. Insights of this report will be used to develop proposals for enterprise development, with the aim of creating self-reliant sustainable livelihoods in post-war Sudan.
Development of grassroots sustainable enterprise requires discussion and debate among Sudanese stakeholders, including IDPs and various levels of government and civil society, ex-combatants emerging from the DDR process as well as experienced enterprise development specialists, the private sector and the local, regional and international development community. The recommendations contained in this report were used as a foundation for the highly successful Forum for Sustainable Enterprise Development in Sudan, titled Alternative Approaches for Local Reconstruction (for the Forum agenda see appendix A). The forum was co-sponsored by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT), International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the World Bank, Ahfad University for Women (Sudan), York University and Dalhousie University (Canada), and was held at Ahfad University for Women, Omdurman, Sudan, on April 1-3, 2007. The event brought together policymakers from the GOS, GOSS, Sudanese and international finance institutions, practitioners, academics, the private sector, IDP entrepreneurs and academics interested in the development of grassroots sustainable enterprise in post-war Sudan. For details on the Forum and more information on grassroots enterprise development in Sudan, please visit the website of the Foundation for Sustainable Enterprise and Development (FSED) at www.fsed.ca/Sudan.

Some participants from the Forum for Sustainable Enterprise and Development in Sudan, Ahfad University, Omdurman, April 2007.
Section One: Historical Perspective

Sudan: Historical Context

Covering two and a half million square kilometers (966,757 square miles), Sudan is the largest country in Africa. Sudan is bordered by nine countries: Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Its location, size and resource wealth have placed Sudan in a unique and often vulnerable position of geo-political significance (see map below). In January 1956, Sudan achieved its political independence from the British.

Sudan is one of the world’s most geographically diverse countries; within its borders can be found deserts, mountain ranges, swamps and rainforests. Three general climatic regions characterize Sudan: a desert area in the north, a semi-arid central belt and a tropical rainy region in the south. Sudan is also rich in contested natural resources, mainly located in the south. These resources include oil, iron, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten mica, silver and gold. Since the 1950s, civil war between the GOS and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) over ownership and control of these resources has been directly linked to the militarized patterns of displacement, both in the oil territories in Southern Sudan but also currently in the Darfur region in western Sudan.

Catastrophes in Southern Sudan and Darfur are directly linked to the broader conflict between successive central governments in the north and the economically, politically and socially marginalized majority of the population in the south, west and east of Sudan. The southern and Darfur regions, which are the primary focus of this report, are among the most underdeveloped regions in the world, due to successive policies which have starved these areas from development infrastructure.
During the Turco-Egyptian occupation which began in 1821, the northern merchants participated in the trade of Southern Sudanese slaves, gold, ivory and timber. The British devised a system of separate administration for the north and south of Sudan. The Closed Districts Ordinances of the 1920s, as well as the Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922, required the use of passports and permits for Sudanese wanting to travel between Khartoum and Southern Sudan. A Language Policy was developed and enforced in Southern Sudan in 1928. This policy adopted English as the official language for Southern Sudan, as opposed to Arabic in the north, and approved the use of local languages. For the south, Arabic was categorically rejected, adding to the separation between the north and south (Machar 1995).

In 1946, an Administrative Conference held by the British in Khartoum, supported by the Egyptians, advocated that Southern Sudan would be handed over to the government in the north of Sudan. A 1947 conference in Juba informed the chiefs of Southern Sudan of the intent to hand over the south to the government in the north. The establishment of the Sudan Legislative Assembly in 1948 included thirteen handpicked delegates from Southern Sudan. In 1953, the Cairo Agreement was no exception; there, the British and government from north Sudan spoke on behalf of all Sudan, requesting self-determination as a whole country. Put in this situation, the people of Southern Sudan were deliberately excluded on the pretext that they had no political parties or organizations (Machar 1995). Sudan gained independence from Britain in 1956, but in 1955 a civil war erupted between the government in Khartoum and Southern Sudanese forces.

History of the Armed Conflict in Southern Sudan

Histories of Sudan are subjective and often highly contested. The armed conflict in Southern Sudan has stemmed from deeply entrenched forms of oppression, inequality and exclusion. Historically, the conflict has been attributed to unbalanced development between the north and the south. Gender, social, economic and political inequalities have incited the conflict. The armed conflict is in large part the product of a history which dates back to slavery in the mid-nineteenth century, occurring predominantly in the south but connected to the economic development of both the north and the south at that time. This tradition of the exploitation of the south continued into the 1980s by the political elite of the dominant north.


1 There have been numerous wars between the north and south, as well as within the south. Even the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) itself split, producing a bloody intra-south conflict (Sudan National Archives, 2003).

2 Immediately before British colonialism subsided and because of tensions and insecurity about the future of Sudan, the southern Torit garrison, accompanied by police, prison guards and civilians, revolted against northern administrators who were in charge of the southern territories during the transition from British rule. Many northern casualties among civilians, including women and children, were documented (Ali & Matthews 1999: 193). The mutiny and loss of Arab lives caused continuing antagonism which, in combination with other differences, later escalated to a full-blown war between the north and south.
Northerners and southerners perceived the armed conflict differently. National governments in northern Sudan, both civilian and military, did not address the armed conflict with a sense of urgency. Rather, they considered it a ‘southern problem’ (Deng 1995). Ahmed Sikainga, for example, observes that northern politicians have always viewed the south as “an afterthought, an appendage and a marginalized section of the society” (Sikainga 1993: 81).

Successive democratically elected governments – the Umma Party (UP) and its sectarian twin, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) – have consistently avoided addressing the root causes of the conflict, instead attributing the armed conflict to external factors such as colonialism, imperialism, communism, Christianity and Zionism (Ali and Mathews 1999: 196). Since 1989, the northern Islamic military government in Sudan has been claiming that “crusades targeting their religious orientation have contributed to the war in the south” (ibid). Each of these governments failed to attribute the root causes of the armed conflict to deeply constructed forms of oppression and inequality. Historically, the conflict in Sudan has been defined by scholars and historians such as Francis Deng as a ‘war of visions’ between Muslims and Christians, north and south, and Arabs and Africans (Deng 1995). While some scholars (Kebbede 1999) broadly endorse Deng’s pragmatic culturalist vision, they view the unequal distribution of resources as central to the understanding of the armed conflict (Suliman 1999: 95).

The perception that the conflict was due to one static root cause is problematic. Armed conflicts are not static; they change over time. In Sudan, the overlapping nature of the armed conflict has been demonstrated by many factors. First, it was a direct result of the lack of socio-economic development in Southern Sudan. Second, it was the legacy of bitter colonial and post-colonial memories of human enslavement, predominately carried out by northerners. Third, the conflict was attributed to a series of untrustworthy acts, un-kept promises and dishonored peace agreements between southerners and northerners. Since 1983, the discovery and production of oil has added a new dimension to an already volatile situation, literally fuelling the war.

\[3\text{ One could trace it back further, of course, to the slavery that took place from the early part of the 19th century during the Turco-Egyptian imperial period of modern Sudanese history (1820-1884).}\]
The First Phase of the War: 1955-1972

The ‘Southern Policy’ created by British colonialism in 1922 is significant for understanding the background of the war. Between the 1930s and the 1940s, Southern Sudan was rendered as a Closed District; northerners were barred from the region without British permits. The Southern Policy was rationalized by the British colonizers on the grounds of protecting the south from northern exploitation, therefore, advocating economic self-reliance. However, with the exception of limited powers exercised by tribal leaders in the south, the Southern Policy failed to develop the south. Britain’s typical ‘divide and rule’ policy eventually led to the marginalization of the south (Ali & Matthews 1999; Kebbede 1999). For instance, education infrastructure was strictly controlled by the British as well as foreign missionaries who imposed the teaching of Christianity in the south, in contrast to Islamic teaching in the north. Indeed, the primary aim of education during the British colonial administration in the south was not to develop the south or promote indigenous knowledge, but instead to exploit the people by emphasizing the teaching of practical skills for manual labour, thus facilitating the exploitation of the rich natural resources of the south.

The ‘divide-and-rule policy,’ reinforced by post-colonial governments, led to institutionalized patterns of uneven distribution of resources, intertwined with politicized ethnic, religious and cultural patterns of oppression. The result was an intensification of inequalities and mistrust between the north and the south and also within various regions of the country. This divide led to the prolonged armed conflict in Sudan.

The first phase of the war of national liberation, led by the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), occurred between 1955 and 1972. In 1955, Southern Sudanesse leaders feared that the process of national independence simply meant a replacement of British colonial rule by Northern-Arab Sudanese colonialism. The SSLM’s aim was to liberate the south from Arab-Islamic domination, creating a ‘new’ secular, culturally diverse country (Danforth 2002). The first phase of the war lasted for seventeen years and ended when the central government in the north and the leadership in the south signed the Addis Ababa Accord in 1972, which gave the south relative control of its territories and resources.

The Second Phase of the War: 1972-1983

The Addis Ababa Accord brought peace, and between 1972 and 1983 northern and southern elements came close to mutual acceptance and respect as different ethnic, racial and religious groups that could live together. During this time, “the south emerged as an island of democracy within the autocratic Sudanese state” (Ali 1999: 11). The Addis Ababa Accord provided the south with an unprecedented degree of autonomy over its rich mineral and oil resources, which in turn posed a threat to the government in the north by restricting its influence in the south. The discovery of oil in the southern territories in the early 1980s was a major factor for the violation of the Accord by the government in the north. In 1980, the military government of Jaafar Mohamed el-Nimeiri redrew the borders between the southern and northern provinces, removing the oilfields from the south (Ali & Matthews 1999: 208).

Another catalyst for the escalation of the war in 1983 was the division of the south into three regions and the subsequent implementation of Shari’a Islamic law onto the non-Muslim southern communities. The imposition of Islamic laws resulted in non-Muslims in the south being subjected to detention, public floggings, amputation of hands and other human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2003). A second war broke out in 1983.
The Third Phase of the War: 1983-2005

The intensification of Islamization in Sudan after 1983 shifted the construction of the war from a ‘civil war’ to a ‘holy war’, or Jihad against ‘infidels’. This changing nature of the war was demonstrated by the shift in the portrayal of the war by the north. Before it began in 1955, the war had been described as a ‘civil war’. In the early period, successive central governments in the north misinformed the public about the magnitude of a war that was conducted in complete secrecy. Not one of the post-colonial governments made publicly available statistics demonstrating the number of casualties, injuries and prisoners of war or the level of destruction of infrastructure and resources in the south. Frustration about the war was among the factors behind two populist uprisings that overthrew military governments in October 1964 and April 1985. The northern government feared that a populist backlash in the north would arise if the human and economic costs of the war were revealed (ibid).

The militarization of the country was rigorously sustained under the current Islamist military government of Umar Hasan Al-Bashir, which came to power in 1989. All segments of Sudanese society were either mobilized or forced to assume their national duty in defending the ‘Islamic nation’. For the first time in the history of the war, civilians in the north were mobilized, public sector employees were required to attend military training and fight in the war, and students were required to train in the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) before attending post-secondary higher education. Casualties of the war began to be celebrated as martyrs, their families were financially compensated and their sacrifice was publicly honored.

Marginalized non-Arab groups began publicizing their marginalization by the hegemonic north. Many men and a few women of the Nuba of southern Kordofan, the Fung of southern Blue Nile, Fur of Darfur in western Sudan and the Beja of eastern Sudan, joined the SPLM/A and fought in what is characterized as a national liberation struggle (Babiker 2002).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

Despite numerous previously failed peace agreements, the war ‘ended’ with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the GOS and SPLM/A in Nifasha, Kenya, on January 9, 2005. The agreement was brokered by the United States and several European countries. Elements of the CPA called for a permanent ceasefire between the north and the south. Both the GOS and SPLA agreed to military standstill and a symbolic end of the war.

The CPA is based on the core principles of self-determination, security arrangements, wealth sharing (including provisions for the division of oil revenues) and power-sharing. The SPLA and GOS have formed a Government of National Unity (GNU) with a decentralized system of administration in the south. According to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the CPA constitutes a series of negotiated agreements and protocols between the GOS and the SPLM and outlines a framework for long-lasting peace. Regarding the CPA, a GOS source stated that the agreement “focused attention on the key requirements for sustainable peace in Sudan...addressing the causes of conflict, including poverty and inequality...and) this requires the establishment of a secure environment for rehabilitation, development and poverty reduction” (S Mohamed 2005, pers. comm., 17 November).

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4 All central governments in the north have considered information about the war as classified. The media coverage of the war has been censored as successive Ministers of Information and National Defense have strictly monitored radio, television and newspapers reporting of the war (Ali & Matthews 1999: 198).

5 Among previous peace agreements are the 1971 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Machakos Protocol, outlining an overall framework for peace, signed between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA on July 20, 2002. The Machakos Protocol did not include any agreement on a ceasefire and was followed by violent fighting around the oil fields of Western Upper Nile.
The DDR process is the main security component of the CPA, and is mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1590. The DDR process is voluntary and is meant to pay special attention to child and women combatants, as well as disabled combatants. Dr. Mohamed also highlighted the importance of ‘development’ for a successful DDR process in Sudan. To emphasize this point, ‘DDR plus’ is termed as the addition of development to the regular DDR process (S Mohamed 2005, pers. comm., 17 November). The UNMIS DDR process does not specifically mention poverty alleviation or development as part of DDR; however, there is an understanding from those involved in the DDR process that poverty alleviation and development are critical for successful and sustainable reintegration. Unfortunately, at the time of the field research, disarmament in Sudan had not yet begun.

The CPA dictates that the resolution of the armed conflict in Sudan will ultimately rely on a popular vote to take place in the south via referendum in 2011, to determine whether the majority of the southern populations will chose to separate the southern territories from the north or remain united. Opinion polling is not advanced in Sudan, but internal surveys suggest that over 90 percent of southerners will vote for separation (Human Rights Watch 2007). Given the historic northern economic interests in the south, this further hinders the future of peace in Sudan.

It is important to note that the greatest weakness of the CPA is that, despite the label, it is not a comprehensive peace and it has not been able to halt armed conflicts within various regions of Sudan. While the war was declared ended in the south by the signing of the CPA, the armed struggle continues intensely in the Darfur region in the west and in various pockets within Southern Sudan and in contested territories in the east.

History of the Armed Conflict in Darfur

Roots of Modern Conflict in Darfur

The region of western Sudan has been plagued by both historic internal and external conflicts and famines. The origin of the Darfur armed conflict can be traced back to what Gérard Prunier terms ‘colonial benign neglect: romanticism and underdevelopment’ (Prunier 2005: 25). There has been political and economic marginalization of Darfur compared to the central Nile areas dating back to Turco-Egyptian rule in Darfur from 1874 to 1883. Prior to colonialism, the Kingdom of Darfur had been at least as powerful and important as its neighbours (Badri 2005: 12).

The British continued to neglect the political and economic development needs of Darfur during the 1899 to 1955 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. According to their administrators, the best style of government in Darfur was the lightest (Prunier 2005: 25). Thus, tribal structures were maintained to facilitate easy rule. As Khartoum began to develop, it became evident that Darfur fell intentionally to the wayside. In 1928, it was reported that most of the teachers in Darfur were themselves illiterate. In 1929 at Gordon College, the only place of higher learning in Sudan at the time, of 510 students, 311 were from Khartoum or the Blue Nile Province, and not one student was from Darfur (ibid: 30). The British Governor of Darfur between 1935 and 1944 wrote, “We have been able to limit the education to the sons of Chiefs and native administration personnel and we can confidently look forward to keeping the ruling classes at the top of the educational tree for many years to come” (ibid).

Furthermore, in 1939, of 17 maternity clinics in Sudan, none were located in Darfur. Major epidemics of disease and famine occurred during colonial rule, especially between 1926 and 1955, when tens of thousands died due to lack of medical facilities in comparison with the rest of Sudan. At the time of independence in 1956, Darfur had the poorest-developed medical services in all of Sudan (Badri 2005: 20).
The Janjaweed – thought to mean “man with a gun on a horse,” “devil on horseback,” or “a man on a horse” – is a blanket term used to describe mostly armed gunmen in Darfur, Western Sudan and now Eastern Chad. The Janjaweed are comprised of nomadic Arab-speaking African tribes. The core members of the Janjaweed are from Abbala (camel herder) backgrounds with significant Lambo recruitment from the Baggara (cattle herder) people. Since 2003, they have been one of the main players in the Darfur conflict.

The Current Crisis

Since 2003, the armed conflict in Darfur has accelerated into a humanitarian emergency that has drastically affected millions of Darfuri women, men and children. It is estimated that about 1.8 million Darfuris have become IDPs and over 200,000 are refugees living in Chad (USAID 2006). In January of 2003, ‘confused clashes’ on the Chadian-Darfur border alerted the GOS to trouble in the region, and on February 26, 2003, an attack on GOS soldiers by a previously unknown Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), working in conjunction with the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), killed 200 government troops (Prunier 2005: 24). The retaliations by the GOS and the Janjaweed® militias the government supported led the then US Secretary of State Colin Powell to call the situation in Darfur a ‘genocide’ (ibid, cover). Although the GOS has since distanced itself from the Janjaweed, initial GOS support for the militias created the beginnings of a war economy which continues to perpetuate violence in Darfur.

The UN has discussed ethnic cleansing in Darfur but has yet to define the conflict as genocide due to perceived tribal elements of the conflict, although “nomadic shepherds are unlikely to conduct aerial bombardments” (Prunier 2007). According to Prunier, the Janjaweed are composed of criminals of diverse ethnic origin, prisoners, members of small African groups and members of the small camel herding tribes of far-north Darfur, whose traditional livelihoods were lost due to climate change (ibid).

Genocide is defined as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in part or in whole, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. It includes killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction, imposing measures to prevent birth and transferring children to another group (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1951).

Although there is no denying the humanitarian crisis resulting from massive displacement and conflict in Darfur, accusations of genocide are contested. By some standards, violence in Darfur does appear to be genocide; however, by definitional standards, the violence in Darfur does not appear to be designed to physically eliminate any one particular group (Straus 2005). This debate is certainly difficult; at the time of the publication of this report the UN has been unwilling to label the conflict as genocide.

To date, the GOS has resisted international pressure to end the violence in Darfur. The token African Union force is ill-equipped and not mandated to end the conflict. There are currently no UN peacekeepers in Darfur and this plan is fiercely resisted by the GOS. The UN and the African Union (AU) have produced only symbolic measures and stalling tactics in Darfur and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is too small to effectively cover Darfur’s 500,000 sq km. Furthermore, AMIS is under-equipped and is mandated to a non-offensive role (Prunier 2007). During a visit to an IDP camp in Southern Darfur during the time of the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), the research

6 The Janjaweed – thought to mean “man with a gun on a horse,” “devil on horseback,” or “a man on a horse” – is a blanket term used to describe mostly armed gunmen in Darfur, Western Sudan and now Eastern Chad. The Janjaweed are comprised of nomadic Arab-speaking African tribes. The core members of the Janjaweed are from Abbala (camel herder) backgrounds with significant Lambo recruitment from the Baggara (cattle herder) people. Since 2003, they have been one of the main players in the Darfur conflict.
team observed Sudanese police and military attempting to quell an IDP riot. AMIS, whose base was nearby, was nowhere to be found. In conversation with the local UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) later that day, it was evident that they were also completely unaware of the situation.

The military reaction of the GOS to the Darfur problem has resulted in an immense escalation of violence and suffering. Had Khartoum reacted with restraint to the killing of its soldiers by JEM and SLA, the severity of the Darfur crisis may have been drastically minimized.

**The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)**

The DPA was signed on May 5, 2006, between the GOS and the faction of the SLA led by Minni Arcua Minnawi. The DPA required that the GOS disarm and demobilize the Janjaweed by mid-October 2006 and downsize opposition forces. The AU was responsible for confirming that these requirements were carried out. Similar to the CPA’s DDR process, a number of combatants were to be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and police. The DPA also stipulated that opposition leaders receive the fourth highest position in the GNU: ‘Senior Assistant to the President and Chairperson of the new Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA)’. Furthermore, a referendum was set for July 2010 to decide whether Darfur would become a unitary region with a single government. Three years prior to elections, a variety of GNU and Darfur posts will be held by opposition groups (Frazer 2006).

A May 31, 2006 deadline was set by the AU for other opposition groups to join the agreement, mainly JEM’s Khalil Ibrahim and the SLA faction led by Abdul Wahid Nur, yet these deadlines passed without new signatories. Furthermore, a ceasefire signed between these groups and the GOS is reported to have been breached by all parties on multiple occasions (ibid).

From the ongoing conflict in Darfur, it is not surprising that the DPA is fragile, non-encompassing and has been poorly received by IDPs in Darfur. In both El-Fashir and Nyala, IDPs violently protested the DPA, claiming that their demands were not represented by the signatories or the agreement. Not only did the DPA not provide them with mechanisms for adequate political representation and the provision of basic needs, but it would not facilitate their speedy return to their communities of origin.

Similar to the CPA, the agreement does not receive support from the variety of political and armed factions of Darfur. Furthermore, many tribal and opposition groups did not participate in the talks, and rumours that new groups are arming themselves in preparation for conflict are common in Darfur. Without full support by all factions and the encamped population, tensions will inevitably lead to continued conflict, both in Darfur and surrounding areas.

Polarization of inter-tribal relations in Darfur since the signing of the DPA highlights its divisive nature. The violent reaction and protests by IDPs in Darfur, with documented attacks on AMIS targets, shows the frustration and lack of legitimacy the mission currently holds with IDPs due to the inability of it to address the dire situation. The unwillingness and inability of signatories of the agreement to represent the IDPs and wider Darfuri society will allow for the continuation of unrest, violence and conflict (DRDC 2006).
Section Two: Theoretical Frameworks and Research Methods

Southern Sudanese Women and the Politics of National Liberation Struggle

Feminist scholarship articulates that women do play multiple and sometimes conflicting roles in times of war and peace (Jacobs, Jacobson & Marchbank 2000: 4). In Sudan, since the 1980s, women have been represented in the international media as passive victims of war and dependent recipients of foreign aid in refugee and IDPs camps. Such images have recently become ubiquitous in the wake of the Darfur crisis in western Sudan. While these depictions point to the trauma and extreme violence experienced by women, men and children, this report recognizes that Sudanese experiences of the armed conflict – particularly those of women – are more complex and varied. They continue to shift as the various phases of conflict evolve.

Southern Sudanese women have been active and powerful agents of both war and peace in their capacities as recruited fighters in national liberation struggles⁷, as well as in their active roles in peace building processes. Nevertheless, Southern Sudanese women face a complicated process of positioning themselves vis-à-vis the politics of nationalism and the national liberation struggle.

Southern women were not mobilized to participate in the struggle as equal partners, but rather were mobilized due to the need for their services and labour. Unlike men, women fighters rarely engaged in military combat. They constituted only two percent of the SPLA in the 1980s. Women recruited to the military mainly worked at civilian tasks that were viewed by some of the SPLA to ‘best suit’ women, such as nursing, preparing food, washing clothes and liaising with and hiding rebels. Nevertheless, some Southern Sudanese women have found that coming into an emergent nationalist movement through these accepted feminine roles is empowering. In considering conflicts elsewhere in the world, Cynthia Enloe similarly argues that “being praised by men in the nationalist movement for bearing more children and raising them well doesn’t always feel like being patronized or marginalized” (Enloe 1989: 55).

⁷ Sudanese liberation movements include the SPLM/A representing Southern Sudan, the Beja Congress representing Eastern Sudan and the Sudanese Alliance Forces (SFA) representing Northern and Central Sudan.
During the national liberation struggle, appropriate gender roles and behaviours were defined in a way that constrained Sudanese women’s activities and activism. However, Southern Sudanese women are not passive victims; they are actors. They have always resisted within the limited resources available to them. Indeed, community disruptions resulting from the violent processes of armed conflict and displacement have led to significant changes in gender roles and relationships within the Southern Sudanese communities.

**Post-War Reconstruction in Sudan**

The term ‘post-conflict’ describes the period after the cessation of conflict. ‘Post-war’ is perhaps a more appropriate term to use, especially in the situation of Sudan, as post-conflict implies conflict is no longer present. In the case of Sudan, conflict has continued in the post-war period.

According to Kumar, the terms ‘reconstruction,’ ‘rehabilitation,’ and ‘rebuilding’ can be used interchangeably and “refer to the efforts to rebuild political, economic, and social structures of war-torn societies” (Kumar 1997: 3). Each stage of conflict requires different levels of cooperation between relief, rehabilitation and development. In this context, rehabilitation is a link between relief (short-term provision of basic human needs) and development (long-term socio-economic and political change). Thus, rehabilitation constitutes short-to-medium term reconstruction efforts, including “activities in the field of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, institutional and political reform” (de Zeeuw 2001: 12).

It is important that post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation activities recognize the role of women and children in the conflict and develop programs sensitive to their special requirements. In Sudan, women participated in conflict, both as combatants and in non-combat roles; this is also true for children. Concerning children and women, Alfredson (2002) writes that child soldiers “need not necessarily be ‘combatants’ to be perceived as members of, or attached to, armed forces or groups. They may perform a variety of other tasks, both military and non-military...” (Alfredson 2002: 17). Furthermore, there appears to be a strong correlation between displacement and recruitment; thus, child soldiers, often belonging to both segments, are often the most marginalized members of a society in, and emerging from, conflict.

As noted above, the DDR process in Sudan must also take into consideration the unique needs of women and children participants in the conflicts in Sudan. According to the UN DPKO Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines (1999), DDR is a complex process with political, military, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic dimensions. It aims to address security challenges during the critical transition from conflict to peace and development when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks outside of their fighting units. DDR seeks to support ex-combatants during reintegration both economically and socially, so they can participate as stakeholders in peace. The main beneficiary of the program is ultimately the wider community (UN DPKO 1999). The same report warns, however, that reintegration is but one component of post-conflict rehabilitation, and should be placed alongside other initiatives for recovery and development (ibid). When referring to ex-fighters, the terms ‘demobilized’ and ‘ex-combatants’ are often used interchangeably to describe discharged soldiers and irregular or rebel fighters (UNESCO 1996: 1). In traditional peace and development programs this group is rarely viewed as a resource for participation. Initiatives tend to be narrowly defined and transition-focused, without considering full social and economic reintegrations or personal transformation. However, “many ex-combatants prove to be very entrepreneurial thereby contributing to reconstruction, but they can also prove themselves forces for national rehabilitation if only given a chance” (ibid: 2).
According to Weiss et al. (2001), post-intervention obligations to rebuild war-torn societies fall under three main categories: peace building, security and justice and reconciliation (Weiss et al. 2001: 39). Although provided in the context of responsibilities of states after an intervention in conflict, the three categories highlight the importance of a multi-faced approach to post-war reconstruction. The term ‘peace-building’ became increasingly used in mainstream discourse after then United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced his Agenda for Peace in 1992. Although initially used in relation to structural reform, it refers to a wide range of processes and approaches required for change from conflict to “more sustainable, peaceful relationships and governance modes and structures” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). This includes “building legal and human rights institutions as well as fair and effective governance and dispute resolution processes and systems” (ibid).

Development is an important and difficult task for nations emerging from war. Often, relief efforts overshadow post-war development needs. Many international development agencies strictly adhere to non-development relief activities during, and immediately after, active conflict. In the case of Sudan, where multi-leveled conflict – community, tribal, regional, and state-sponsored – is ongoing, post-war economic development is of critical concern. Unfortunately for Darfur, local development actors are often ignored and restricted by relief-focused international aid organizations. Such counter-productive policy and action by the international community are not new to Sudan, as evidenced by ‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’, a humanitarian campaign both praised for its ability to navigate between two warring factions (Weiss & Minear 1991) and criticized for alignment with these same factions for delivery of aid (Taylor-Robinson 2002).

There is increasing literature on the potential negative impacts of aid and intervention. In her book Do No Harm - How Aid Can Support Peace or War, Anderson shows evidence that aid can play both a positive or negative role for economies transitioning from war to peace (Anderson 1999). Duffield (2001) examines the role of aid in relation to IDPs in Sudan from a policy perspective and cautions that aid in conflict situations is often complicit with and accommodates violence (Duffield 2001: 202). Community development interventions, however, have suggested that aid interventions supporting entrepreneurship can help individuals and communities, including refugees (Korschning & Allen 2004; Craig & Lovel 2005)

**Sustainable Livelihoods & Development**

The Bruntland Commission defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987 43). In the mid-1980’s, Robert Chambers formulated the main approach to sustainable development. Chambers put forth the idea that development should be people-centred, holistic and dynamic, should build on strengths, form macro-micro linkages, and be sustainable, meaning independent of external support and resilient to external shocks and stresses (Kollmair & Gamper 2002: 4). Chambers and Conway (1992), state that “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base” (ibid: 3). Sustainable livelihoods development, then, is a holistic term encompassing economic, social, ecological and human development, and is most effective with participation of, initiation by, or direction from, the grassroots levels.

For instance, David Wheeler et al. (2005) have developed an applied model of business development that equates the significant and systemic changes in enterprise networks with the critical growth and sustainability of local enterprises. Sustainable Local Enterprise Networks (SLENs) are collaborative, trust-based networks that deliver human, social, financial and ecological benefits for all participants. They address objectives of sustainable development and poverty alleviation, by
fostering relationships and building enterprise capacity among various partners, including entrepreneurs, the development sector, investors, local training institutions, community members, sustainable local businesses and government. SLENs offer an alternative to traditional development activities that often have a narrow focus and undermine local generation of creativity, capabilities and self-reliance.

Contrary to conventional media portrayal of IDPs in western media, the researcher found Sudanese IDP women, men and children with a wealth of skills, experience, creativity and motivation which can be harnessed in the development of sustainable enterprise and SLENs. This fits well with the SLEN model, as typically, a Sustainable Local Enterprise Network starts with a range of existing assets that are then augmented by some type of external investment functioning as a catalyst for increased growth; positive outcomes can then result in virtuous cycles of reinvestment in human, social, financial and ecological capital (ibid).

Sustainable gender-aware livelihood creation through sustainable enterprise development can assist with the reintegration of IDPs and ex-combatants into society, reducing the likelihood that they may return to combat as a survival strategy. This process, in effect, is the transformation of conflict through the creation of sustainable livelihoods.

Clearly the private sector – ranging from the local and informal to multinational – has a vital role to play in creating wealth and promoting socio-economic development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 2004). The private sector also plays a role in contributing – both directly and indirectly – to social reintegration, human security, conflict resolution, and crisis prevention.

There is growing evidence that as market economies become more widespread and as business and trade become more central economic factors in societies around the world, the relevance of enterprise to the maintenance of peace and security is increasing. National, regional and international small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as multinational corporations (MNCs), can also play a direct and indirect role in conflict prevention and resolution through their procurement and operation decisions and their ability to work with governments and indigenous
communities (Nelson 2000). It is evident that there are large Sudanese businesses and MNCs interested in the stability of Sudan and aware of their potential role in promoting peace or conflict through their operations.

Moreover, there are a growing number of success stories outlining the innovative and effective ways which micro-, small and large businesses have been able to contribute to crisis prevention and conflict resolution around the world, along with a supporting set of tools and resources (e.g. the International Labour Office (ILO) Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-Affected Countries). The ILO has catalogued specific experiences and learning relating to entrepreneurship development programs for refugee and IDP women, men and children in Africa, namely in Sudan, Somalia and South Africa (ILO 1998).

Research is beginning to shed insight into the role of conflict-entrepreneurs, who may or may not be combatants, who exploit their position for economic benefit. In contrast, there also exist entrepreneurs who struggle to survive under conflict to prevent exploitation (Korf 2005: 201). Duffield (2001) supports this position and, using a case study of shadow coffee merchants in Southern Sudan, illustrates how “the networks that support war cannot easily be separated out and criminalized in relation to the networks that characterize peace; they are both part of a complex process of actual development” (Duffield 2001: 190). Interventions which support legitimate entrepreneurs who struggle within war economies must be careful to avoid networks that also support conflict. Supporting stability-oriented economic activity may provide a platform for conflict-marginalized civilians to participate in enterprises and other activities which promote post-war reconstruction and development. Yet despite their undisputed role in driving sustainable development in war-ridden zones, foreign aid, assistance and private funds directed at enterprise development have hardly reached conflict and post-conflict areas.

Research Methods

This study adopted qualitative Participatory Social Assessment (PSA) methods that fall within the realm of Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology. This approach finds its roots in the Participatory Rural Approach (PRA), which, according to Chambers (1992), is the local facilitation of investigation, analysis, presentation and learning, ensuring that locals present and own the outcomes and also share in the learning process. In this approach, facilitators are self-critical and continuously examine

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8 Based on multiple conversations with the chairman of a large Sudanese corporation and a manager of an international petroleum company operating in Sudan.
their behaviour, while accepting personal responsibility for errors and embracing them as an opportunity to improve. Information and ideas must also be shared between local people, between facilitators and local people, and between facilitators themselves (Chambers 1992). Key to using the PSA approach is the legitimization of local knowledge by local representation in the community, ownership of research and empowerment of the local community.

There was extensive reliance on local Sudanese institutions in the logistical planning and completion of the fieldwork. The GOS and GOSS provided security clearance and support in the collection of data in their respective constituencies; Ahfad University for Women provided logistical support and allowed the researchers to have the benefit of its strong and long-standing social and institutional connections; and many Sudanese academic organizations provided technical and logistical support as well as access to the local communities they serve.

The research team conducted focus groups with IDP communities (see appendix B for Focus group discussion questions) and interviews with government officials, NGOs and individuals. Participatory techniques such as pile ranking and proportional piling were used during focus group sessions to encourage the communities to conduct their own analysis of the questions and then present them to the researchers, who acted as facilitators. Transparency was imperative to the fieldwork, thus each interviewee was provided with written documentation explaining the research actors and purpose. Since many of the focus group participants were illiterate, and verbal authorization is custom, written authorization from interview participants would have been culturally inappropriate and politically sensitive. Instead, the researchers verbally explained the research purpose and actors to tribal leaders and focus group participants to gain acceptance. Each participant had the opportunity to ask clarification questions.

Often the focus groups and interviews were conducted in difficult political, social and economic environments. Focus groups were uncontrolled and the group participants were selected by IDP leadership. When the researchers were given the opportunity to arrange groups, they attempted to best reflect the community and balance age, gender and ethnicity. It should be noted that the nature of the research was highly qualitative and contextual in nature. Due to the nature of data collection and analysis, the researchers do not claim that the findings of this report are generalizeable beyond the specific contexts from which they were formulated.
Research preparation, including the development of focus group and interview questionnaires, occurred primarily during the months of March and April 2006. The fieldwork was conducted from April 2006 to June 2006, with some follow-up field activities occurring in July 2006. The following locations, communities and organizations were visited:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Focus Groups</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
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<tr>
<td>Juba, Southern Sudan</td>
<td>• Lobonok camp</td>
<td>• GOSS</td>
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<td>Malakal, Southern Sudan</td>
<td>• Obel camp</td>
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<td>Rumbek, Southern Sudan</td>
<td>• Akot</td>
<td>• GOSS</td>
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<td>• Pulshume</td>
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<td>Al Fasher, Darfur</td>
<td>• Blacksmiths Cooperative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Abu Shouk &amp; Al Salaam camps (visit only)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nyala, Darfur</td>
<td>• El Seref camp</td>
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<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>• Jabarona camp</td>
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<td>• Mandela camp</td>
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<td>• Wad Al Basheer camp</td>
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</table>

In Juba, the research team worked with graduates of Ahfad University employed by local NGOs and Government of Southern Sudan institutions. In Malakal, junior academic staff and graduate students from the Upper Nile University assisted with the facilitation of focus groups and the collection of data. In Al Fasher, professors and students of the University of El Fashir were part of the research team, and in Nyala, staff members from a local NGO, run by a well-known graduate of Ahfad University for Women, assisted with the research. In Khartoum, the IDP focus groups were conducted by graduate students from Ahfad University for Women. All of the interviews with GOSS officials, NGO and development agency staff were conducted in English; focus group sessions with IDP communities were conducted in the appropriate local dialect.

In every location visited, field research with IDP communities was conducted through local institutions and with the assistance of local research teams. Linkages were formed between and among various Sudanese universities and NGOs for the purposes of facilitating the research project. Detailed training was provided to all interviewer/facilitators in techniques and approaches. Reliance on local institutions and research teams provided a bridge to overcome diverse institutional, language and cultural gaps often found in conflict segregated post-war Sudan. Other than one non-Sudanese lead researcher from York University, all of the researchers who participated in this study are Sudanese, representing all corners of the country, making this a truly Sudanese field study. No doubt this was a key factor in the team’s acceptance by many IDP communities who are living extremely difficult existences. We are grateful for this acceptance.
Section Three: Field Research Findings from Southern Sudan

Background

The population of Southern Sudan is approximately seven million inhabitants who belong to a large number of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups. They predominately engage in agro-pastoral economies and reside in Equatoria, as well as parts of Bahr Al Ghazal. It is estimated that about 98 percent of the total population live in rural areas. Approximately 21 percent had access to a safe water source in 2001 (UNICEF 2004: 10, 25). The Gross National Income per capita is estimated at $90, with around 90 percent of the population earning less than US$1 per day (ibid: 5, 8).

The local populations of Southern Sudan speak a dialect of Arabic known as Arabi Juba, as well as a variety of tribal languages. In town, western-style dress is worn, and in rural areas both western dress and traditional clothing are worn by both women and men. Tribal scarification is common among all communities of Southern Sudan for both men and women and in both rural and urban areas. Much of the economic activity in Southern Sudan is conducted through East Africa rather than through Khartoum, with a strong interest from South Africa (especially in banking). If this trend continues, the economic pull to the east and south may fuel additional political tension between Khartoum and Southern Sudan.

Southern Sudanese are heterogeneous communities and include broader ethnic groups such as the Dinka, Nuer, Azande, Bongo Didinga, Lotuko and Shuluk. Juba, considered thus far to be the capital of Southern Sudan, is indicative of the diversity of the communities in Southern Sudan. Although the Bari inhabit much of the Juba area, the population of Juba consists of a mix of tribes. The Mundari inhabit the Terekeka area, although some moved to Juba during the conflict. Juba and Terekeka are also inhabited by the Nyangwar (from Rokon area), some of whom have also migrated to Juba town. Among the IDPs in Juba are the Pari, originally from Torit District or Lafon County. The Pøjulu can be found in Juba county and Juba IDP camps. Other groups in Juba include the Acholi (areas bordering Uganda), the Madi (from Magwi County), the Baka (from Western Equatoria), the Kuku (from Yei), the Zande (from Yambio), the Kakwa, the Toposa and Arabs (mainly living in Juba town). There are a few Dinkas living in Juba, many occupying official positions in the GOSS administration.

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8 Focus group discussion between Dr. Amani El Jack and women in Gumbo Market, September 7, 2006.
Before the war, Juba was a centre for trade in Southern Sudan. Currently, Juba is host to many GOSS ministries and agencies, as well as a wide range of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. The soil and climate around Juba are suitable for the growth of a variety of crops, vegetables and fruits. There are likewise other natural resources available to local people. The Nile River can be used for irrigation, drinking water, as a source of fresh fish and to generate hydro-electric power. Poor roads and transportation difficulties make the rainy season, from May/June to September, a challenging time of year for locals with regards to trade and other forms of income generation.

General Observations

Juba

Upon arrival in Juba, the contrast in development of basic infrastructure compared with Khartoum was clear. The few main roads that are cleared of landmines are in terrible condition and unmanageable without a 4x4 vehicle. Public transport services are poor and do not service all areas of town, leaving local residents to walk long distances to reach their destinations. Infrastructure in general is inadequate in meeting the needs of the population – power supply is not continuous and very limited, buildings are at the fringe of collapse, clean water is scarce and health and public services are almost non-existent for the majority of residents. This poses gender-specific implications for both women and men.

There is an enormous presence of the UN officials and NGO staff in Juba. Since the signing of the CPA, the Juba area has experienced an influx of economic and other activity due to what many call an ‘NGO invasion’ and the presence of a large number of Kenyan and Ugandan businesspeople. This has put pressure on the IDPs and residents of Juba, as their access to surrounding land and resources is restricted and price of commodities in the local markets has skyrocketed. Hundreds of new 4x4 vehicles are roaming the roads carrying the international development community from GOSS offices to the UN compound and accommodation locations. Local accommodation has been unable to keep up with demand. Renting a tent for the night costs approximately $150 USD and meals at restaurants serving the non-residents cost approximately $15 USD per person. A car with driver costs a minimum of $100 USD per day. At the time of the study, the price of bottled water in the local market was six times that of bottled water found in Khartoum. These extraordinary prices are a direct result of the infusion of aid workers and development funds. . . One NGO director stated that the ‘Juba miracle’ is that residents are still able to survive.

A lot of construction has commenced in Juba, much of it focused on buildings and infrastructure to service donor agencies. Development funds, other than the cost of UN and NGO salaries, vehicles and buildings, have been focused on capacity building for the government ministries, including constitutions, legal documents and training. These important efforts are unfortunately not seen by most local residents. The banking sector appears quite active. However, the researchers found the southern-based Nile Bank to be one of the only financial institutions to truly have a vision and desire for the provision of microfinance to all women, men and children in the community.

Relations between different ethnic groups in Juba, and in much of Southern Sudan, have yet to be normalized. The hardships of the long war and the accumulation of ethnic, gender, racial and religious divides advocated by both the GOS and SPLM are still affecting the mindsets of the population.

10Ibid
The researchers met with GOSS officials whose central offices are located in Juba, the international and local NGO community, UN staff and IDPs in the Lobonok camp (in the Jebel Kujur area of Baher El Jabel State). GOSS ministry offices are located in portables, run-down buildings or in the houses of ministers – all of which are not suitable for the quality and quantity of work they are undertaking. No affordable housing facilities are available for government and civil servants. Some GOSS ministers are living in the tent compounds or in tukuls, small traditional mud and straw huts occupied by the majority of local residents and IDPs.

The Juba market does not appear to allow for production and consumption of local non-agricultural goods. The market is dominated by Northern Sudanese, Ugandans and Somalis, with little opportunity for local participation. Goods, including bottled water, electronics and clothing, are imported from Uganda and Kenya. Some local handicrafts are sold in the market but by Northern Sudanese vendors. Large businesses in Juba appear to be operated by Northern Sudanese as well, with the hotel and tent-accommodation industry run by Kenyan and Ugandan companies and employees. Southerners with access appear to be civil servants and military people and are primarily men.

Malakal

Malakal is the capital of the Upper Nile State. It is located on the banks of the White Nile, north of its convergence with the Sobat River. For much of the civil war, Malakal was a garrison of GOS forces, but is now part of Southern Sudan. The largest ethnic groups in the area are the Shuluk and Nuer, but Dinka and Murle, as well as other groups, are also found in the area.

The researchers found that Malakal has the potential to become a beacon of development for Southern Sudan. First and foremost, there exists a wealth in natural resources in the area. The soil in Malakal is rich black ‘cotton soil’ and is ideal for agriculture. Secondly, the Upper Nile University in Malakal is the most active of all universities in Southern Sudan and is already helping to make a large impact on the town itself. At the time of the research, most universities in Southern Sudan had not yet returned to their original locations, and were still operating out of Khartoum, where they had relocated during the war. This is not the case with the Upper Nile University, which had ten of its twelve faculties operating in Malakal and was in the process of moving the remaining faculties. It was clear to see that faculty and students were very active at the university, and there is currently an undertaking to expand facilities. The faculty and administration are mainly male, but the university provides access to both male and female students.
Malakal appeared to be a town where northerners and southerners can work together without the tension experienced in other areas of the south. This apparent cohesion is a direct result of the town’s location and experience during the long running civil war. In November 2006, a number of months after the researchers left Malakal, the perceived cohesion in Malakal fractured when the largest breach of the CPA occurred in the area between GOS forces and the SPLA. In what was called the Battle of Malakal, approximately 150 people were killed including civilians, and hundreds injured (Sudan Tribune 2006).

Malakal has not experienced the same invasion of foreign development workers as Juba, although there is still considerable activity and a heavy presence of UN peace keepers. The city itself has paved roads and some basic infrastructure and there appears to be an effective system of transportation for locals to travel to surrounding communities. There exists an active market selling a variety of goods and a number of northern Sudanese banks. The market shops are run by men while foodstuffs are sold by women.

Rumbek
Rumbek is the capital of the Lakes States region and, after the signing of the CPA, it served as an interim administrative centre for Southern Sudan. During the long civil war, the area and its residents suffered immensely from heavy fighting. The Agar, Aliab and Chic (the three main tribes of the Dinka) are the main groups in the area, but other groups such as the Atout and Jurbel are also present.

Rumbek was the final town visited by the researchers in Southern Sudan. It has also experienced a similar invasion of staff from the UN and INGO community. In fact, primarily UN planes and helicopters landed at the dirt-runway airport; some airport officials mentioned that commercial planes use the airport as well. Tent compounds established in the vicinity of the airport, similar to those found in Juba, provided accommodation for foreign nationals working in Rumbek. One such compound contained accommodation, food service, INGO offices and nightly entertainment. Some INGO staff that the researchers met both lived and worked within the compound and thus had minimal, if any, contact with women and men in the community.

Most of the local community is living in traditional tukuls, clearly not serviced by electricity or water. Roads are in decent condition and even a local telecom company serves the Rumbek area, although it is not connected with other networks in Sudan. Markets are quite active, and interestingly, the currency used in Rumbek is that of the old Sudanese Pound, used prior to the Sudanese Dinar (SD). These notes are in terrible condition – most are on the verge of disintegration and are held together with scotch tape. The notes are in constant circulation in the Rumbek area only. There are a few currency exchange offices in the town, some located at the tent compounds housing foreign nationals. These offices appear to be run by Somali nationals, and are buying US dollars at an ideal exchange rate. For example, at a time when official banks in Khartoum were offering 221 SD per $1 USD, the currency exchange in Rumbek was 250 SD per $1 USD, a very lucrative opportunity for those traveling to and from Khartoum frequently. Since the time of the research, such variance in currency valuation has been reduced or eliminated.

There appears to be a large population of mainly young male combatants stationed at Rumbek who are waiting for the demobilization effort to begin. Some are available to hire as drivers and guides. The presence of the development community, an active market, IDPs and ex-combatants would make Rumbek an ideal location for enterprise development programs. This was overshadowed by ongoing conflict between tribal groups in the Rumbek area, which prevented the researchers from traveling to some nearby IDP communities.
Interviews

GOSS
Interviews with GOSS officials were aimed at identifying government intentions and the level of preparedness with regards to post-war development including PSD and enterprise development, the provision of services and issues of conflict transformation. Standard questions were given to all ministries, as well as questions specific to each particular ministry including: infrastructure and capacity; services provided; opportunities and obstacles; and future plans. GOSS officials were interviewed primarily at their ministry offices in Juba, as well as in the Rumbek field offices.

South Sudan Relief & Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), Juba
The SSRRC, formerly known as the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC), is the office of the Government of Southern Sudan responsible for monitoring and overseeing all UN and INGO activity in Southern Sudan. Its main function is to act as a bridge, coordinating and facilitating development activities of NGOs with those of the GOSS. All INGOs, researchers and individuals wanting to work or conduct research in Southern Sudan must first register with the SSRRC office. The registration process allows the SSRRC to track development actors and activities and provides facilitation for organizations or individuals, access, and de facto protection of the GOSS. The SSRRC also keeps an inventory of local NGOs working in Southern Sudan. The main office serves as the coordination office for the Bahr El Jebel State.

Two senior SSRRC officials were interviewed. One had also been a senior official with HAC before the signing of the CPA. At the time of the interview, the SSRRC office occupied an old multi-level building in the Amarat area of Juba. The office of the SSRRC was in the worst condition of all the GOSS offices visited. The building was degraded by years of war and neglect and clearly lacked basic amenities. There were two main offices, one for the director and one shared by the deputy and another senior staff member. Other officials occupied an open area on the ground floor. Computers and other technology were not present, nor were there personnel to attend to office management duties. Both officials interviewed agreed that the condition of the premises is unsuitable for the work they are undertaking, but stated that there are no funds budgeted for renovations or maintenance. Budget increases are required for the facilitation of SSRRC activities including logistics, transportation, staff training and for staff to travel with NGOs to local and IDP communities.

According to the SSRRC officials interviewed, field officers are unskilled and require training to enable them to effectively conduct their duties. Training for senior staff is non-existent as capacity-building packages for GOSS are directed at other ministries. The lack of technology and personnel prohibited the SSRRC from providing the researchers with official letters of permission to facilitate access to IDP camps and to show to security officials if required. Thus, verbal permission, an escort and an introduction to the IDP camps by an SSRRC Field Officer were given in lieu of documentation, to show the consent of the state and to prove the legitimacy of the research.

Coordination is taking place between GOSS and local and international NGOs working in the field of humanitarian assistance. This coordination takes the form of monthly meetings between SSRRC/GOSS and NGOs. Emergency meetings and working groups (often including NGOs, women's organizations and IDPs) are scheduled as needed. These meetings are often housed at NGO offices due to lack of adequate facilities. It was suggested by one official that coordination meetings required greater frequency and focus to ensure the communities of Southern Sudan are better served.

An important concern raised by the SSRRC was the ability of IDP’s who return to their place of origin to also return to livelihood strategies undertaken prior to the civil war. SSRRC encourages voluntary return of IDPs; however, returnees are faced with many obstacles including: land mines in
agricultural fields and livestock routes; occupation of land by other communities or groups; military activities of the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA); and financial concerns regarding rehabilitation and resettlement programs, including livelihood development assistance.

Local NGOs providing services in Southern Sudan include Sudan Aid, SEC (environmental and sanitation) and Sudan Council of Churches. These NGOs are involved in building the capacity and self-reliance of local Community-based Organizations (CBOs), conflict resolution, women-focused income generation schemes, seed provision, group farming activities, social capital support, and handicraft and health training. INGOs operating in Southern Sudan include Nikodu (livelihoods and livestock), Accomplish (rural cattle vaccination), Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD), Pact Sudan, Woman Self-Help, Action Conflia Farms, Help Age International, Action Against Famine, Norway Church Aid, International Rescue Committee, Save the Children and Oxfam. These operate primarily in the realm of relief but have extended their mandate to include socio-economic and agricultural development. ACORD adopts a gender sensitive approach and works on issues related to local capacity building, inter-family conflict resolution, carpentry, bridge-building, beekeeping and some women-focused income generation and microcredit programs that are not yet self-sufficient. Pact Sudan is working on issues of conflict mapping and conflict resolution, including some very interesting work with Chambers of Commerce and traders.

SSRRC were concerned that there was little training being done to improve general human resource capacity in the South. Computer skills, management, administration, communication and negotiation skills are greatly needed in the general population and civil society. Southern Sudan also requires health personnel, rural extension agriculture programs, carpenters, welders and other skilled labour, as well as a general increase in levels of education.

Discussion surrounding the private sector and development revealed that the private sector in Southern Sudan is not actively engaged directly in development issues. SSRRC is interested in a private sector approach to development and plans to give support to this area. It was suggested that the government could hold seminars and workshops for the private sector and NGOs to inform, educate and build partnerships for PSD, development in general, and the environment.

According to the SSRRC officials, IDPs in the Juba area have mainly been displaced from the Jabel Kajur area by the LRA. They were displaced in both 1997 and 2002, and have received basic support from SSRRC, except during the 1998 Juba drought.

Sudan Relief & Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), Rumbek
The SSRRC Director of Lakes State region met with the researchers in Rumbek. The office is housed in a small building which was undergoing renovations at the time. Technology was present, as well as staff, and thus the Director was able to provide documents legitimizing the team’s research in the Rumbek area.

The Director was greatly concerned with the resettlement of returning IDPs to the region. SSRRC in the Lakes State is discouraging the creation of camps, so returnees are moving into existing communities. As a result, there are few camp situations in Rumbek and the surrounding areas. According to the Director, there are 12,048 IDPs, many located in Khartoum, ready to return to Lakes State, but there is no funding to do so. It was mentioned that $24 Million USD was set aside by the GOSS to facilitate the return of IDPs, and each state was provided with $500,000 USD, but nothing happened. Presently, of the original 12,048 IDPs, only 2,448 are ready to return. At the time of the interview, the rains were approaching, and thus even this number will likely be prevented from returning for some time. Local IDPs in the Lakes State area are located in the following communities: Akot (20 miles from Rumbek); Shebet (30 miles from Rumbek), West & East Ural (70 miles from Rumbek) and Central County (Rumbek area).
Ministry of Health, GOSS, Juba

In Juba, the researchers interviewed the Deputy Minister of Health at the Ministry of Health office located in the GOSS compound in a large portable-like building. Technology was present, including Internet, which was being wired by an Italian national working with one of the development agencies. The Deputy Minister expressed that Southern Sudan is facing human resource challenges and that these will take time to address. Mid-level officials need strengthened capacity, but currently there is little training available.

The water system is an important consideration in Southern Sudan. The water purification plant, which only serves the Juba area, was not functioning properly at the time of the research. A new and large-scale water purification plant is planned for the Juba area. Currently, most residents in the Juba area get their water from the Nile, but this has led to major health problems since February 2006, including a major cholera outbreak. Sanitation needs are increasing for all people everywhere. During an outbreak, media promotes information to the public through press houses, such as the Juba Post, and local FM radio stations.

With regards to hospitals and health centres, the Ministry of Health is considering the provision of training as well as compensation, so that if doctors agree to work in Juba or the south, the GOSS will consider covering the costs of specialized training. The GOSS also intends to build housing units for doctors, staff and ministry officials. There are currently in the range of 300-400 southern doctors in the SPLA area serving 9 million people. There are also 4 million people of Southern Sudanese origin living in Khartoum.

A Health Science Training Institute exists in Juba and Malakal and is a cooperative effort with the Liverpool School of Medicine. This is a training relationship; however, a nation-wide campaign is needed. The Deputy Minister has not considered the use of university medical students as paramedics or health services staff. INGOs help at a lower-scale level. Currently, Norwegians People Aid runs a school to train nurses and lab technicians and OMRF has a school to train medical assistants.

A major health challenge in the region is the practice of teething, marking and scarification by many tribal groups. The sharing of tools and improper medical treatment leads to the spread of disease. Women experience health problems in gender specific ways as a result of their productive and reproductive roles and responsibilities. The GOSS is clearly against it any form of female genital mutilation (FGM) and, according to the Deputy Minister, there is not a FGM problem in Southern Sudan. Furthermore, an HIV/AIDS policy for Southern Sudan was developed during the war and will be under review soon to introduce gender sensitive and culturally acceptable health measures. The Deputy Minister also stated that GOSS is not against the promotion and use of condoms.

At the time of the fieldwork, the Ministry of Health was preparing a final draft health policy for Southern Sudan. The draft will welcome the private sector in the development of health services, especially with regards to hospitals and clinics. The Deputy Minister believes that the local populations of Southern Sudan are able to pay for basic health services and identified the following potential roles for the private sector in health care services:

- small-scale water purification operations, as safe drinking water is the greatest health challenge for rural Southern Sudan;
- schools for training paramedics, to assist with the servicing of basic health needs to the women, men and children in the communities of the South; and
- hospitals/clinics that would service rural areas.
Local and International Development Agencies

The development community has a long history of work in Southern Sudan. A plethora of INGOs and UN agencies are operating in Juba and other areas of the region, along with many local organizations, particularly women’s organizations. In general, the development community expressed that livelihoods would come through proper investments. Local capacity building, such as the return of the University of Juba, is an important factor. Many expressed faith in the efforts of the GOSS, but are concerned that energy is currently being directed at governance and capacity building rather than the immediate needs of the population. One NGO staff member stated that “the government came from the bush into a chair, with a focus on laws and constitution” rather than the local community.

The development community also expressed concerns over the affects that lack of infrastructure, conflict and conflict resolution, and weather patterns in Southern Sudan have on the local population... Most of those interviewed expressed the belief that the private sector must play a more active role in creating sustainable livelihoods and promoting development. The following are a selection of some of the organizations visited, representing the development activities in Juba and/or Southern Sudan.

Help Age International, Juba

Help Age International is an organization which strives to assist older people to fulfill their potential to lead dignified, healthy, and economically and physically secure lives. In Juba, they run a number of programs targeted to communities throughout Southern Sudan. According to the senior official at Help Age International, Juba, the DDR process has not started in Southern Sudan. The local communities receive inadequate services and even the health centres themselves are without water.

The senior official noted that, outside of Juba, there is absolutely no infrastructure. Flying even 20 minutes outside Juba, one can find communities that go without salt three quarters of the year because there are no markets to distribute it. Members of these communities will walk 84 km to Juba to purchase salt. Many of the surrounding agricultural communities grow only two or three types of crop, which leave them vulnerable. Traditional farming tools are used without extension services to help improve productivity or provide access to new tools and techniques. Fishing communities often do not have access to markets; thus they fish for sustenance only.

For many of the herding tribes, cattle are used for prestige and not economic value. Herders may have 5,000 head of cattle and will follow them wherever they go but would not sell one even if their child happened to be ill. To the herders, cattle have no economic meaning, and instead are considered social capital and used for weddings and funerals.
A larger problem for the communities of Southern Sudan, according to the official, is the tension felt towards Northerners. During the war, Northerners were considered enemies and these attitudes do not change easily. Terms such as Jelaba and Jur are used to describe outsiders – the first having been associated with Northern merchants accused of stripping Southern resources. Patience and education are needed to move from hate to acceptance. At one time, Help Age had set-up an eye-clinic in Yay, but the local community there would not allow doctors from Khartoum to serve them. Tension between Southern communities also exists and is a great concern.

The Help Age senior official believes that income-generation projects can bring people together and ease community conflicts, but too often it isolates groups due to the narrow focus of target communities. Transparency in any project is important, as experiences differ from location to location, community to community and project to project. On the topic of remittances, the official stated that there are some remittances being received in Juba; however, it does not appear to be substantial enough to support the livelihoods of much of the community.

**The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), Juba**

In Juba, the researchers met with members of the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), the NGO charged with de-mining and training Sudanese nationals in such activities. Their work is focused in Southern Sudan and Darfur and is an important part of the DDR program.

One member of the team stated that in the Juba area, FSD had hired 120 ex-combatants for de-mining. Of these 120, over 60 were fired due to alcoholism problems. 81 new recruits were recently hired from returnee populations, mainly those returning from Ugandan and Kenyan refugee camps. The official stated that the refugees are better educated than the ex-combatants and are less likely to show up for work inebriated. Interestingly, there is widely available documentation that large cash payments are often misused by ex-combatants, as they are not accustomed to managing funds and may be more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol.

FSD members noted that the mandate given to them by the UN is to clear roads for UN activities and to open Juba to different markets – both to Khartoum and East Africa. There is no intention to de-mine farmland so that people can return to sustainable forms of livelihoods. The official who commented on this stated that the responsibility to de-mine farmland would be left to Sudanese national, and that these activities would not likely start for ten to fifteen years. An official at the UNDP was able to confirm this statement.

**The United Nations (UN), Juba**

The researchers met with two UN staff members, one from the UNDP and one working with UNMIS (Southern Sudan) who has UNDP and Ministry of Justice (Southern Sudan) experience. Both are legal officers with vast experience with issues pertaining to DDR, governance, gender, government capacity building and human rights. One is a foreign national and the other a Sudanese national.

Land tenure and inheritance were raised as important legal issues pertaining to development in Southern Sudan, especially for women. Communal land is shared and under the authority of tribal leaders, almost always men. Property itself can be purchased, giving legal and economic rights to an owner, where communal land faces many political and economic challenges. With current inheritance customs, cattle, an important factor of wealth, does not go to women. Thus, women in Southern Sudan, especially the large group of marginalized IDP women, are very concerned with their potential for economic development. Access to markets is also a large retardant of the economic development of women. Conflict exists between Dinka IDPs who are using agricultural land for grazing their cattle and other IDPs interested in raising crops. Exacerbating this issue are Mulas, militias involved in cattle raiding from competing tribes. Chiefs of returning IDP communities do not
appear to be concerned with the land tenure issue, as they expect that anyone inhabiting what was once their land will simply evacuate.

During the interview, it was strongly expressed that UN staff in general do not understand the fundamentals of DDR and conflict. IDPs are afraid of guns and other weapons, and expect that the GOSS will ensure their safety. At the time of the fieldwork, the DDR process had not begun. Although the CPA described the DDR process in detail, including figures, it remains unclear the actual numbers that will be decommissioned and what types of training programs would be established for their reintegration. It was suggested that training should take place in both mobilized units and in the areas of return, and that conflict management and avoidance training is essential. There is also the issue of civil security for Southern Sudan. Many senior military officers will require adequate training to run police departments, prisons and participate in civil service.

**ACORD Sudan, Juba**

The Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD) is an international organization whose primary activities in Southern Sudan involve research on violence against women, conflict transformation and peace building. A senior staff member of ACORD Sudan was interviewed and provided considerable insight into the challenges faced by Southern communities, with specific focus on women and children.

During the interview, the staff member stated that children born in refugee camps outside Sudan are raised with different cultures and languages, resulting in inter-family and inter-community conflict. Conflict resolution must be taught to overcome this tension, especially among youth. One example given is the different eating habits of youth returning from Uganda. In Sudan, communal eating is commonplace, with all members of a family eating from a communal dish. In Uganda, each person will eat from their own plate. This difference has caused tension in families that have been split by war. Youth raised in Uganda feel that communal eating is unhealthy and demand separate portions; tensions arise when families do not have enough income to afford separate portions of food. Youth from abroad have also more liberal attitudes towards drinking alcohol, which causes a variety of tensions and social problems in Southern Sudan. Workshops and seminars run by ACORD address these issues.

Other issues pertinent to the community have resulted from situations where men left their wives to join the fighting in the bush. Many of these wives remarried. Upon the return of their first husbands, custody battles over children take place. Land ownership is also an issue, as people have built on plots of land owned by others who have now returned and are demanding their land. Often, these situations cause conflict, which can easily escalate involving many members of a community. The issue of weapons, according to the ACORD staff member, is another major concern and cause of conflict in the South. Guns are often used for cattle raiding and looting among the various tribes of Southern Sudan (including the southern and eastern tribes of Tabosa, Dinka, Murle, Latukas and Makura, and the western tribe Mundaris). Landmines are also a key issue. Since the cessation of fighting, the mines tend to affect women more, because they go into fields to collect firewood and grasses.

The ACORD staff member interviewed also highlighted that tensions exist within the GOSS. Thus, a variety of tensions and potential conflict exists, at the level of the community and government, and with the SPLA and other groups of Southern Sudan. IDPs are often unwilling to return to their place of origin unless there is assurance that they will receive the same basic services (schools, water, health services) that they currently have access to in the IDP camps. According to the staff member, although the GOSS manages to persuade many people to return via workshops, some return is not completely voluntary.
Skills-training programs that ACORD is involved in include: carpentry, tailoring, handicrafts, bee-keeping and poultry farming. These programs are directed at IDPs in SPLA areas and refugees in Uganda, so that they might return to their areas of origin with skills. Environmental protection and self-reliance are important aspects of the training. A microfinance program was funded by the British Embassy and UNIFA, where women in Juba were trained in basic business management, bookkeeping, sales, literacy, gender mainstreaming, gender and social skills, and then were given funding to start enterprises in the South. The program had approximately a 70 percent repayment rate from the women, whom had been selected because they were made vulnerable by the war and were providing for their dependents. Many of the women who received funding participated in market activities, selling food items, such as durrah (corn). It did not appear that the funds were invested into their businesses; however, they helped the women lift themselves out of the poverty trap sustaining the needs of their families. Funds, for example, might have been used to pay for their children’s school fees, rather than for business growth. A similar program was established for men. It failed, but the staff member did not mention why. ACORD is still assessing microfinance as a tool for the alleviation of poverty; however, it does not appear that any program they have operated is self-sustaining. Donors are needed, as well as a strong local CBO to manage such a program. The staff member stated that the Nile Bank has good ideas on microfinance.

Enterprise activities focused on infrastructure are needed in Sudan, especially Southern Sudan. It is imperative that there is no gender discrimination in these programs. For example, ACORD found that with construction workers, men and women learned from one another and, as casual labourers, women were found to be more productive than men. Interestingly, compensation for a variety of work, including casual labour, is related to education level, not for the work being performed. Prior to the war, women were primarily involved with duties related to marriage and family, but now they are involved in the labour market. Still, cattle herding is considered a man’s job. There appears to be some interesting trends happening with farming. The ACORD staff member stated that, in some families, members participate in communal and individual plots. Communal plots are used for staple crops for feeding the family. Individual plots are used to grow crops for market. Of the individual plots, there are examples where children as young as seven years old are helping to pay for their own health care, clothing and school fees. This is helping to teach self-reliance at an early age. It is not sure how widespread these activities are. Cultivation tribes are primarily located in East Equatoria (Madis, Kooko, Esholis, Equaqua), West Equatoria (all tribes) and Juba (Bari).

**International Rescue Committee (IRC), Juba**

The IRC is involved in many relief-related activities in Sudan, especially in Southern Sudan and Darfur. The researchers met with two IRC staff members while in Juba, one a Sudanese national and one a Canadian national.

Conflict transformation activities are being undertaken by IRC in the Juba area. One project highlighted is a CIDA-funded project aimed at training large numbers of youth groups in Southern Sudan in the field of conflict transformation. One Canadian and one Sudanese trainer were part of the first phase of the project, which took place in 2003. The second phase started in 2004, with 60 youth groups representing up to 1,500 youth participating. Intensive conflict transformation was conducted by the Centre for the Study of Violence (CSVl) of South Africa using both white and black South Africans and militant training techniques. Peace building officers, trainers and youth groups participated. IRC stated that it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of such training; however, it appears that the training has been used in practical ways. The third phase has not yet begun, but will also be CIDA-funded and will provide sub-grants for youth groups to form their own organizations. The phase will focus on further conflict transformation training, the establishment of centres for sports, returnees, reintegration, and agriculture for youth, all geared to different communities. The IRC staff stated that much of the economic empowerment support they received has left their organization; other than market surveys they are not involved in activities related to economic empowerment.
are no longer involved in microfinance but are willing to partner with enterprise development initiatives, leveraging the above described partnerships and other networks to promote community-driven reconstruction (CDR) through community development centres (CDC).

**PACT Sudan, Juba**

PACT Sudan was highly recommended to the research team from a variety of sources in the Juba area. At PACT, the researchers met with a senior staff member. Much of the work that PACT is undertaking is in the area of conflict resolution, peace building and capacity building. At the time of the research, the organization was undertaking a project to map the current conflicts in most areas of Southern Sudan using community-driven community analysis. PACT provides space, assists with planning for community groups and works with governments for natural resource management in Equatoria, all pastoral areas and Upper Nile. PACT has cross-border staff in surrounding countries and works with a variety of NGOs and UN agencies to implement programs and conduct research.

The staff member stated that conflict in Southern Sudan is often personalized and politicized. Idioms of language and community interpretation of conflict are important to understand before attempting to address conflict. A weak judiciary, problems of youth and arms, the stalled DDR process and the lack of an effective interface between authority and community are hindering conflict resolution.

Poverty is a major driver of conflict and is a significant issue for youth in pastoral areas. Youth need special consideration when developing programs for conflict transformation. The staff member stated that the destruction of the pastoral system will solve lots of problem; there are too many cattle, too few schools (resulting in poor levels of education) and a lack of new livelihoods being developed. Furthermore, the impact on schools, new forms of employment and vocational training must be seen in the context of its impact on youth.

When asked about IDPs, the PACT staff member cautioned the researchers not to forget all returnees. There are spontaneous returnees, UNHCR-sponsored returnees and refugees returning from Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. Knee-jerk interventions do not work; triggers and constraints to resettlement and development must be examined. Currently the issue of land is a major issue for resettlement and livelihoods, especially in the Blue Nile and Nuba areas.

When discussing the role of the private sector in conflict transformation, the staff member stated strongly that the private sector equates with negative exploitation for pastoralists, as they are not used to the notion of enterprise and there are many cases of exploitation. Arab merchants have been traditionally involved in trade and markets. Therefore, little indigenous knowledge exists for trading. In Rumbek and Equatoria, for example, Somalis are heavily involved in trade. The Dinka-Nur have little interest or capacity and this will take a long time to develop. Enterprise would be best understood in the Bahr el Gazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria areas and among Ugandan returnees. Other constraints to trade are: culture, mindset and being landlocked. Market routes, including the Nile and roads, are controlled by elites and people are often afraid of exploitation, deterring them from trade. There is, however, a generational shift taking place.

Enterprise focused on natural resources, such as lulu oil and gum Arabic should be considered. However, oil imported as relief aid has destroyed or severely retarded the development of national oil and local oil-related enterprise. Outside of the realm of natural resources, there are few legal and other services that exist to support enterprise development. PACT is involved in projects with World Vision to develop farmers’ markets in Yambio and honey production in Miridi. The staff member mentioned that the Chamber of Commerce model is known in Southern Sudan. Alliance Upper Nile is an example of an existing chamber that is currently operating. Communication challenges are preventing success stories and interesting models occurring in other parts of Africa from reaching the communities in Sudan. People know nothing of what is happening outside their own communities. There exist cooperative models of trade that have found success, such as peace markets for traders
in Yay and Rumbek. The PACT staff member did mention that some people are exhibiting entrepreneurship and are choosing to make an effort. Some herders, for example, take their cattle to Uganda and bring goods back to sell in Southern Sudan.

**Southern Sudanese IDP Focus Groups**

**Lobonok IDP camp, Juba**

**Background**

When visiting IDP camps in Southern Sudan, what was most disturbing for the researchers was the primary livelihood strategy practiced by the IDPs at Lobonok camp, located on the eastern edge of Juba a few minutes’ drive from the GOSS Assembly. There are two IDP groups of Baria ethnicity living at Lobonok camp – the first are from Eastern Equitoria and the second are a combination of Eastern and Western Equitoria.

The Eastern Baria group arrived earlier than the mixed group and made some use of local resources, mainly land and agriculture, which were available to them. Initially displaced in the early 1980’s by the conflict between the GOS and the SPLM/A, the IDPs moved to the Eastern side of Kujur Mountain, where they still had partial access to their lands and traditional livelihood strategies. In 1997, the IDPs were displaced a second time due to intrusions by the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). At the time of the study, the LRA still occupied lands at the Eastern side of Kujur Mountain. Lobonok camp is located not far from the Western side of Kujur Mountain, which was, at that time, part of the Juba ‘garrison’ under the control of the GOS.

Regular aid was provided to the IDPs by the GOS during the conflict in Southern Sudan until the signing of the CPA. The aid encouraged the IDPs to stay in the Juba area, out of reach of SPLM recruitment efforts, and also discouraged the involvement of the international community. Post-CPA, the LRA remains the major obstacle for the return of the IDPs.

Many of the IDPs experienced human rights violations and gender-based violence. IDP women and men have reiterated horrific experiences including the death of their family members and their own experiences of rape and violations. Gender-based violence was practiced through the killing of civilian women, men and children, and through abduction and rape. One woman in Lobonok IDP camp stated that both she and her daughter had been captured by the LRA and repeatedly raped over a number of days; although she survived the brutal incident, her daughter did not. Formerly pastoralists, the IDPs survived initially by collecting and selling grasses and firewood, which further subject them to rape and gender-based violence. This quickly became unsafe due to attacks on the IDPs, especially women, as they traveled further away from the camp to find scarce resources.

Now, each member of the family, from young children to the elderly, sit on the ground all day, every day, breaking large rocks into smaller ones. The sight of an entire community doing such strenuous work brought the feeling that the researchers were witnessing heavy labour at a prison camp. No tools or gloves are used and many injuries result. The rocks are collected in large bags, each selling for under $1 USD per day. A person in the camp might earn approximately $1 USD per day after a full day of breaking rocks. Ironically, their hard labour is for the benefit of the development industry; middlemen buy the rocks and sell them to builders constructing new NGO and UN buildings.

The same group of IDPs told the researchers that the location of the camp was slated for the development of another tent compound, and thus they would be relocated again. This third displacement would also serve the interests of development agencies, who would house their staff in the new tent compound. Once relocated, each family will have to again construct their *tukuls*. 
Livelihoods Strategies and Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-war Livelihood Strategies</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-war Livelihood Strategies</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stone Crushing</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent on Aid</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting Firewood/Charcoal</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting Grass</td>
<td>16%</td>
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For the IDPs of Lobonok camp, Juba, the primary pre-war livelihood was farming, with a minority of community members participating in hunting and gathering activities during the off-season. Their activities were primarily for sustenance, with any surplus taken to markets for sale. These livelihood strategies are consistent with the fact that the Baria are traditionally a pastoral tribe.

Immediately after their initial displacement, livelihoods practiced by the IDPs included collecting firewood, charcoal, dry grass and other building materials, which exposed them to gendered forms of violence. When displaced by the LRA into the Juba area, many men gained employment with the GOS and provided low-cost manual labour to the area.

Post-CPA, the IDPs who had worked with GOS have become idle. Furthermore, the influx of activity in post-CPA Juba has put pressure on the IDPs and residents of the town, restricting their access to land and resources and dramatically increasing the prices of commodities and goods in local markets. The restricted access to land in the immediate area has forced the IDPs to become dependent on income from women, who are still able to access lands on the outskirts of Juba, often in the areas frequented by the LRA. Although men were previously involved in wood and grass collection, there has been a shift in this role to women due to violence by the LRA. One elderly female focus group participant argued that women are subjected to physical violence and rape by the LRA, but men who are captured by the LRA are killed. This is one of the many difficulties the community faces when determining who will leave the camp to collect wood or grass. It represents how both women and men experience acute human suffering and psychological and social damage from the dislocation and from losing their sense of place, their culture and their social values. This is negatively affecting most women, men and children, and is impacting them in gender-specific ways.

Although 41 percent of the community stated that stone crushing is their main income strategy, it was evident by observations at Lobonok camp that, in reality, stone crushing is practiced by almost all community members, including women, the elderly and young children.

Interestingly, when asked which livelihoods they would like to adopt, many of the IDPs stated that they would like to return to farming and agriculture, yet with improved skills and technology which would allow them to become more productive so that they could increase their surplus for market. Some, especially youth, were interested in business and trade activities. The high interest in agriculture and trade reflects traditional livelihood strategies and market activity based on culturally acceptable gendered roles and activities within

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Desired Employment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming (high interest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading and business (high interest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bee harvesting (medium interest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing (if staying in the Juba area)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
their households and communities. Honey-making was also a popular livelihood, as well as tailoring. If permanent settlement occurred in the Juba area, fishing the Nile River would be possible. Most IDPs, however, wished to return to their place of origin, which would negate a fishing option. Interest in bee harvesting, tailoring and fishing may have reflected the content of previous NGO research or training initiatives. Some IDPs stated that, if they had to remain crushing stones, the use of tools or machinery might assist with their work, such as hammers and stone crushers.

Many IDPs expressed that they would like to work with the GOSS. Prior to the CPA, many of the IDPs at Lobonok camp were dependant on employment with the GOS and this response highlights this relationship. Remittances played a role in their sustenance when they first arrived at Juba. Relatives in the area provided food, small amounts of money and clothing, until the point when the IDPs began to collect charcoal and cut firewood and grass. The IDPs stated that they do have assets in their place of origin.

Concerns
The main concern of the Lobonok IDPs is the issue of security if they are to return to their village. They are very afraid of the LRA. Access to food, health care and education are also major concerns. Food and water are scarce. One woman from a focus group stated that “without food, all the people do is think about their losses, and their children are constantly crying from hunger.”

The youth expressed that education is a major challenge for them. They are tired of heavy labour associated with gathering and breaking rocks and are aware that their abilities are much greater and are being wasted. Children are going without education and social services. Shelter issues and the inability to access credit are also concerns. The lack of these resources impact all members of the community negatively; however, women tend to be more adversely impacted give the patriarchal nature of the Southern Sudanese society.

When they do return to their original villages, the focus group participants stated they are concerned about the provision of education and health, skills for well-digging and assistance in food, seeds, agricultural tools and shelter. The IDPs repeatedly placed a strong emphasis on the connection between health and education.

Existing Skills and Capacities
The IDPs at Lobonok believe that the GOSS needs to help them prior to returning to their homes and should begin immediately. During the focus group, it was mentioned that UNICEF had trained 30 IDPs – 20 men and 10 women – to bore holes for wells and maintain water pumps. A few of the focus group participants stated that they would have preferred training in constructing pumps, as well as digging and maintenance. The focus groups stated that carpentry and building skills are lacking in the community, although the demand for basic carpentry skills in Juba has decreased in favour of highly skilled workers due to the construction boom.

Repeatedly, the IDPs stated that they do not have skills applicable for the local area or for the few resources available to them. Their skills need to be re-strengthened and connected to the local market and productive resources. The researchers felt very strongly that their displacement and complete removal from traditional livelihoods has led to a severe lack of confidence in their own existing abilities.

Enterprise Activity
The IDPs at Lobonok have a good general understanding of the terminology of entrepreneurship and support enterprise development as a tool to improve livelihoods. They believe that enterprise can lead to gradual improvements in income, which in turn would be spent on food, health care, the building of schools to improve education for their children and clothing. In the words of one of the
community members, such improvements would allow the community, which as survived horrific atrocities, to “feel human again.”

At one point a local NGO, the Nile Community Development Organization (NICODO), provided five men and five women from the camp with small loans and business training. They were then able to open a small kushuk in the market, selling biscuits, dry goods, etc. Unfortunately, the market was bombed and the IDP merchants were not able to repay their loans. Although the program appeared to assist with income generation for the participants, NICODO did not continue their activities at Lobonok after the IDPs had defaulted on their loans. The women in the focus group stated that they would use loans to sell goods at market or to start a bakery to make and sell bread, if there was enough demand to sustain a business.

Women are engaged in market activity more than men. The community often decides to send women to collect and sell resources, putting them at risk of rape, instead of sending men who are at risk of death if caught by an armed militia. Children are also participating in these activities, putting their safety at risk as well.

Although not mentioned in the context of pre-war or post-war livelihoods, some IDPs stated that there are women in the camp who brew marissa. The brew, usually made from sorghum and high in vitamin B and protein, and has a long history with the communities of Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. The researchers are not aware how the conflict has affected the production of the drink.

The community felt that they needed assistance or income and training to start enterprises. Various members of the community are keen to cease dependency and move into self-reliance yet have concerns about the lack of financial services ready to engage in small enterprise with payment arrangements that suit their conditions.

**Aid and Assistance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid and Assistance Required</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-food Items</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit/Loans</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked about aid requirements, the response was clearly food. It was evident to the researchers that food was scarce for the IDPs at Lobonok. Many children appeared to be malnourished and during the focus groups it was stated repeatedly that lack of food was causing the group to suffer from hunger and illness, especially for children and the elderly.
**Constraints**
The main constraints to self-reliance for the Lobonok IDPs are:

- LRA activities prohibiting their immediate access to resources and land and keeping the community in a constant state of fear;
- Lack of identification documentation, which prevents the IDPs, particularly women, from accessing land, credit and government services; and
- Lack of access to local markets for potential trade and services.

Lobonok IDPs also face difficulties because they are viewed as a non-aligned group, leaving them in a vulnerable position. When displaced into the Juba area, the GOS provided employment and aid to the IDPs to prevent attacks by other Baria groups and to ensure that the IDPs were not recruited by the SPLM/A. Despite this, some of the IDPs stated they did in fact work for or with the SPLM, even though they were only paid in food or weapons. Now that Juba and their areas of origin fall under the administration of GOSS, the IDPs have been prevented from participation in the local economy.

**Obel IDP camp, Malakal**

**Background**
Obel Camp is located approximately one hour by bus outside the town of Malakal, in the Upper Nile Province, along the lower Sobat River. The camp is divided into four sections: Obel 1, 2, 3 & 4. It is a mixed IDP camp, with people from Baria, Farqack and other locations in the South. The IDPs have lived in Obel for approximately 21 years, since 1985. Tribes include Shuluk, Nuer, Aljwack, Marle and Dinka. The Nuer and Shuluk are, however, the dominant tribes.

Prior to the CPA, when Malakal and the surrounding areas were controlled by GOS, the Nuer were viewed as enemies and placed far from the town. Although Obel became a location for recruitment by the SPLM, there were few quarrels between the GOS at Malakal and IDPs at Obel because of the distance between the town and the camp. After the signing of the CPA, the government in Malakal fell to the GOSS and became a Nuer stronghold. Many of the Shuluk IDPs were either pressured to leave Obel or relocated to areas near the town of Malakal, residing with Shuluk tribal communities living there. Due to the tribal linkages, many of the Shuluk IDPs that relocated became economically and socially integrated into the Malakal area.
Being the dominant tribe at Obel, the Nuer either directly or indirectly pushed the Shuluk into other areas, unless they allowed themselves to become assimilated into the Nuer community. When the researchers visited Obel camp, the language used by IDP tribal leaders, including Shuluk, was Nuer.

The Battle of Malakal in November 2006 (Sudan Tribune 2006), in which approximately 150 people were killed, including civilians, was fought between the Shuluk communities who supported the pro-government South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) and the communities at Obel who were supporters of the SPLA. The SSDF was a pro-GOS militia that joined the SPLA after the CPA. There are still significant tensions and discrimination between the old factions that have led to recent clashes in Malakal and in Juba.

In the past, if there was stability in their places of origin, the community might have returned. However, this issue is not clear now and this has caused conflict with the owners of the land on which the camp rests. There also appears to be tension between the traditional or tribal authority and youth (possibly ex-combatants) at Obel. This became evident when a group of well-organized and well-dressed youth, speaking excellent English and requesting funds, approached the researchers insisting that they were responsible for providing consent for any activities in Obel camp. This group of youth completely disregarded the fact that the tribal leadership had sanctioned the research. The group appeared very well organized with a clear system of authority or rank. It is a strong likelihood that this was a group of ex-combatants, who have returned to Obel after the signing of the CPA. After much discussion, the group accepted the researchers and the research agenda, and began to discuss the topic of livelihoods at the camp.

Obel Camp struck the research team as an interesting case for many reasons, including:

- it is a protracted camp where residents have been practicing a variety of livelihood strategies;
- it is unique in that there are a number of different tribal communities living together in one area;
- IDPs have access to diverse resources, including land and the Sobat River; and
- there is clear tension between the traditional or tribal authority of the camp and youth (possibly ex-combatants).

Livelihoods Strategies and Remittances

Obel IDP camp is unique in that the residents have access to natural resources, allowing them to sustain pre-war livelihood strategies after the conflict, although not to the same degree. The researchers witnessed a variety of gendered traditional livelihoods being practiced women, men and children at Obel. Women were observed collecting and drying grasses, fishermen could be seen in small boats on the Sobat River and livestock grazed in the field at the opposite bank of the river. Obel is also home to an active market.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-war Livelihood Strategies</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herding</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-war Livelihood Strategies</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collecting Wood and Grass</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herding</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the percentage distribution of the residents involved in different livelihood strategies both before and after the conflict.
Prior to the war, the Nuer were herders, with some farmers; Shuluk were primarily fishermen, then farmers, and finally herders. It was mentioned that the collection of grass and firewood was practiced as a regular and needed activity.

Due to the location and availability of land and river, post-conflict livelihood strategies still include the similar gendered roles and activities performed by women and men, but to different degrees due to issues of insecurity. Cattle looting and killing by active militias and warring factions in the area, in which many of the Obel youth have been involved, has discouraged herding. Fishing has become more important due to the close vicinity of the Sobat River. IDP women have become more involved in main livelihood strategies due to conflict and security reasons, mainly in the collection of wood and grasses. The production of marissa, coffee and tea and other small-scale enterprises were mentioned and witnessed by the researchers. However, these were not reflected by the focus group during the proportional piling exercise.

Schools next to Obel provide basic education for the children of the camp, which has likely influenced desired employment by the focus group participants, especially girls and boys.

Few remittances are received by a small number of Obel residents. These are sent through the hawala system, with transactions likely occurring in Malakal. This system is promoted informally, through word of mouth.

Concerns
Concerns of the residents at Obel include infrastructure (electricity and roads), safe water and tools to improve productivity in work. The safety of residents and livestock and the ambiguity regarding their potential return to their place of origin and the opportunities that exist there are also concerns. Health was a concern for some in the community. It appeared that, within the camp, there is a disparity in the health of residents. This was apparent to the researchers especially among groups of children and women. Some exhibited strong external signs of protein malnutrition such as hair discoloration and peeling skin, while others did not.

Existing Skills and Capacities
It appears that the residents at Obel are skilled in traditional livelihood strategies, as well as small trade and market activity. Basic education is available, and youth have the opportunity to attend local schools.
Enterprise Activity

Many of the IDPs expressed their desire to participate in enterprise activities. There exists a small but active market at Obel, where a variety of goods and services are sold, including fish, meat, cigarettes, wood and kitchen utensils. Women are active in the Obel market, selling wood and grasses that they have collected and retail items brought in from outside markets. Women are also responsible for the production of food items including coffee and tea, based on stereotypical gendered division of labor within these communities.

Some IDPs at Obel stated that they are ready for entrepreneurship activity and training in enterprise related investment, planning and management. Brick making was suggested as a possible enterprise opportunity, which would use the abundant supply of cattle dung and would address the construction needs of the community. Irrigation systems for farming would improve productivity of farmers, possibly allowing more residents to participate in small-scale market-focused agriculture.

Microfinance, banks and revolving funds were discussed by community members, but access to these are currently non-existent at Obel. It was mentioned that there were past loan schemes with fishermen, yet these were not successful because the loans were defaulted.

Aid and Assistance

Health services and education were stated by the focus groups as the top assistance required. This reflected the desire in the community for more education opportunities beyond the primary education already provided. Health requirements reflect that the community is unable to access existing services at the town of Malakal, most likely due to distance and lack of funds and identification. Access to transportation between Malakal and Obel would improve work opportunities and market access for the IDPs.

The IDPs stated that currently there are no NGOs providing training, services or safe drinking water to the IDPs at Obel camp. The World Food Programme (WFP) delivers food twice annually at irregular intervals. The IDPs at Obel are concerned that the food aid will decrease, since the announcement that the WFP will cut food aid and shift services from IDPs in camps to returnees at their places of origin.

Constraints

Interestingly, personal safety was rated extremely high as a concern of the IDPs during the focus groups. This could reflect the dangers in the area for women collecting wood and grasses, looting of livestock and the escalating political and tribal tensions in the area. Heavy fighting which occurred in the Malakal area in November 2006, six months after the researchers visited Malakal and Obel IDP camp, justifies that the IDPs were not exaggerating their concern for personal safety.
IDPs at Akot, near Rumbek

Background
The situation of the Dinka IDPs at Akot, who originated from Pagaraw in Eastern Yirol, is very interesting in comparison to other IDPs in Southern Sudan. Akot is located approximately 30 km southeast of Rumbek, just over one hour by pick-up truck. There is no physical camp for the population. Instead, approximately 600 IDPs initially moved to Akot when the Sultan agreed to host them. The IDPs were allotted plots of land to farm and build tukuls. The arrangement required that, in return, they would farm the land and provide the crops to the Sultan. According to the Sultan, heavy rains and the search for land to settle caused many of the IDPs to disperse, leaving 390 IDPs at time of the study. It is possible that the ‘dispersed’ IDPs left Akot to find a better life, or it might be possible that they were pushed or encouraged to leave for socio-economic factors.

It should be noted that during the focus group, the Sultan of Akot was present, as well as a small number of his people. As a result, the IDPs may have been reluctant to communicate fully their concerns with the researchers, considering their living arrangement. Due to this, the researchers were particularly careful to ensure that the IDPs guide the discussion on potentially sensitive issues not related to enterprise capacity and development. These issues included specific details of current living arrangements, logistics of aid allocation and the circumstances surrounding how and why many of the IDPs in the community had come to leave.

Livelihoods Strategies and Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-war Livelihood Strategies</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herding</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing Kitchen Utensils and Pots</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Labour</td>
<td>4%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-war Livelihood Strategies</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Trading</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry and Building</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting Grass</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting Firewood</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing Marissa</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Labour</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the time of the study, the rainy season was just beginning and, therefore, most of the IDPs were not engaged in farming activities. Prior to being displaced, this particular community was primarily involved in farming, trade and herding. Fishing, production of kitchen utensils and pots and manual labour supplemented this income.

After being displaced, livelihoods once practiced as sustenance activities, such as grass and wood collection, have become opportunities to earn income. Small trade has also become important for the community, likely due to the existence of travelers passing through the town who required foodstuffs and goods. Carpentry and building have become important for the community as well and these skills were provided to the community by a Swedish NGO. Those who were trained in carpentry and present at the focus group may have unintentionally skewed the data to favour their trade, unless the larger percentage of those involved in construction reflects that most community members are involved in the building of tukuls.

There are no remittances being received by any of the IDPs at Akot and no communication with the IDPs who left Akot after initially settling there.

Concerns
One major concern for the IDP community at Akot is their desire to return to the status they held in their own lands before the conflict. Outside of their lands, they face a great deal of tension and discrimination and are often categorized as the Jur, or outsiders. As a Dinka population living in a GOS area as IDPs, they face strong discrimination. Other Dinka tribes look at the group as one which is of lower status. This analysis partially explains why some of the Dinka IDPs have managed to become employed as domestic labourers, a position which is associated with lower social status.

It is inevitable that the IDPs will have to eventually move from the arrangement they have found themselves in. Their segregation and dependence on the Sultan is not conducive to long-term settlement. The situation also appears frustrating for the Sultan and residents of Akot.

Existing Skills and Capacities
Carpentry and construction training did take place with approximately 20 of the IDPs, supervised by the Swedish organization Rädda Barnen, which advocates for the rights of children. There was no other skills training reported by the community. It appears that the IDPs, once displaced, have ceased to produce some of the kitchen utensils and pots which they had originally produced. The skills related to this former work would be well suited for production of small handicrafts, etc.
Enterprise Activity
One of the Akot IDP focus group participants produced and sold marissa to the local community. Due to her small successes, she afforded herself a slightly higher standard of living, as noted by her dress and status in the community.

The main road from Rumbek is close to where the IDPs are living. Many villages can be found dotting the road between Akot and Rumbek. Due to the traffic along the road, many vendors are engaged in small trade, retailing anything from foodstuffs and refreshments to tools and equipment. Bicycles are a common form of transportation for residents, and thus, bicycle repair facilities can be found dotting the road and appear to be doing quite a lot of business. These small shops are quite plentiful, which suggests that they are economically viable.

Aid and Assistance
When visiting the community, the Sultan stated that he was having difficulty providing for the community, as the WFP had ceased its activity at Akot. In Rumbek, however, a UN staff member stated that he was aware of an upcoming shipment of food to the community. Due to rains, the researchers were unfortunately not able to return to Akot on the delivery date to witness the amount and mode of food relief delivery. Although there are schools and health clinics in the Akot area, it is unlikely that the IDPs are able to access these for their health needs.

Constraints
The greatest constraint for the IDPs at Akot is access to their own lands. The IDPs, displaced from their lands, are now farming and giving the surplus to the Sultan of Akot. Furthermore, as Jur in Akot, they face tremendous discrimination which inhibits their opportunities.

Pulshume, near Rumbek

Background
Pulshume is a small area near Rumbek, where the researchers met with a group of residents initially from Tali, near Juba. The researchers expected to find an IDP camp at Pulshume, but instead, found a small group of Dinka led by a young woman of the tribe named Yayen Mading. To the researchers, it appeared that the community was not structured in as patriarchal a manner as some of the other communities in Southern Sudan. During the focus group session, women and men participated freely together and, at times, women dominated the focus group in a relaxed and open manner. In other IDP communities, men initially dominated the discussion and women either followed freely or required facilitation to encourage participation.
The small group at Pulshume had been displaced by conflict and had settled independently in the area approximately two years prior to the time of the research. Due to heavy rains, the focus group session was cut very short. Therefore, the following provides only a partial glimpse of the livelihood strategies and enterprise capacity of the community.

Many of the young men in the community wore modern urban clothing, which points to strong social, cultural and economic linkages between the community at Pulshume and the town of Rumbek. Children and elderly appeared happy, healthy and strong.

Livelihoods and Livelihood Obstacles
Pre-conflict livelihoods for the Dinka at Pulshume included farming, cattle, making kitchen utensils and milling grain. The residents stated that they did receive food aid support by the WFP after the signing of the CPA, including one shipment in 2005 and one in 2006. The dependence on food aid was critical, especially during times of famine when many of the tribes of Southern Sudan suffered greatly.

Land is readily available and the community stated that they are prepared to farm now that food aid is not forthcoming. Landmines present a significant obstacle to farming in many areas around Rumbek but not in the immediate area of Pulshume. The community plans to clear land and farm it after the rainy season. Initial capital, agricultural tools and seeds would assist with start-up farming activities.

Access to safe drinking water is a main concern for the residents at Pulshume, as well as the availability of health services and mosquito nets. Household items, such as mats for sleeping, are also scarce although they are readily available in Rumbek. When it rains, the community is completely immobile.

Evidence of Dependency Culture
The community stated that they were extremely hungry and required food aid; however, the researchers did not see signs of hunger in the community. In fact, the Pulshume residents were engaged in herding activities and collecting fruit which was plentiful in the area. Requests for food are possibly linked to the dependency of long-term relief aid in Southern Sudan. Relief agencies have brought changes in Dinka culture that has elicited different attitudes toward foreigners, because of the perceived powers of aid workers. For example, Jok (1999) argues that during the distribution of mostly insufficient relief goods, community representatives provide inflated population figures to try to gain greater access to supplies. Others also attempt to portray their particular communities as more needy than others. Jok further stresses that the “behavior of portraying oneself as poor and needy is a direct result of relief aid, because this is something Southern Sudanese communities try not to show under normal circumstances” (Jok 1999: 3).
Summary

Southern Sudanese women, men and children have fled their homes in massive numbers as a result of the long civil war. They reside in IDP camps, such as those in Juba, Rumbek, and Malakal, which were visited by the researchers. These groups of women, men and children have experienced displacement, trauma and violence in both similar and different ways. During the process of their displacement and settlement in camps, they confronted distinct disadvantages within their household and communities due to the disintegration of extended families, kinship and support systems. Both men and women in the Southern Sudanese communities are at a disadvantage when it comes to meeting their ‘responsibilities’ as spouses/husbands and mothers/wives. However, marginalized groups of women and children, who have already been subordinated by the structural inequalities of male dominated Sudanese society because of their gender, age and class, have been more adversely affected by displacement.

Nevertheless, the experiences of displacement have also resulted in positive transformations in the lives of Southern Sudanese. Indeed, displacement has created new responsibilities for women, as some of the research participants have attained some level of education and vocational training in IDP camps, enabling them to re-evaluate and alter oppressive gendered perceptions, roles and relationships.

Enterprise capacity as discussed during the focus groups offers a means to livelihood development and also an avenue for empowerment. Models of sustainable enterprise can facilitate economic and community development, removing barriers to overcoming marginalization at the same time as strengthening capacity for equality among and between individuals and communities of Southern Sudan.

The conflict between the GOS and Southern Sudanese forces and internally between Southern Sudanese factions cannot be viewed in isolation from the current conflict in Darfur. First and foremost, the political and military movements of the south and the structure of the CPA has directly and indirectly influenced not only the conflict in Darfur but even the nature and direction of the DPA. Secondly, the GOS, as the central military and political power in Sudan, has itself influenced the direction of both conflicts, in its direct action, political maneuvering and the manner in which it has engaged in power and resource-sharing through the two peace agreements. Finally, although many of their challenges are unique, the victims of both conflicts share many of the same challenges regarding their displacement, current dire situations and post-war reconstruction and development needs.
Section Four: Field Research Findings from Darfur

Background

Darfur in Arabic means “land of the Fur.” Darfur is the most western region of Sudan, bordering the Central African Republic, Libya and Chad. An independent sultanate for several hundred years, it was incorporated into Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces. The area of Darfur covers approximately 493,180 km² (196,555 miles²) and is home to approximately 80 tribal and ethnic groups, the majority of which are also represented in Chad. The people are primarily nomadic herders or pastoralists.

Darfur is mainly an arid plateau with Jebel Marra (the Marrah Mountains), a range volcanic peaks rising up to 3000 m (10,100 ft) in the center of the region. The landscape in Darfur include plains and sandy low hills (known as goz) in the east, the arid Sahel zone of Africa at the edge of the Sahara desert in the north, wadis (valleys) and basement rock in the west and the mountains in the east. The rainy season occurs from June to September, turning the dusty region to green. Most Darfuris are agricultural and thus highly reliant on the rains. Millet, groundnut and tumbek (tobacco) are all grown in Darfur. The three federal states of Darfur are: West Darfur, South Darfur and North Darfur. The region's main towns are Al Fasher (North Darfur), Nyala (Southern Darfur) and Geneina (Western Darfur).

Tensions in Northern Darfur were escalating for quite some time prior to the explosive conflict which displaced so many in such a short time. These conflicts are rooted in agricultural-pastoral land confrontations brought on by environmental and population changes and regional confrontations in Chad and Libya and the resulting access to weapons. The IDPs in the Al Fasher camps are from dry areas of North Darfur and many are originally Fur, Berti or Zaghawa farmers from Jebel Marra. Due to the dry conditions, many nomads moved with their cattle into agricultural lands, which led to increased tensions between nomads and pastoralists. Such lower-level conflicts provided fertile ground for the recent large-scale conflict. The explosion of conflict in Darfur, although not often discussed by humanitarian organizations or the media, has also been tied to the discovery of oil in Darfur (Zamaan Daily 2004). When looked at in a framework of historical ethnic tension, underdevelopment and the discovery of resources, the motivation and instigation of conflict share many similarities to the conflict between the GOS and Southern Sudanese movements.

The ethnic and tribal landscape of Darfur is incredibly diverse, and includes non-Arab pastoralists such as the Fur and Masalit (central-belt) and agro-pastoralists such as the Zaghawa (northwest).
Arab camel nomads, mainly the Rizeigat (divided into three clans: Umm Jalul, Mahariya and Ereigat) compete with the Zaghawa (in north Darfur). Baggara cattle herder Arabs (south of the central-belt) consist of Rizeigat, T’a’aisha, Beni Helba, Habbaniya and other tribes. Jellaba traders have populated urban centres in Darfur, holding economically important positions, although their numbers are smaller than the main nomadic and pastoral groups. Jellabas originate primarily from the Arab tribes of the Nile valley and consider themselves ethnically distinct from the nomadic Arabs of Darfur (Haaland 2005: 106).

Much press on Darfur has focused on the ‘Arab’ versus ‘African’ nature of the conflict. According to Alex de Waal, the militarized and ideological ‘Arab’ versus ‘African’ identities are the product a complex history of “national Sudanese processes, wider African and Middle Eastern processes, and political globalization” (de Waal 2005: 197). These processes “have been radically and traumatically simplified, creating a polarized ‘Arab versus African’ dichotomy that is historically bogus, but disturbingly powerful” (ibid). “The US government’s determination that the atrocities in Darfur amount to ‘genocide’ and the popular use of the terms ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ by journalists, aid agencies and diplomats, have further entrenched this polarization, to the extent that community leaders for whom the term ‘African’ would have been alien even a decade ago, now readily identify themselves as such when dealing with international interlocutors” (ibid).

The complexity of the security situation and development challenges on the ground in Darfur was outlined by a senior volunteer at a local CBO in Nyala. He stated that both Ma’alaya Arab IDPs as well as Dinka IDPs are present in Nyala, with violence occurring between the two communities. Five hundred rebels formerly with the JEM, a faction of the SLM/A, are living among the Ma’alaya IDPs. One target of the violence is the scarce water resource. For example, Janjaweed Zagat tribes have destroyed 18 water pumps, each worth about $2000 USD. Without access to water, IDPs cannot return to their areas of origin. Furthermore, the destruction of water resources has led to increased violence between Ma’alaya and Dinka groups, who are fighting for access to remaining pumps. In 2004, Ma’alaya IDPs revolted. They had not been receiving any forms of humanitarian aid and they refused to work with the GOS/HAC. OCHA and UNMIS seemed unaware of the problems. Furthermore, he stated that if community and rebel leadership based in Nyala are unable to negotiate peace, they will likely attack the government, using attacks to improve their negotiation capabilities. In effect, this is the use of guns to secure livelihoods and control over resources. The roots of the historical conflict in Darfur, according to the volunteer, are: tribalism, land tenure (tribal), marginalization, unbalanced and lack of new development and control over resources. The Abuja Peace Agreement for Darfur, signed May 5, 2006, does not appear to address these core issues.

An emerging concern among the people of Darfur is the tightening of access to financial resources; the fighting factions have created a new form of war economy that encourages looting and trafficking of illegal drugs. According to a young Masalit man from Al Riyadh IDP camp in El Geneina, West Darfur, "an hour with a gun is better than a month in the market."

**General Observations**

**Al Fasher**

The Ahfad University for Women and York University researchers first visited Al Fasher in North Darfur, one of Sudan’s largest historically rich cities. It has infrastructure which is established but deteriorating, busy markets and an active university (El-Fashir University). The local Arabic dialect and style of dress are more similar to that found in Khartoum and Omdurman than most of the other cities visited in Sudan.

11 Taken from an interview conducted by Dr. Babiker Badri in the Al Riyadh IDP camp, El Geneina, West Darfur, Nov. 2007
The researchers visited Al Fasher at the time of the signing of the DPA. Political tensions resulting from the agreement were evident by IDP protests in the camps, the unease of government and international NGO officials and appeals for calm and acceptance of the DPA on local radio broadcasts. The DPA was signed between the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), led by Mini Menawi, and the GOS. Many IDPs and their representatives feel that their demands were not addressed in the agreement, resulting in widespread protests and unrest in the camps. During the same week, political leaders who traveled from Khartoum to visit the IDP camps in Al Fasher faced protests barring them from entry into camps.

The researchers first visited the local GOS Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) office. HAC is responsible for relations with all humanitarian and development organizations and is, in effect, part of the security apparatus of Sudan. The researchers presented letters of permission from the main HAC office in Khartoum and requested letters from the local office supporting the fieldwork activities. Obtaining letters from the Al Fasher office was a long process which took a number of days. Although not explicit, it appeared that there was intent to delay the research team by requiring that the researchers type, print and photocopy several drafts of a permission letter that the HAC office eventually signed and stamped.

After obtaining the permission letter, an appointment was made to meet with HAC officers at the IDP camps, who would allow the team entry to meet with the leaders of the IDP communities. When arriving to meet the HAC officials at Abu Shoke and Al Salaam IDP camps, there were further delays and, in end, the researchers abandoned this route to the camps. It is possible that such delays are intended to discourage researchers from entering the camps, to prevent IDPs from expressing their frustrations, to prevent witnesses to the horrific conditions of the camps and/or to curb potential negative reporting which might reflect upon the GOS in Darfur. Since the study was led by Ahfad University and received a high level support from the NS DDR Commission, the denial of access reflected the large degree of political tension in Darfur at the time.

Determined to gain access to the IDPs, the researchers met with the Spanish Red Cross, the international agency responsible for the management of operations at the Abu Shouk and Zemzem camps in Al Fasher. Meeting with the Spanish Red Cross coordinators at their compound in Abu Shoke did not assist with access to the IDP camp leadership. Although the IDP leadership was at the compound for a meeting to discuss the tense situation in Darfur, the Spanish Red Cross representative provided the final barrier to entry into the camp, claiming that there was little enterprise capacity occurring and little desire to discuss enterprise and development. The visit provided insight into the tense political climate of Darfur and exposed the difficulties that relief-oriented agencies have regarding development-related activities and research in the midst of conflict and political tension. One coordinator stated that the IDP tribal leadership is

IDPs herding cattle, taken from Red Cross compound at Abu Shouk camp, Al Fasher.
weary of research activities, although the experience of the researchers in other areas of Darfur and Southern Sudan proved otherwise. After insisting that the Spanish Red Cross not deny a Sudanese-led research team from meeting with the IDPs, the research team arranged entry into the camp at a later date, so that a team of researchers (faculty and research assistants) from El Fashir University could conduct the study.

Traveling through the IDP camps of Al Fasher was a haunting experience. Thousands of condensed makeshift tents, often put together with PVC tarps and cardboard, dot the landscape. There is a lot of activity in the camps: children are everywhere, women are riding donkeys apparently moving goods from place to place and there are long line-ups of IDPs at each of the water pumps that dot the camp. In some areas, families are beginning to use mud bricks to build more permanent dwellings, a testament to their lack of hope for a quick return to their places of origin.

The markets in Al Fasher are extremely large and vibrant, evidence that an abundance of economic activity is taking place in Darfur. Trade in traditional commodities, such as tumbek (tobacco), and an extensive meat market were witnessed, a reflection on Darfur’s long history in both industries. Active markets have also grown next to the IDP camps in Al Fasher, called Souq el-Fashir (Al Fasher market), with a wide variety of goods and services traded and sold. Both IDPs and residents of Al Fasher participate in this market and both men and women appeared engaged as vendors and traders.

In the main Al Fasher market, the researchers met with a group of displaced blacksmiths, all men, who have formed a collective to support their activities (see below). The creativity and determination of these displaced tradesmen is inspiring, and shows that, even in the most difficult areas of conflict, there is opportunity to develop livelihoods using social networks as a foundation.

**Nyala**

Upon arrival at the Nyala airport, the researchers noted a heightened activity of security personnel questioning travelers, especially non-Sudanese nationals. Even with high-level authorization for this study, the researchers were met with many direct and unwelcoming questions. One UNICEF staff member was aggressively confronted by a non-uniformed security officer who demanded a passport instead of the normal UN identification tag with which UN staff members are authorized to travel. After the incident, the UNICEF staff member commented that it was not uncommon to be singled out and denied entry into Darfur as a foreign national working with a development agency, especially with mounting international pressure on the GOS regarding the Darfur crisis. Upon leaving Nyala, all passengers boarding World Food Programme (WFP) flights, including the researchers, were subjected to the same treatment.
From the airport, the researchers continued to the office of Ahlam Charity Organization, a local CBO engaged in development activities, including work with IDPs. Ahlam assisted the researchers in selecting assistants and facilitated access to the local HAC office. After brief meetings with the senior official and provision of the names of the research team, the HAC office in Nyala provided the team letters of support for the research.

Two IDP camps in Nyala were visited. When entering Otosh camp, one researcher witnessed the IDPs protesting, some even standing on the tops of shacks and makeshift buildings. Police and military arrived shortly afterwards to thwart the protest and the researcher decided to leave for safety reasons. One of the residents of the camp who had informed the research team of the protest was briefly questioned by the military as the researchers were leaving. Across town, the leadership at El Seref camp was completely unaware of the tension at Otosh Camp.

There is an active economy in Nyala, apparent by the presence of old and large markets, new hotels, etc. El Seref camp also has a small market next to it run by IDP merchants.

**Local and International Development Agencies**

In Al Fasher, the researchers met with Practical Action Sudan, formerly known as ITDG (the Intermediate Technology Development Group). The blacksmiths collective (see below) is one of the primary accomplishments of Practical Action Sudan. When asked about the opportunity for enterprise in Darfur, the senior official interviewed stated that small-scale entrepreneurship is the only opportunity for employment in Darfur. Currently, the government does not have any projects for livelihoods development and there are no large companies employing the people of the region, especially those groups who are marginalized, including women and blacksmiths. For women, Practical Action is providing technical and managerial capacity for agro-processing (jams, local juice production, vegetable dehydration or any related small business) and a revolving fund. In 2005, the fund reached 800 women and 60 million Sudanese Pounds and could be targeted at any small business activity.

In Nyala, the researchers noted many CBOs attempting to improve the lives of IDPs. Currently, the local agencies in Nyala are working on minimal budgets with volunteer staff. It was evident that the capacity of these organizations is not being nurtured, as international NGOs prefer to work directly with target populations and not through local institutions. This has, in effect, excluded the local Darfuri development community from engaging the development needs of the IDPs and general Darfur community in a sustainable manner. The highly politicized and often restricted ability of the international agencies, coupled with the lack of support and involvement of local development actors, has resulted in the lack of organization and expression of IDP and community needs. Supporting local development agencies, who understand the history, context, culture, languages and development needs of the target population, would assist in strengthening the long-term development impact. The serious consequence from the inability of the local organizations in Darfur to engage in the development process is reflected by the wealth of knowledge and understanding which, without an avenue for expression, is rendered useless. The deep understanding of the complexities of the current situation and the root causes of the conflict, as described by the volunteer in the Darfur background portion of this report (see above), reflects the importance of engaging local development actors to inform and lead the development process in Darfur.
Darfur IDP Focus Groups

The differences between IDP camps in Southern Sudan and Darfur are striking, both in size and purpose. It appears that the IDP camps in Darfur are camps of containment, rather than assistance. There is officially a dual management system of the camps by GOS/HAC with the support of the AU and international NGOs, such as the Spanish Red Cross. This arrangement has often polarized HAC officials and the international NGO community due to internal and external events and political stalemate. Sudanese organizations, such as local NGOs, CBOs and women’s organizations, have been completely excluded from management and involvement in the camps. Therefore, tension and conflict between the GOS and the international community has allowed IDPs to suffer greatly from the lack grassroots capacity for relief and development.

The analysis has shown that there are three sets of community leaders inside the IDP camps. One set of leaders are sheiks assigned by the local government authority to administer the IDPs regarding registration, aid distribution and political rallying. Most of the sheikhs do not live within the camp and, therefore, the camp is a workplace rather than their residence. Another set of leaders are assigned to the IDPs by opposition groups such as SLA/JEM. The third set of leaders is from the IDP community, usually the native administration of the various displaced tribes. The IDPs tend to refer to their native administration leadership, although these leaders rank low in the power structure compared to government or opposition leaders. Opposition support and resistance to the GOS is strong in most of the Darfur camps, especially in Gereida which is Darfur’s largest camp in Darfur.

The IDPs in Darfur are very active in markets. In fact, the researchers found large, vibrant markets at most of the Darfur IDP camps visited. Nowhere in media, both local and international, has the existence of such IDP markets been adequately communicated. The gender relations in these camps are manifested in the fact that members of nomadic herding tribes have become quite active in the markets, especially women who often use donkeys to transport goods or are engaged handicrafts production. Men often tend cattle and camels and young boys and girls tend goats and sheep, if they still have access to them in the camps. IDPs originating from farming tribes have a lesser division of labour along gender lines, as men and women often farmed together. After being displaced, it is the pastoralist IDPs who tend to work in construction, as domestic help and labourers, and are less involved as traders in the markets.

In Southern Sudan, the researchers were welcome to conduct studies with all IDP communities and to discuss a wide variety of important issues. In contrast to this, in Darfur the researchers were strongly discouraged by both HAC officials and the international NGO community from discussing the issue of return with the IDPs. This was a discouraging sign, foreshadowing long difficulties ahead for the IDPs. Already, some families are beginning to replace their makeshift tents with small brick structures, showing that they are well aware of the potential permanency of their situation.
Abu Shouk IDP camp, Al Fasher

Background
Around the city of Al Fasher there are three IDP camps (Zemzem, Abu Shouk and Al Salaam). Abu Shouk and Al Salaam are literally two extensions of the same camp. These camps are under joint administration between the HAC of the GOS and international development agencies. During the fieldwork, it was evident to the researchers that there is an active political polarization occurring, which even the INGOs have been drawn into. There is strong distrust between HAC and the INGOs, which has led to a deterioration of coordination between the two parties. The result is decreased service to the displaced communities and even violence towards NGO staff. Many local aid workers have been killed since the signing of the DPA. Caught between these polarized groups are the IDPs themselves, who are often used as a pressure tool.

Livelihoods Strategies and Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-conflict Livelihood Strategies</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming, Animal Husbandry and Trade</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
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<td>Farming and Animal Husbandry</td>
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<td>Farming and Trade</td>
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<td>Animal Husbandry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
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<td>Herding</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<th>Post-conflict Livelihood Strategies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selling Water</td>
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<td>Renting Cars for Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Working in Brick Kilns</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Animal Drawn Carts for Trade</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Consumer Commodities</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Tea/Coffee</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairdressing</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing and Selling Food</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Dry Fodder</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Firewood and Charcoal</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Animal Drugs</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The respondents mentioned that they used to practice two types of agriculture prior to the conflict. These were goze, rainy agriculture in sandy soil, and wadi, irrigated agriculture. Almost 60 percent of the community practiced both types of agriculture, 30 percent practiced solely irrigation agriculture and 15 percent practiced sandy soil agriculture. They cultivated a variety of vegetables and fruits. The entire community grew the staple durrah (corn) and a majority also grew tumbek (tobacco). Just over 30 percent of the community grew fruits and just over 20 percent grew other vegetables including sorghum, onions, radishes, okra, tomatoes, potatoes, sweet potatoes and beans.

Animals most commonly raised were sheep (20 percent), goats (16 percent), female donkeys (12 percent), camels (8 percent) and cattle (8 percent). Approximately 20 percent of the community engaged in animal husbandry and kept donkeys, sheep and goats, and 16 percent kept both donkeys and goats. Those involved in commerce/trade activities sold or traded tumbek, female donkeys and consumer commodities or had a small shop in the market to sell nuts, fruits and vegetables.

The variety of post-conflict livelihoods differs greatly from the traditional pre-conflict livelihood strategies. The Darfur IDPs were separated from their everyday practices and their familiar environment and experienced profound injustices, loss, trauma, marginalization and gender-based violence leading to drastic changes in behavior, perception and lifestyles. This immense difference can be attributed to the complete removal of the IDPs from access to land and resources and the total shift of the IDP population from rural villages to urban centres. Some post-conflict livelihoods practiced, such as domestic work and renting cars for trade are dependent on the proximity of the camp to the town of Al Fasher.

Remittances are not received by residents of Abu Shouk. If the IDPs have family living in the Al Fasher area, they may receive non-monetary support, such as lodging, food or supplies. IDPs get money to purchase food through commerce and trade, loans or credit from merchants and by offering labor such as working in brick kilns or transporting goods.

The activities listed here are viewed by the IDP focus group participants as existing income generating opportunities.

Water, a scarce and necessary resource in the camp, tops the list at 40 percent. Following it is domestic labor, transport, trade and food service opportunities. All women in the community, according to the focus group participants, are engaged in income generation activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Income Generating Activities</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selling Water</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing Clothes</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Animal Drawn Carts/Transportation</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Wood for Construction and Fuel</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Tea</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing/Barbequing Meat</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Concerns**

The IDPs at Abu Shouk have both immediate and general concerns. Not surprisingly, security concerns top the list of both.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediate Concerns</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing Food (for family)</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (for children)</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding Employment</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Concerns</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Security</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returning to Villages</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinuing Education of Children</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Personnel in the Camp</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The focus group participants stated that they want to return to their villages. However, the difficulties faced outside the camps will prevent them from doing so until conditions improve. In order to return, the IDPs state that they will require protection, security and a peaceful culture of co-existence between political and tribal factions. They also reiterated that perpetrators of human rights violations and gender-based crimes should face transitional justice measures, such as truth commissions and prosecutions. With regards to their return, the IDPs want it to be voluntary and with assistance through agricultural equipment, seeds and veterinary services.

**Existing Skills and Capacities**

Focus group participants claimed that training in solar stoves and handicrafts had occurred in the camp, but only camp leaders and their affiliates participated in this training. Most of the IDPs, only recently displaced, still have their traditional livelihoods skills and very much wish to practice them. Their adaptability, survival instinct, desire for self-reliance and hard work ethic has enabled the IDPs to develop new skills and adapt old skills to their new environment.

**Enterprise Activity**

The focus group participants stated that most of the entrepreneurs in the camp are women. Prior to displacement, women, men and children maintained gender-specific roles. Women, for instance, were mainly responsible for the majority of subsistence agricultural work while men were largely responsible for herding, fishing and hunting. After displacement, enterprises exist in the camp and can be easily seen through the daily activities of the camp residents. In Abu Shouk, most people suffer from poverty, so the social and economic benefits of a successful enterprise might do very little to improve their situation in the camp. Some of the private sector and entrepreneurship activities mentioned included:

- transportation, using cars, donkeys and carts;
- working in brick kilns;
- producing and processing food production;
- engaging in trade; and
- blacksmithing.

According to the IDPs in the focus group, some potential enterprises in the camp were unable to be sustained due to lack of finance and training. Two examples were given. First, generators were brought into the camp for power, but the entrepreneurs were unable to purchase fuel to get the generators and business going. Second, a woman who had a television set started a club where other women could pay to watch shows. Apparently, women were interested in being part of the club but a working receiver could not be sourced. Microfinance was suggested as a way to overcome the start-up barriers of these two types of enterprises. Finance is not available to the IDPs. Such services are simply not available and personal loans are difficult to attain from people outside or inside the camp due to high levels of discrimination against and between the IDPs.
Aid and Assistance
All IDPs receive relief aid, mainly in the form of sorghum, wheat, beans, oil, salt, sugar and other foods. The focus group participants stated that the community is eager to return to their villages so that they can return to self-sustaining livelihood strategies, including agriculture. Once they return, they would like assistance with tools and training in intermediate and modern technology to assist with development and productivity.

Constraints
Constraints stated by the IDPs are overwhelmingly related to livelihoods capacity. Credit or finance tops the list, followed by lack of employment opportunities, fuel and literacy and freedom of expression. Psychological problems also need to be addressed for the IDP population.

To alleviate the above constraints, the IDPs stated that finance could be provided, along with fuel or fuel alternatives. Social and psychological support, literacy and employment opportunities for those who have appropriate skills and education were also suggested.

Blacksmiths Collective, Al Fasher
In Al Fasher, the researchers met with a group of displaced blacksmiths who had formed a collective with the assistance of Practical Action Sudan (formerly known as ITDG – the Intermediate Technology Development Group). In 1990, Practical Action began to work with blacksmiths in the Kokabia locality of Al Fasher to help build capacity for their trade. This included the formation of a blacksmiths society. The blacksmiths faced numerous challenges. Many of the blacksmiths are IDPs displaced by conflict, and now reside in Al Fasher.
Furthermore, blacksmiths are a traditionally neglected group, associated with lower castes of Darfur society. These are not only ethnic and class activities, but also gendered activities, evidenced by the fact that all blacksmiths encountered were male.

Practical Action works to provide technical and managerial support, including official registration and recognition of the collective, shelter for blacksmiths that require it and space for office work, storage and training. Training covers areas of design, manufacturing, production and quality control. Practical Action also assists with the negotiation of large contract, and has helped facilitate a revolving fund consisting of credit in the form of steel. Almost all of the raw materials used are scrap metal shipped in from Khartoum – old oil drums, automotive parts and anything else that can be salvaged. Since inputs primarily consist of scrap and tools are primary, the products produced are basic, rough and unrefined.

As a collective, the blacksmiths produce mainly agricultural tools and have been producing upwards of 90,000 tools annually for various agriculture-related NGOs. According to Practical Action senior staff in Al Fasher, these collective contracts are worth upwards of 500 million Sudanese pounds annually. Individually, the blacksmiths operate as independent entrepreneurs and produce a wide variety of goods. Examples include desks made from old oil drums, traditional handicrafts and tools such as daggers and innovative traps to catch coyotes.

In 2003, when conflict erupted in Korma and Taweeleh, blacksmiths in this area scattered. Most
came to Al Fasher and were sheltered by their counterparts in the collective. A similar collective was started by Practical Action in Kanang and currently in the two societies there are over 160 members. The blacksmiths collective has also been replicated in other cities, including Dar es Salaam and Kutum.

The researchers spoke with a number of blacksmith, and heard their stories of struggle and success. One blacksmith interviewed has been able to purchase a small property and provide stability to his family. Others have found success as well, although to varying degrees. Some members are struggling financially, but find security and opportunity in the collective.

The researchers found the blacksmiths collective unique in that:

- it highlights a unique and successful cooperation between an NGO and individual entrepreneurs;
- it incorporates a mechanism of credit available to its members;
- the blacksmiths are a marginalized group, both as displaced persons and because of the discrimination associated with their caste/trade; and
- the collective model appears to be replicable to some degree of success.

The blacksmiths expressed a long term goal of constructing a communal manufacturing facility complete with electricity, smelting capability, heavy machinery and storage. This would serve the purpose of improved variety and quality of production and training. Members of the collective mentioned that they are beginning to save for such an investment. On the demand side, the collective hopes to improve their marketing. Approximately 50 percent of their current production is sold to Kasala, Kutum, Karang, Dar es Salaam, Ocar, Lagaua and Kordofan. The collective hopes that marketing efforts could create access to Khartoum, as well as regional and, possibly, international markets.

**El Seref IDP camp, Nyala**

**Background**

El Seref camp, in operation since October 15, 2004, is located on the southern outskirts of Nyala and is home to IDPs from North, East and South Darfur. It is the only camp in Nyala which has IDPs originating from Arab tribes. Its residents include Massalit from West Darfur and the Arabs of Ta’alba and Tarjem. Some members of the Janjaweed militia have originated from these tribes. There are Fur and Zaghawa IDPs in El Seref as well. The mix of IDPs at El Seref has allowed the security of the camp to have a strong
hold, keeping the camp relatively quiet compared with other Nyala camps such as Otosh, Kalma and Derej, which are inhabited by the mainly pro-resistance Fur from the East Jebel Marra mountain region. El Seref is also a newer camp located furthest from the town of Nyala, which has allowed the GOS and AU forces to implement improved security systems in the camps.

According to the tribal leaders representing the IDPs at El Seref camp, the following INGOs are present and operating: CARE, International Medical Corps (IMC), Humedica (Germany) and World Vision. Relief aid is only addressing about 50 percent of IDP needs and water scarcity is a significant problem in the camp. Amazingly, the researchers observed small plots of land next to some tents in the IDP camp, as well as some larger plots at the edges of the camp. This is a testament to the survival instinct of the Darfur tribes, who, even in times of stability, live on inhospitable land.

Due to the political tension among IDPs in Darfur, the issue of return was not discussed during the focus groups, at the request of the HAC office. The IDPs stated that government officials in the camp organize religious sessions in which the majority of the IDP population participates.

**Livelihoods Strategies and Remittances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-war Livelihood Strategies</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
<th>Post-war Livelihood Strategies</th>
<th>% of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Making Handicrafts</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herding and Animal Husbandry</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Preparing Food, Coffee and Tea</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Operating Stoves and Baking</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Collecting Firewood</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Handicrafts</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanic Work</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Tailoring and Needlework</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Butchering</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Building</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Washing Clothes</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanic Work</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prior to the conflict, approximately 70 percent of the community generated income through work, while 30 percent did not generate income. Livelihoods practiced by the IDPs at El Seref camp are gendered. Prior to the conflict were mainly farming, trade, animal husbandry and herding were practiced, with tailoring, building, handicraft production and mechanic work contributing to livelihoods to a lesser extent. It is the gendered responsibility of the women to collect wild fruits, which the Darfur community depends on, as well as firewood, a gender role that has systematically exposed women to gender-based violence.

After displacement, approximately 70 percent of the IDPs are unable to work. The 30 percent that are employed work mainly as labourers, but some are also employed in handicraft production, food/coffee/tea preparation, baking, collecting firewood, building, tailoring and needlework, trade, random and irregular labour, butchering, washing clothes, farming, and mechanic work. Men work as
labourers, such as brick kiln workers. A woman-only IDP focus groups stated that women work mainly as domestic labourers (44 percent), traders (37 percent), in construction (10 percent), in handicraft production (9 percent), and in the preparation of food/coffee/tea, collection of firewood and clothes washing. It is common for women to work in construction in Darfur. In fact, at the HAC office in Al Fasher, the researchers witnessed women working in the construction of a new building, performing activities such as digging and moving bricks and other materials. Gender stereotypical perceptions about women as ‘peaceful’ make it much easier for women IDPs to find employment due to severe security-related mobility restrictions placed on men and due to the fact that Nyala residents would not hire a man to perform domestic labour.

The IDPs at El Seref wish to adopt livelihoods in trade and farming, and to a lesser degree animal husbandry and livestock, construction, handicraft production and finally, tailoring. This is not surprising, as the IDPs have experience in trade, farming, and in animal-related livelihoods. To pursue their desired livelihood strategies, the IDPs require money, goods, scales for trade and carts, donkeys and cars for transport. Obstacles include no access to credit or cash, robbery/theft of assets and lack of transportation.

Participants in the focus groups varied on the issue of remittances. Some focus groups stated that they are not aware of any remittances being received by the residents of El Seref camp. Other groups stated that a small percentage of IDPs, possibly up to 3 percent, receive assistance from family that might be located in or near Al Fasher.

Concerns
The main concerns of the IDPs are scarcity of water and food, lack of security in the camps and in their villages and limited health and education services. Inadequate relief (limited access to relief cards and relief reduction by NGOs), limited fuel and firewood, theft of donkeys and goods (including robbery between residents of Nyala and IDPs), no access to traditional livelihood strategies and no development activities are also concerns.
Focus group participants also stated that the distance between the camp and the town of Nyala is long and without adequate transport services. Most of those who work in the city return to the camps before dark, otherwise they are targeted by looters and face robbery or killing by bandits. Women face distinct disadvantages, namely gender-based violence and systemic rape.

**Existing Skills and Capacities**

The IDPs at El Seref have experience primarily in trade and animals. Alternative skills that can generate income include brick making, working as porters (carrying things from place to place) and general labour. The IDPs noted that they were not aware of any training in the camp despite the heavy presence of the government and international NGOs.

**Enterprise Activity**

The IDPs view enterprises as a way to improve livelihoods. Enterprises do exist in the camps according to the focus group participants. Entrepreneurs often work alone or in groups. Some are involved in the trade of goods from Nyala or handicraft production. When asked what capacity is needed for starting and sustaining small enterprise, a group of women IDPs overwhelming exclaimed, “we do not want blankets... we want credit.” Outside of credit, training is also required by the IDPs to start and sustain enterprise.

Active markets exist in all the camps of Darfur including El Seref, where a small market of IDP vendors provides goods and services to the camp. In the market, the researchers found handicrafts being produced and sold, a coffee/tea vendor, a butcher and meat BBQ vendor and a vendor selling canned and consumer goods. According to the IDPs, enterprises which can be profitable are brick making, working as porters and trading in retail goods from Nyala. Currently, there are no finance or credit services available to the IDPs.

**Aid and Assistance**

Food is received solely through relief aid. Food relief consists of wheat, sorghum, oil, bisselah (beans), lentils and salt. The focus group made it clear that sugar is not received by families in the camp. The IDPs feel that they will be able to become independent of aid once the conflict has subsided (implying return to their lands). Although the IDPs stated that food is received from aid only, some IDPs were attempting to sew land in and around the camp. Some meat and foodstuffs were also sold in the adjacent market which serves camp residents.

**Constraints**

Obstacles to achieving desired livelihoods, as stated by the IDPs, include lack of credit, lack of cash, theft of assets and lack of transportation. Of course, security concerns preventing men from working and putting men and women in danger are major constraints for the IDPs at El Seref camp.
Summary

After generations of low-level conflict between different herding and pastoral communities, often resolved through traditional mechanisms, Darfur has become an area of explosive conflict. Almost two million people in Darfur have suffered massive and violent displacement. The IDPs are, for the most part, warehoused in large urban camps where they face political and economic uncertainty, limited access to basic necessities including personal security and water, multiple layers of often ambiguous GOS and opposition authority and the inability to express their political aspirations. The intense international political pressure on the GOS is reflected in hostility between the GOS and INGOs and also serves to keep the local development community out of the equation. Relief-focused agencies with a mandate to provide necessities in conflict environments have difficulty recognizing and strengthening the existing capacity for enterprise development for IDPs and the local Darfur community.

The conflict in Darfur has worsened economic and social conditions that were tenuous to begin with. The traumatic experiences of impoverishment and displacement have restricted men’s and women’s access to economic activities such as agricultural, pastoral and trading work. It has, however, simultaneously opened a new range of opportunities, particularly for women, to engage in informal sector activities such as selling foodstuff and trading, which have enabled them to provide for their families. Indeed, in the absence and or incapacity of male labour, women in Darfur have adopted new economic roles, learned new skills and assumed leadership in their households. This transformation can be harnessed through enterprise development, first as a means of transition and then as a means for sustained development.

Finally, it is important that the Darfur crisis be viewed in conjunction with wider conflicts in Sudan and in bordering countries, both of which destabilize Darfur and fuel the conflict. Peace agreement models, if not truly inclusive and comprehensive, will undoubtedly lead to continued conflict and splintering of marginal opposition groups. Furthermore, if the underlying root causes, such as underdevelopment and unequal resource allocation, are not addressed, peace will have little chance at success. On a positive note, the fact that the local Darfur development community has yet to become engaged in the development process reveals that there is a wealth of knowledge, understanding and experience which can be utilized in the development process. Local actors are essential for the creation of sustainable models of enterprise development, both in the identification of opportunities and markets and in the understanding of the needs and capabilities of IDPs.
Section 5: Conclusions & Recommendations

Common Concerns
In both Southern Sudan and Darfur, there are critical concerns as well as emerging opportunities when considering grassroots enterprise development. Although each region is different politically, historically, culturally, ethnically, environmentally and in terms of customs and language, there are issues of concern which apply to both Darfur and the South. These common concerns include the environment, gender, security and land tenure and rights.

Environment
Due to natural factors, conflict and the concentration of displaced populations, there is a depletion of natural resources in many areas of the South and Darfur. IDPs displaced from their lands have turned to collecting wood for charcoal, building and fuel. The environment is affected, especially in Darfur, where desertification also contributes to conflict and resource depletion. Once resources become scarce, added tension often results between IDPs and local communities. This is not only experienced by IDPs. In Darfur, nomadic tribes driven by the expansion of the desert will graze their cattle on pastoral land, aggravating existing tensions over resource scarcity. The destruction of villages, the warehousing of millions of IDPs and activities surrounding the extraction of petroleum and other resources has had severe environmental repercussions which need to be addressed.

Gender
Displaced females are among the most marginalized in Sudan. Not only do they face the same challenges as other IDPs, but they have also been subjected to added suffering based on their gender. Widespread rape and attacks on women and girls has occurred in both Southern Sudan and Darfur. In the South, women IDPs seem to take more responsibility for the well-being of children and in Darfur, women IDPs are responsible for much of the income generation as men are seriously prohibited from economic participation due to mobility restrictions. Girls cannot be overshadowed by the focus on women and the concerns of special groups, such as women and girl combatants, must be seriously considered.

Extreme violence associated with displacement in Southern Sudan and Darfur has had extremely negative, but also potentially positive, consequences for the IDPs lives. A significant number of the women indicated that their experiences of forced displacement have caused physical dislocation, disruption of social and cultural traditions and material dispossession. In particular, the women IDPs
were separated from their everyday practices and their familiar environment and experienced profound injustices, loss, trauma, marginalization and gender-based violence. However, the experiences of displacement have created new responsibilities for women who have become the sole breadwinners in their households. Women’s newly acquired skills and roles challenge patriarchal values and the structures that have historically discriminated against them.

**Security**

Security dynamics are very different in both Southern Sudan and Darfur, but they are extremely important to each and are contextualized in detail throughout this report. In Southern Sudan, ongoing conflict in areas of the south, the presence of a large number of combatants yet to be decommissioned and landmines are a threat to the security of IDPs and the general population. In Darfur, the threat is more immediate. Conflict is still ongoing between rival factions and the GOS; in one instance a researcher witnessed the police and military attempting to thwart demonstrations in Otoosh camp, Nyala. The IDPs are not safe in their camps, in the areas surrounding their camps or in their villages. Perhaps the most challenging factor for sustainable enterprise development in Darfur and Southern Sudan will be the logistics of developing and launching future interventions in complex, ever-changing environments which are likely to face at least some degree of conflict for a very long time.

**Land Tenure and Rights**

Land tenure and property rights issues are of great concern. In Southern Sudan, there are many claims to inhabited land by returnees, a complete lack of documentation and registry and no operational institution to effectively settle these claims. Communal land versus property rights is an ongoing and complex debate with severe implications for the types of enterprise which can be developed, especially in Southern Sudan. Land rights will also be an important issue to address in Darfur, especially if the next generation of IDPs are born and raised outside their tribal villages. In both areas, conflict between pastoral and nomadic tribes, as well as restricted access to trade routes, must be addressed.

**Southern Sudan**

**Major Concerns**

The signing of the CPA has brought significant changes to Southern Sudan. The GOSS has formed and is starting to build capacity with the help of the international community. Overall, there is increased economic and development activity. Post-war Southern Sudan, however, is still not without conflict and other challenges. Some of the main considerations in the development of grassroots enterprise and SLENs in Southern Sudan include differentiation between communities, socio-economic issues and the current status of the DDR process.

**Differentiation Between Communities**

Differentiation between different groups has become a major challenge for issues of integration, resettlement, peace and stability at the grassroots level. Southern Sudanese who remained during the war, IDPs in SPLA controlled areas, IDPs in the south in the GOS controlled areas, IDPs from Northern Sudan and refugees from Uganda, Kenya, CAR, Egypt and even Europe and North America are all affected by differentiation. The concept of the *Jur*, or outsider, has been used to label those Southern Sudanese who are now returning. Often originating from the same communities, those labeled as *Jur* are disconnected from the benefit of social linkages. Interestingly, the IDPs in Equatoria who sought refuge in the same area are not facing the same degree of discrimination. Enterprise projects focused on agriculture, for example, can quickly improve social linkages among these IDPs and other communities.
Socio-economic Issues
Socio-economic issues in Southern Sudan include the dependency culture in Baher Al-Ghazal area, the presence of land mines in roads and fields in Equatoria and issues surrounding land tenure, property rights and access.

IDPs who are receiving even basic health, education and relief services, especially those communities who have been receiving these for a prolonged period of time, will be reluctant to return to their areas of origin in rural Southern Sudan where these services may not be offered. This goes beyond dependency on aid alone, as most IDP youth in Southern Sudan were born in camps, many of which are located in urban areas where health and education services and employment opportunities are greater than what are found in their original villages.

In addition, land mines are a major obstacle for communities of Southern Sudan with regards to safety and livelihoods development. Just as existing communities are restricted by land mines, returnees in many areas will find that they are unable to practice pastoral or herding livelihood strategies due to land mines. Unfortunately, current de-mining practices by the UN are focused solely on roads. Although this will benefit trade, open markets and allow the GOSS and the UN to expand their services and operation, it does little for the most marginalized communities of the south. Land mine clearance and provision of services would encourage return.

Land tenure and property rights issues are extremely complex and important issues that need to be addressed. Many people in Southern Sudan are in limbo, unaware of how they will settle their land claims. The lack of an operational property registry and system of resolving land claims will prolong conflict over land and retard small-scale agricultural enterprise development. Already, returnees are facing conflict as they return to their lands now inhabited by other people. Furthermore, tribal or communal ownership of lands raises questions with regards to enterprise development – including land management, ownership and control of production and surplus, entrepreneur incentive and community power dynamics – all which can interfere in the development of enterprise. The GOSS should continue to work hard on the land tenure issue and ensure equality for IDPs from GOS and SPLM/A areas who will be settling in Southern Sudan.

DDR Status
The DDR status is worrisome. At the time of the research, there were no ex-combatants in Sudan. The DDR process appears to be in stalemate and this has immense implications for security. Most combatants were still affiliated with their commanders in the field. In Rumbek, the researchers met with ex-combatants using trucks belonging to their units for enterprise purposes. These youth were frustrated, waiting for overdue salaries, and stated that they were prepared to participate in conflict if it were to ever resume. Still, they desired a life outside of combat and were very interested in future opportunities for enterprise development as a way to transition from a combatant livelihood strategy to one of independence and community development. At the time of publication, preliminary efforts to create livelihood opportunities through enterprise for demobilized combatants had begun in Blue Nile state.

Emerging Themes
From the fieldwork conducted in Southern Sudan, a variety of positive themes emerged with regards to the development of sustainable enterprise. These include:

- a wealth of natural resources;
- a strong desire for post-war livelihoods;
- encouragement for the return of displaced persons;
- existing enterprise capacities;
- an active financial sector; enterprise/market activity; and
- engagement of the local private sector.
A Wealth of Natural Resources
Southern Sudan is extremely wealthy in natural resources which can be utilized for grassroots enterprise. In many areas of the South, the soil and climate are conducive for a variety of agriculture. There is access to rivers, so both irrigation and rain-fed agriculture are possible, as well as fishing. There is ample land for grazing, providing for a variety of available livelihood strategies.

Strong Desire for Post-war Development
There is a strong desire for post-war development in all communities in Southern Sudan. From GOSS officials to entrepreneurs and IDPs, there is a realization that there currently exists support and an opportunity for development. The various communities of the south realize the challenges, sensitivities and complexities associated with conflict and post-war reconstruction and are very open to exploring new and holistic development approaches and models.

Encouragement for the Return of Displaced Persons
The GOSS, GOS and the international community, as part of the CPA, are encouraging the return and reintegration of IDPs to their areas of origin. In Juba, the researchers met with refugees who have returned to Southern Sudan from Kenya. Although the tensions created by land rights and discrimination are immense challenges, perhaps there will be no other time when the desires of national and international actors and the displaced community are better aligned for the return of displaced Southern Sudanese.

Existing Enterprise Capacities
There is enterprise capacity among many of the displaced communities in Southern Sudan. In the camps where IDPs have had access to land and markets, such as at Obel camp in Malakal, enterprise capacity is much stronger. At Lobonok camp in Juba, enterprise capacity is restricted due to the lack of access to land and markets. Still, the Lobonok IDPs cite examples of training and market participation which their own community have been involved with. Although at risk of magnification in Darfur, the dependency culture created by relief efforts in Southern Sudan is slowly deteriorating post-CPA due to a reduction of WFP and UN aid and an increased focus on development.

Active Financial Sector
Although it is reported that banks in Sudan are required to channel a minimum of ten percent of their loans to microfinance, it is difficult to find evidence of this. Currently, there are but a handful of organizations providing microfinance in Sudan, many as part of small-scale cooperative models serving members in the thousands (FAO 2005). Organizations currently providing microfinance in Southern Sudan, such ACORD, along with experienced regional and international institutions such as the World Bank and Développement international Desjardins (DID), can work with IDPs and communities in the south to develop appropriate microfinance.
An active financial sector, including the emergence of Southern-based banks, holds great potential for development in Southern Sudan. Executives at the Nile Bank in Juba, for example, have stated their intention of developing microfinance services for IDPs and the local community, who are currently unable to access finance due to lack of collateral or credit history. The Nile Bank is considering microfinance models used in Uganda and relationships with East and South African banks to implement such services.

**Enterprise/Market Activity**

Since the signing of the CPA, enterprise and market activity has grown tremendously. Much of the trade and market activity is from Uganda and Kenya; however, there is a growing local community of entrepreneurs. In Juba, the researchers met with a woman entrepreneur of Zanvy origin who has achieved social and economic success and acceptance by the local Baria population due to her activities in the local market. This particular entrepreneur grows and sells pineapples and claims that her success is due to her ability to control production, transportation, distribution and sale of the product. Access to markets is limiting the development and growth of enterprise at Obel camp and, although Lobonok IDP camp is in close proximity to Juba markets, IDPs are not able to access local resources. It appears that both camps face challenges due to their location in relation to urban areas, which may be a determining factor in access to (or interference with) resources and markets.

**Engagement of Local Private Sector**

There exists in Southern Sudan a wealth of potential from the engagement of local private sector actors. Although much of the private sector activity in Southern Sudan is overwhelmed by East African players, there are strong Sudanese corporations which can play a role in the development of grassroots enterprise capacity in the area. The Haggar Group of Companies, for example, has history, reach and proven commitment to the development of the private sector in Southern Sudan. In fact, when meeting with the researchers, the Chairman of the Haggar Group of Companies expressed his long-term interest in enterprise development for poverty alleviation and private sector approaches to development. Such players have the capacity to work with, and spawn, enterprise for high risk and marginalized populations.

**Recommendations for Enterprise Development**

Grassroots enterprise development has the opportunity to address a variety of post-war reconstruction needs. In Southern Sudan, it is the hope that enterprise development will help rebuild livelihoods, communities and the relationships between them. Education will be a critical factor in both the decision of IDPs to return to their lands, as well as for the development of Southern Sudan. Institutions focused on general training and the teaching of specialized skills are required and will assist in the reintegration of IDPs, ex-combatants and others affected by the war who want to take part in the development of their communities. Although some institutions, such as Ahfad University for Women, are planning Community Development Centres in the South, there are relatively few universities or other institutions providing the same services. Such initiatives can support the development of enterprise-focused curriculum, offer specialized training in enterprise development and offer training in specific trades and technology, including agricultural extension. Private or public institutions and public-private partnerships could fill this role effectively.

Furthermore, it cannot be stressed enough that the development of microfinance capacity for residents of Southern Sudan, especially marginalized groups such as IDPs and ex-combatants, will be required as an important enabler of enterprise. Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) can take a variety of forms, including banks and cooperatives. In East Africa and parts of Sudan, it appears that the cooperative form of microfinance is more popular.

In many IDP communities of Southern Sudan, women expressed that they take the majority of responsibility for the welfare of children. Income generated by women is directed to children and the
family, whereas men often spend a proportion of their income on alcohol or other discretionary expenses. In Southern Sudan, enterprises should be developed that will engage women effectively and safely, yet should not exclude men. Although IDPs and ex-combatants are the intended target for the development of grassroots sustainable enterprise, the communities they will settle in must be equitably included, to increase social linkages and opportunities for conflict transformation instead of aggravating tension and conflict due to segregation and unequal development.

Effective and critical systems of measurement must be developed to determine which enterprises are improving opportunities, empowering marginalized groups and contributing to improved livelihoods and conflict transformation. There are two main areas of consideration for grassroots enterprise development in Southern Sudan:

- enterprise addressing development needs; and
- enterprise models built around traditional livelihood strategies

**Enterprise Addressing Development Needs**

In the current phase of post-war reconstruction in Southern Sudan, a variety of development needs are required for all communities, from IDPs and returnees to rural villages and urban centres. Grassroots enterprise can address these needs, which include clean water, health services, de-mining, appropriate building materials, energy and communication in rural areas.

Water filtration and distribution enterprises should be considered for Southern Sudan. According to the Deputy Minister of Health, GOSS, clean water is the greatest health threat to Southern Sudanese and, unfortunately, a planned water plant will not service communities outside of Juba. In many areas of Southern Sudan, the researchers were told of cholera outbreaks and witnessed unclean water sources. At the Juba market, bottled water imported from Uganda and Kenya was simply too expensive for the local population to afford. Rivers run throughout Southern Sudan and would be able to provide input for small-scale water filtration and distribution enterprises, which could service both urban and rural communities.

In addition to water services, health clinics servicing rural communities would not only improve the health and health-related knowledge of rural Southern Sudan but would also be an incentive for IDPs to return to their areas of origin without the fear of their children losing health services. The Deputy Minister of Health strongly believes that rural communities in GOSS areas are able to pay for health services, as they often spend large sums of money to transport ill children to urban health centres.

Enterprises able to deliver de-mining services for agricultural land and roads would also be of great value to all communities in Southern Sudan. These enterprises could be well suited for disciplined ex...
-combatants. Since UNMIS are focusing on de-mining roads and will not begin work on farmland for at least ten years, there are opportunities for private de-mining. The benefits of such enterprise for conflict transformation, engagement of ex-combatants and resettlement of returnees are substantial.

In most of Southern Sudan, traditional building methods are used for construction of tukuls. Due to conflict and factors resulting from conflict, natural resources used in construction, such as grasses and wood, are often scarce. Reliance on such materials for post-war livelihoods has led to resource depletion, environmental damage and increased conflict over scarce resources. Non-residential urban construction projects often use bricks manufactured in large kilns or import cement. Already, entrepreneurs in different parts of Sudan have developed a variety of appropriate building materials for pro-poor rural and urban residential construction. At Obel camp near Malakal for example, one IDP suggested that the abundance of cattle dung could supply small-scale brick makers serving the IDP and Malakal community. Working with local entrepreneurs to develop appropriate and marketable building materials will address a variety of community and environmental concerns.

Energy will also play a vital role in the development of Southern Sudan. Electricity is partially available in Southern Sudan, primarily through generators, although there are plans for expansion of power facilities in urban centres. However, most residents and communities in the south go without power. Development of enterprise models which can provide energy to urban residents and rural villages can support other enterprise activities, such as communication, and can help to improve the quality of life. If energy can be channeled to specific purposes, such as ovens for cooking, this will enable communities to decrease their dependence on wood for fuel, which will have positive environmental and health effects and will increase enterprise opportunities.

Mobile phone service is available in urban centres of Southern Sudan yet it is unreliable. In Rumbek, a local mobile network has been established, but it is not connected nationally and only services the immediate area. Internet is available in Southern Sudan through UN agencies for their own staff members. Where foreign workers find accommodation, internet time can be purchased at $1 USD per six or seven minutes, which is far too expensive for locals to access. In the very near future, it is likely that national and regional networks will service urban areas of the south; however, communication infrastructures in rural areas will likely lag behind. Enterprise models, such as mobile village phones, can service populations who are returning to their areas of origin yet have family or other contacts in the urban centres where their camps were located. Khartoum IDPs returning to the south could represent a potential market for communication services, given that the use of mobile phones is considered a normal way of life in Khartoum and these IDPs will be accustomed to mobile communication. Communication services, including mobile networks and internet, can also support enterprise development by providing health and market related data.

**Enterprise Models Built Around Traditional Livelihoods Strategies**

Traditional livelihood strategies are widely practiced in Southern Sudan and are desired by IDPs. Southern Sudanese, originating from pastoralist or nomadic tribes, are interested in developing skills and capacity and gaining access to lands and resources to once again practice traditional livelihoods, such as farming and herding. IDPs from Khartoum, or those who have settled in urban areas in Southern Sudan, will be aware of the potential modern enterprise can have for development. These communities will be keen to apply or develop enterprise models which will allow them to practice traditional livelihood strategies, participate in markets and develop their communities and opportunities for their children. It will be especially important for enterprises and enterprise models built around traditional livelihood strategies to be sensitive to existing social customs. The objective of such enterprise should be to enhance quality of life and opportunities for development by increasing social networks and linkages while not destroying traditions and customs important to the social fabric of communities.

Small plots, joint plots and community cooperatives, using the most efficient irrigation or rain-fed agriculture techniques, could provide opportunities for training in agriculture production and
marketing for those communities long-removed from such activities or where land is communal. These initiatives could eventually lead to individually or family operated enterprises. A variety of related enterprise, such as canning, jams, dried fruit, oils, specialty herbs and spices and soaps can add value and breadth to development of agriculture and markets in Southern Sudan. When considering such enterprise, access to markets and the support of training and technology are crucial.

Great potential exists in Southern Sudan for livestock and related enterprise. Cattle is a sign of social wealth in Southern Sudan and many herders would not sell or trade more than the minimum number of livestock required to meet their other needs. Hundreds of cattle might be given as a dowry in a wedding, yet the same herders would not dare take their cattle to market. Introducing enterprise models for livestock production and related enterprises, including meat processing and leather, while still retaining social traditions, might appeal to returnees wanting to practice traditional strategies and still participate in trade and markets. Sensitivity to the social importance of cattle when introducing trade and livestock related enterprise models will be important and must be developed with direction and involvement of communities at the grassroots level.

**Darfur**

**Major Concerns**
Darfur is an entirely different case than Southern Sudan. The recent DPA is still very fragile and conflict is ongoing between the groups who have signed the agreement, as well with other groups who have not. Millions of displaced are suffering, frustrated and want to move to self-reliant livelihood strategies. Some of the main considerations in the development of grassroots enterprise and SLENs in Darfur include:

- access to traditional livelihood strategies;
- security and safety; and
- representation and participation.
Access to Traditional Livelihoods Strategies

The significance of the recent displacement and removal from their traditional livelihoods has shattered the lives of the IDPs. Where many communities in the south have had years, even decades, to adjust to and develop new livelihood strategies, the Darfur IDPs have been thrown into a situation where they are struggling to survive on a daily basis. Millions of displaced people in Darfur are unable to access their land, villages and markets and have lost their livestock and assets. They are unable to resume their traditional trading and migratory routes. Thus, many IDPs who once traded within Darfur, and even to Chad and Libya, are unable to do so. Labour migration to Libya has ceased and so have the remittances associated with them. IDPs are in a period of immense instability, fear and daily struggle for survival. The fact that the topic of return is a discouraged topic of discussion indicates that they are likely going to be kept in this situation for a long period of time. Already, some IDPs in Darfur are beginning to replace their makeshift tents with small brick structures, a testament to the potential permanency of their situation.

Security and Safety

Security concerns in Darfur are complex, multi-faceted and many-leveled. There is a need for protection, documentation of human rights abuses and the guarantee of safety for IDPs. Presently, the presence of conflicting parties – opposition forces, government agents and, in some camps, Janjaweed – poses a threat to the stability of the camps and the personal safety of IDPs. The GOS is not considered by the IDPs to be a protection force and is not trusted by the IDP community. Furthermore, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) suffers from limited scope and a reputation tattered from continual accusations of abuses committed against the IDPs. Immediate concerns include security inside and around the camps, prevention of travel outside the camps for men and limited access to markets and trade. Of course, the IDPs are greatly concerned about safety and security in their villages and hope that peace will bring secured stability so that they can return to their lands and livelihoods as soon as possible. The emerging war economy in Darfur is of increasing concern; it adds yet another layer of security risk and will require political resolve and resources for disarmament.

Representation and Participation

IDPs in Darfur have been unable, discouraged or prevented from organizing to express their ideas, demands, experiences and aspirations. When considering grassroots networks for the development of sustainable enterprise such organization is very important. Living in a harsh, fast-changing and often politically volatile environment, IDPs in Darfur must be involved in the processes which are to determine their existence.

Although there are immense development and humanitarian challenges in Darfur, relief efforts have completely excluded existing Sudanese capacity to address these issues. Local and national Sudanese organizations, better able to understand the history, cultures, conflicts and opportunities for development in Darfur, are excluded from the relief and development process. Currently, many international organizations choose to skip local actors in favour of working directly with IDP communities in the provision of relief aid and services – at many levels this is simply not sustainable. The focus on relief aid alone completely overlooks existing capacities for self-reliance and may even work to undermine these opportunities. Working with local actors to build in-country capacity can provide access and legitimacy, determine opportunities and build strong social capital which may provide further access and security. Engagement of researchers, especially local academia, could ensure that opportunities for replication of successful enterprise interventions do not go unnoticed and will advance the debate on grassroots enterprise development and the opportunity for post-war reconstruction and peace building. IDPs want development and wish to be part of the development process. International agencies are also frequently involved in political tensions, which affect their operations and credibility in Sudan. The inability of IDPs and local actors to engage at the grassroots
level also allows the international community to propagate a curtailed image of the displaced in Darfur. The image broadcast strongly focuses on relief shortcomings and ignores development capacity.

**Emerging Themes**

In Darfur, the researchers found a variety of positive themes with regards to development of sustainable enterprise, including:

- entrepreneurial spirit and desire for self-reliance;
- existing skills;
- understanding of enterprise enablers; and
- existence and participation in IDP camp markets.

**Entrepreneurial Spirit and Desire for Self-reliance**

The entrepreneurial spirit of IDPs in all areas of Darfur is astonishing. From the blacksmith collective in Al Fasher to IDPs in El Seref, the researchers found a determined, energetic and creative population wanting to control their modes of income generation. In Abu Shouk camp near Al Fasher alone, IDPs herded cattle, transported goods by donkey to markets in the camp and even sold nuts to other IDPs at busy water pumps. All focus group participants expressed a strong desire for self-reliance, a testament to the long history of trade and self-reliance of the people of Darfur.

**Existing Skills**

In Darfur, the researchers found a strong skill-set among IDPs, applicable to a wide variety of enterprises. With appropriate enterprise models and market access, the IDPs are able to successfully apply their skills in Darfur, as exemplified by the blacksmiths and IDPs participating in camp markets. It cannot be stressed enough that the IDPs brought with them the skills and vigour required for survival in difficult environments. Their recent displacement and current living conditions have created a need-driven atmosphere where IDPs are desperate to use their skills and the little resources they have to provide for their families.

**Understanding of Enterprise Enablers**

Credit is understood by the IDPs in Darfur as a critical enabler of enterprise. Wherever they visited in Darfur, the researchers were told that finance, market access, proper tools and equipment and training are required for successful enterprise. In El Seref camp in Nyala, a group of women IDPs stated strongly that they do not want relief items but instead require credit for income generating activities.
Existence and Participation in IDP Camp Markets

Even in their difficult political and environmental climate, Darfur IDPs are participating in the large markets which have developed at the camps and many are working in adjacent towns. Since travel is restricted for many IDPs, especially men, the camp markets serve as intermediary markets between the IDPs and the town. The opportunity presented by the existence of the markets is excellent for the development, testing and incubation of enterprise.

Recommendations for Enterprise Development

Enterprise development for IDPs in the complex and rapidly-changing Darfur environment will prove to be a challenging but vital undertaking. Political instability, no access to resources and traditional livelihoods, lack of mobility, disconnection from managing their own affairs, insecurity of IDPs, the relief-focus of the international community and the ambiguity over their return are forbidding obstacles. Yet the development and participation of IDPs in camp markets, existing skills among IDPs, their desire for self-reliance and their survival spirit are encouraging themes which can become foundations for enterprise development and the beginnings of an improved life.

Without knowing when or under what circumstances the IDPs will return, skills and enterprises should be adaptable to both the urban IDP camp environment as well as rural villages. Security for women and increased mobility for men are important considerations. The availability of microfinance services for IDPs in Darfur is critical and has been stated by the focus groups in Darfur as necessary for self-reliance. Since local Darfur and Sudanese organizations are mostly excluded from involvement with IDPs in Darfur, and the IDPs face various layers of leadership in the camps that represent various political interests, it is essential that a local organization be developed by or with the IDPs. This organization could be in the form of an NGO, CBO or an umbrella organization focused on the development of grassroots enterprise where IDPs can organize, express their desires and connect with MFIs, universities and training centres, NGOs, governments and the local private sector.

Women in Darfur have a long history of involvement in trade, enterprise and modes of production. After displacement, women have become involved in camp markets and often have access to urban centres near the IDP camps as domestic labourers. Such participation and access to the urban centres makes the women excellent candidates for enterprise development. Men are often restricted from being mobile due to security measures and thus have fewer enterprise options open to them, but are still able to participate in camp markets. Enterprise development focusing on women will bring the most benefit to the IDPs in Darfur. Men should not, however, be excluded from such activities. Initiatives should be careful not to empower specific groups in the IDP camps but should instead be spread among different tribes and groups. Communities of non-IDPs located near...
the camps might also benefit from such initiatives, especially if they will lead to social and economic linkages and facilitate market access and trade between IDP camps and surrounding urban centres.

Infrastructure is an important consideration for enterprise development in Darfur. Roads between camps, villages and towns can facilitate trade in primary and barter markets, create secondary markets and allow camp markets to flourish. Improvements in roads and traffic can also increase economic and social linkages between different groups in Darfur, helping to reduce local and community conflicts and encourage peaceful existence.

For the IDPs, health and education services, provided publicly, privately or through private-public partnerships, will be essential to encourage return, as these services are provided in camps and are currently not available in rural villages where the IDPs originate.

Effective and critical systems of measurement must be developed to determine which enterprises are improving opportunities, empowering marginalized groups and contributing to grassroots livelihoods and conflict transformation. Three areas for grassroots enterprise development in Darfur include:

- enterprise addressing the immediate needs of encamped IDPs;
- enterprise addressing development needs; and
- enterprise models adaptable to traditional livelihood strategies.

Enterprise Addressing Immediate Needs of Encamped IDPs

Water distribution enterprises for IDPs in Darfur can address the immediate needs of the camp residents. Although water pumps exist in the camps of Darfur, the supply of water is not enough to meet the demands of the ever-increasing IDP camps. Water continues to be a scarce resource and enterprise models for water distribution can service the needs of IDPs. In Al Fasher, there are water distribution companies which deliver to homes of residents who can afford it. In the Palestinian refugee camps of Beirut, for example, water is delivered to storefronts inside the camps, which in turn sell different levels of distilled water to the refugees. Less distilled water is used for washing while more expensive, highly distilled water is used for cooking and drinking. Such a system might successfully address the needs of the IDPs in the Darfur camps and might also be transferable to their locations of origin once return is possible.

Currently, the majority of food in the camps is received through relief aid. IDPs stated that the food aid received is not sufficient and that they require more and different types of food. There is a need for market-based food distribution in the camps and this need will only increase when relief efforts decrease and agriculture and livestock-related enterprise can be effectively developed.

Enterprise Addressing Development Needs

Transportation enterprises facilitating the trade of goods should also be considered for development for IDPs in Darfur. Many IDPs stated that they would be better able to participate in local trade and market activity if they had access to donkeys, carts or vehicles. Important considerations for such enterprises include security for women engaged in transport, as well as theft of donkeys, carts or goods. Men groups stated that vehicle rentals are available for trading purposes but it was unclear who owns the vehicles or how rental services are implemented.

IDPs in the camps of Darfur are living in makeshift tents, unlike the traditional and more secure tukuls in which most IDPs in Southern Sudan currently reside. Recent displacement has not afforded the IDPs the opportunity to build more stable residences and, due to extreme competition for natural resources in the area of the camps, most building resources such as wood and grasses have been depleted or it is unsafe for women to collect them. Some IDPs have begun to replace their tents with
small buildings made of locally produced bricks, providing their families with better shelter and security. Small-scale brick production enterprises can provide the IDPs and surrounding communities with building materials that do not draw upon scarce resources, will assist with the development of more suitable and stable housing for camp residents and will improve their security and health.

Energy will play a vital role in development in Darfur. Electricity is available in urban centres. However, many residents living in the poorer outskirts of urban areas do not have access. Development of enterprise models which can provide energy to IDPs can support other enterprise activities such as communication and cooking and can help to improve overall quality of life. If energy can be used to reduce dependence on wood for fuel, this will also help ease resource pressure and the negative health effects of burning wood.

Security in the camps is a major concern for IDPs, especially women. Using communication systems to improve security for IDPs and to provide communication support for other enterprises can be important in the IDP camps. These services will also be important in rural areas of Darfur where conflict is ongoing and in areas where the IDPs will one day return.

Such enterprises, targeted to immediate needs, can facilitate the transition to more long-term development-focused enterprise activity once the IDPs are able to secure their return to their homes and villages or to a permanent settlement in an urban area if they choose. Thus, enterprise activities which address immediate needs can also be termed transitional enterprises if they are able to help facilitate the future reintegration efforts of IDPs.

Participants in Darfur’s emerging war economy should be encouraged to participate in legitimate development-oriented enterprise activity. Such programs can be informal for civilians and IDPs not involved with one of the fighting factions in Darfur, or through formal demobilization activities for active fighters.

Enterprise Models
Adaptable to Traditional Livelihoods Strategies
Trade, agriculture and livestock production are familiar livelihood strategies in Darfur. Such enterprises require land and access to markets, and although IDPs in Darfur have been completely removed from access their lands and resources, such livelihood strategies are important and desired by the IDPs. At Abu Shouk camp in Al Fasher, the researchers witnessed IDPs from nomadic tribes herding cattle and at El Seref camp in Nyala, IDPs were preparing to cultivate small plots of land. The traditional land administration in Darfur is haikura, which is controlled by indigenous tribes for farming, herding, trade and residence. Tax is paid in the form of ashura, literally 1/10th of produce, for use of the land.
Such a system originally allowed pastoralists to practice their livelihoods, granted nomadic tribes passage for cattle and did not pose obstacles to trade. Enabling a system where traditional livelihoods of agriculture, livestock and trade can be practiced will empower the various tribes who are now IDPs and keep them connected to their livelihood strategies in preparation for their return. What is required is access to land and resources which will permit such activity. Although the following recommendations for enterprise are suggested for the IDPs of Darfur, many of these recommendations are applicable to all communities of Darfur, both in rural and urban areas.

Agriculture for IDPs in Darfur is difficult without access to land. Small plots, joint plots and community cooperatives located in, or next to, the camps are possible. Women from pastoral tribes will especially be well skilled for communal and individual farming, food processing and harvesting, such as the production of jams and dried vegetables. Crushing nuts for oil production and food processing in general are suitable enterprises for Darfur and can add value to existing food markets, especially in rural areas. Small flour mills or grinders can also be suitable enterprises if markets exist and transportation routes are unobstructed. In Al Fasher, underground water reserves are present allowing for a variety of agriculture and industry development. In Nyala, most agriculture will likely be rain-fed and more seasonal in nature.

Darfur was once a centre for livestock production and trade and still has a wealth of capacity for development of livestock and livestock-related enterprise, such as meat processing and leather goods. Enabling IDPs to engage in herding and livestock production can spawn a wide variety of trade and secondary industries such as meat processing, tanneries and cheese and butter production. The development of ranches for IDPs to practice livestock livelihood strategies is a possible short-term solution to the limited land and mobility of IDPs and could provide a venue for education, skills training, markets and related enterprises (such as meat processing, tanneries and diary industries) and, most importantly, could create a safe and secure environment for IDPs who are otherwise restricted. Support services, such as finance, enterprise skills training, marketing services and industry organization, can also be provided.

Large-scale tanneries do not exist in Darfur. In Nyala, there was an attempt to establish a sophisticated facility using modern techniques and chemicals, but this facility is not operational. Instead of the development of such facilities, IDPs can engage in small-scale tannery enterprises using natural, chemical-free techniques. The leather produced from these enterprises can be used for handicrafts and the production of shoes, saddles and other items. From livestock production to meat processing and tanneries, a number of specialty production-focused enterprises can be created if access to local, regional and international markets is not obstructed. IDPs from nomadic tribes will be more accustomed to handicraft production and have experience in these activities, including the production of carpets and leather goods.

The IDP blacksmiths collective is an example of semi-skilled tradesmen engaging in enterprise which recycles scrap steel, creating tools used for agricultural development. At first glance, it appears to be a well-rounded SLEN, complete with entrepreneurs and enterprise incubation, a credit component, skills development, access to markets, a social vision and an NGO partner providing a variety of business and marketing support services. Such models have the potential to transform vulnerable and marginalized groups with low social capital into productive agents of development with increased socio-economic status. The IDPs in Darfur are excellent candidates for models of enterprise requiring skilled and semi-skilled labour. With proper access to markets and the right partnerships and finance tools, the IDPs will be able to apply their skills to a wide variety of trades. Small-scale and ecologically sensitive enterprise, addressing community and development needs, will be suitable for IDPs located in camps near urban markets. Ensuring flexibility and mobility in such enterprise will enable IDPs to replicate such enterprises in their areas of return.
Next Steps

Development of grassroots enterprise requires discussion and debate among Sudanese stakeholders, including IDPs, various levels of government and civil society, ex-combatants emerging from the DDR process, experienced enterprise development specialists, entrepreneurs and the development community from Sudan, Africa and the international community. The engagement of local development organizations in the post-war reconstruction and enterprise development process is essential. The inability to engage local development actors in meaningful ways excludes valuable knowledge, experience and understanding from the development process. This is especially evident in Darfur, where there currently exists little opportunity for IDPs and local NGOs to express their concerns and desires.

The recommendations contained in this report provided input for the successful Forum for Sustainable Enterprise Development in Sudan (see appendix A) which took place in Omdurman, Sudan. Examples of SLENs and unique enterprise models were highlighted to promote the potential for grassroots sustainable enterprise in development and conflict transformation in Sudan. Identification of entrepreneurial activity in both active conflict and post-war areas is complete and awaiting a second phase of larger scale action research where ‘what works’ may be discovered and modeled using grounded methodology. The potential exists for knowledge sharing and replication of such models for Southern Sudan, Darfur and other regions. Sudan’s millions of IDPs, refugees, impoverished communities, those active in emerging war economies, and combatants waiting to be demobilized as part of the DDR process can benefit greatly from sustainable enterprise approaches to reintegration and development.
Appendices
Appendix A: Forum for Sustainable Enterprise Development in Sudan, Agenda

Forum for Sustainable Enterprise Development in Sudan
*Alternative Approaches for Local Reconstruction*

**APRIL 1st PROGRAMME**

*Private Sector Solutions to Transforming Conflict to Peace*

9:00 Opening Remarks: Dr. Gasim Badri, President, Ahfad University for Women

9:15 Inclusive and Pro-Poor Growth: Models for Sudan?
HE Sok Siphana, Former Minister of Commerce of Cambodia, and International Trade Center, Geneva
Ms Ishraq Hassan Dirar, Director, Microfinance Unit, Central Bank of Sudan

10:00 Panel 1: Investing in Peace: Entrepreneurship and Conflict Transformation
HE Anthony Makana, Minister of Commerce, Trade & Supply, GOSS
Dr. Anis Hajjar, Chairman, Haggar Group of Companies
Dr. Asha Alkarib, ACCORD Sudan
Discussant: Dr. Amna Rahama, Chair, Women, Peace, and Development Network

11:30 Break

12:00 Panel 2: Sustainable Local Enterprise Networks
Mr. Kevin McKague, President, Foundation for Sustainable Enterprise and Development
Discussant: Professor Amna Sadiq Badri, Ahfad University for Women

1:00 Lunch

2:00 Panel 3: Removing Constraints to Informal Enterprises
Ms Catherine Masinde, Sr. Private Sector Development Specialist, FIAS (TBC)
Dr. Mohamed Dingle, Deputy Director, WTO Affairs Committee

3:00 Comments: Format and objectives of following days
Dr. Susan McGrath, Director, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University

4:00 Press Conference

**APRIL 2nd PROGRAMME**

*Critical Themes and Opportunities*

9:00 Opening Comments: HE Minister Malik Agar, Ministry of Investment

9:05 Field Research Findings from Southern Sudan & Darfur
Dr. Babiker Badri, Ahfad University for Women
Mr. Samer Abdelnour, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University
Mrs. Amani El Jack, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University
Discussant: Dr. Amna Rahama, Chair, Women, Peace, and Development Network
10:30 Break

11:00 Panel 5: Cross-Cutting Themes: DDR & Security, Gender & DDR, Landmines
Dr. Sulafeledeen Saleh, DDR Commissioner North Sudan
Mr. Arop Moyak, DDR Commissioner South Sudan (TBC)
Dr. Balquis Yusuf Badri, Professor, Ahfad University for Women
Ms Nagat Salih, ABRAR
Discussant: Dr. Susan McGrath, Director, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University

1:00 Lunch

2:00 Enabling Microfinance
Mr. Mutwakil Bakri, Microfinance Unit, Central Bank of Sudan
Mr. Serge Gosselin, Market Development Director, Développement international Desjardins
Discussant: Dr. Wael Fahmy, Ministry of Finance

3:00 Video: Women and Development (Practical Action)

3:15 Reflections from the IDP Community
Discussant: Mrs. Amani El Jack

4:00 Closing Comments
Mr. Magdi Amin, World Bank

APRIL 3rd PROGRAMME
Building Relationships

9:00 Opening Comments & SLEN Refresher – Mr. Kevin McKague

9:15 Case Study: Honey Care Africa
Mr. Amaan Khalfan, Honey Care Africa
Dr. Oana Branzei, Schulich School of Business, York University

10:00 Microcredit & Enterprise in Sudan – Experience of Practical Action
Mr. Mohamed Majzoub Fidiel, Director, Practical Action Sudan
Mr. Shibeika Izzeldin, Team Leader, Markets and Livelihoods, Practical Action Sudan

11:00 Break

11:30 Introduction to Breakout Sessions – Dr. Oana Branzei

12:00 Breakout Sessions I

1:00 Lunch

2:00 Breakout Sessions II

3:00 Plenary Panel: Reflections, Recommendations, and Next Steps
Mr. Samer Abdelnour, Dr. Babiker Badri, Dr. Susan McGrath
Appendix B: Focus Group Questions for IDPs

Focus group questions sometimes changed due to language differences, context and stage of research. The list below is the most representative listing of questions posed to the various IDP communities.

Livelihood Strategies and Remittances

- Identification of Pre-conflict and post-conflict livelihoods (list and proportional pilling)
- Livelihoods people wish to adopt (list and proportional pilling)
- Existing skills for desired jobs/vocations (Do they have the skills or not? Are they training for the skills currently?)
- What assistance do people require (list and proportional pilling)
- What are the livelihood strategies being practiced currently? Are there any obstacles preventing IDPs from maximizing the benefits of these livelihood strategies? (If yes, list and rank)
- List alternatives that can be adopted to improve quality of life, and what do you require to adopt these alternatives?
- Coping strategies (ways in which households modify livelihood strategies to minimise impact of conflict)
- Do you receive remittances, who and where do they come from? Is the amount satisfactory? Is it still being received? How frequently is it or was it received?
- How do you afford food and goods?
- What income generating activities exist? (proportional pilling)
- Are women engaged in income generating activities?
- Is there credit/microfinance available to IDPs? What type (loans vs. grants)? Does this benefit you?

Concerns

- What are your main concerns? (list and proportional pilling)
- What are your main worries? (list and proportional pilling)
- Are they planning on staying in the area, going to their place of origin, or going somewhere else?
- What are the requirements that they demand if they are to go back to their places of origin?
Private Sector and Entrepreneurship

- What is the private sector? What is entrepreneurship? (how do people understand the concept and language of entrepreneurship?)
- Do enterprises exist in the IDP camps?
- Do people support enterprise development as a way to improve livelihoods?
- Does it improve socio-economic status?
- Is there an active private sector function in Southern Sudan?
- What capacity is needed for starting and sustaining small enterprise (i.e. credit/finance, training etc)?

People

- Who is good at selling? What do they sell?
- What other skills exist and who has them?
- Who are the entrepreneurs?
- Why are they good?

Aid/Assistance

- Do you receive relief aid?
- If yes, what type of aid? (list) How ready are you to stop receiving aid and be self-sustainable?
References


de Zeeuw (2001), Building Peace in War-Torn Societies – From Concept to Strategy, Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Conflict Research Unit


ويمكن أن تستفيد المجتمعات المحاذية للمخيمات من هذه المبادرات أيضاً، خصوصاً إذا أدت إلى تمكين الروابط الاجتماعية والاقتصادية وتسهيل الاستفادة من الأسواق في مخيمات المهجّرين والمراجعة بين هذه الأسواق والمراكز المدنية المحيطة بالمخيمات.

كما ينبغي تطوير أنظمة قياس فعالة وحاسمة لتحديد أي من المشاريع يوفر فرصاً للتحسين وتمكيناً للمجموعات المهمّة، ويسهم في توفير وسائل معيشة محسنة وفي تحسين النزاع. هناك ثلاث مجالات يمكن من خلالها تطوير مشاريع على مستوى القاعدة في دارفور، وهي مشاريع تتعلق باحتياجات المهجّرين الفورية في المخيمات مثل توفير الماء والمواد الغذائية؛ ومشاريع تتعامل مع الاحتياجات النموذجية مثل الموانئ والطرق والطاقة والأمن؛ ومشاريع تتلائم مع استراتيجيات وسائل المعيشة التقليدية للتجارة والزراعة وإنتاج الموالي وصانعات التكنولوجيا التي تتصل بها. ويمكن أن يوفر تطوير المشاريع للمهجّرين في المخيمات وسيلة فعالة خلال القيام بأنشطة إعادة التوطين في المستقبل، وإذا يمكن النظر إلى هذه المشاريع على أنها مشاريع اقتصادية.

ومع بالغ الأمور أهمية إشراك لاعبين محليين في عملية التطوير. فاللاعبون المحليون يملكون المعرفة القوية والفهم والخبرة والروابط مع المجتمعات المستهدفة. ويمكن أن تؤدي تغذية قدرة اللاعبين المحليين على زيادة فعالية الحملات التنموية وتيسير مقارنات التنمية المستدامة، وتقويم السياسات وتعزيز الفهم وعدم تكرار الأخطاء السابقة. وهذا هو الهدف لجميع المناطق السودانية وخصوصاً في دارفور حيث لا يستطع اللاعبون المحليون في الوقت الراهن الإجابة بشكل كاف على العملية التنموية. وبإمكان الملايين من السودانيين المهجّرين داخل البلاد واللاجئين والمقيمين الذين يبحثون فرصاً في عملية نزع السلاح والتسريح وإعادة الدمج وكذلك المجتمعات السكانية الفقيرة الاستفادة بشكل كبير من مقارنات المشاريع المستدامة لإعادة الدمج والتنمية.
المهمة، ويساهم في توفير وسائل معيشة محسنة وفي تحويل النزاع.

والمجالان الهامان لتطوير مشاريع على مستوى القاعدة في جنوب السودان هو مجال المشاريع التي تتعامل مع الاحتياجات التنموية، مثل الماء والخدمات الصحية وإزالة الألغام وتوفير مواد بناء ملائمة وتوفير الطاقة ووسائل الاتصال في المناطق الفقيرة؛ ويبناء المشاريع النموذجية القائمة على استراتيجيات وسائل المعيشة التقليدية التي تم تحسينها قبلان الرعاة والرجل، مثل المشاريع التي تتعلق بالزراعة والمواشي، وذلك كله بالتعاون مع توفير فرص المشاركة في الأسواق وفرص لعب المستفيدين دورًا قياديًا في تطوير مجتمعاتهم.

ويشكل تطوير المشاريع للمهجّرين داخل البلاد في بيئة دارفور المعقدة وسريعة التغير مهمة صعبة لكنها حيوية الأهمة. فعدم الاستقرار السياسي، وعدم إنتاج المواد من موارد ووسائل المعيشة التقليدية، تعتمد المعيشة على القدرة على التفاهم وإقتسامهم عن إدارة شؤونهم الخاصة، وعدم توفر الأمان، وتركيز المعونة التي يقدمها المجتمع الدولي على الإغاثة والعموم الذي يكแทน مسألة عودة الهيئات الدولية كلها وعناق هائلًا، لكن تطوير أسواق المخيمات ومشاركة المهجر فيهما، والمهارات الموجودة، ورغبة المهجر في الإتكال على النفس وروح البقاء والاستمرار كلها أمور مشجعة يمكنها أن تصبح أساسًا لتطوير المشاريع وبداية حياة أفضل.

لقد انخرطت النساء في دارفور منذ أسرار طويل في التجارة والمشاريع وأنماط الإنتاج، وبعد تشرذم انخرط في أسواق المخيمات، وكثر ما عملن النساء في البيوت في المناطق السكنية المحاذية للمخيمات. وتشجع مشاركة النساء في العمل وقدرتهن على الوصول إلى الموارد المدنية على تطوير المشاريع للنساء. أما بالنسبة للرجال فكثيرًا ما تكون حركتهم مقيدة بسبب الإجراءات الأمنية، بما يقلل الخيارات.

بالنسبة إلى تطوير مشاريع تخصصهم، غير أنه يمكن للرجال المشاركة في أسواق المخيمات. وقد يكون رجل يشمل تخصصهم هو الأكثر نفعًا للمهجّرين في دارفور، غير أنه ينبغي ألا يقصي الرجال عن مثل هذه الأنشطة. كما ينبغي أن تكون المبادرات حريصة على عدم تكليف مجموعات معينة من المهجر في المخيمات دون غيرهم، وعلى أن تشمل القبائل والتكتيكات المختلفة.
المهجِّرين؛ والقدرات الموجودة في مجتمعات المهجِّرين على إنشاء المشاريع؛ والقطاع الإقتصادي وتنوع مصادر في جنوب السودان والاهتمام بالاقتصاد الجزئي؛ وانتشار المشاريع/السوق رغم أن انتفاخ المهجِّرين منها لا يزال محدوداً؛ وانخراط القطاع الخاص المحلي في التنمية.

أما في دارفور فقد وجد الباحثون مظاهرة إيجابية متنوعة تتعلق بتطوير المشاريع المستدامة، منها روح الريادة والاتصال على النفس؛ والمهارات الموجودة التي يمكن استخدامها في مشروع واسعة النطاق؛ والقيم الموجود للتسهيلات التي تتعلق بالمشاريع مثل الإنتظام والتدريب؛ والرغبة القوية في الإتكال على النفس والتحرر من الاعتماد على الإقامة؛ وجود الأسواق في مخيمات المهجِّرين، وبعضها كبير ونضج.

الوصولات

يوفر تطوير المشاريع على مستوى القاعدة فرصة للتعامل مع الاحتياجات المختلفة لإعادة البناء في فترة ما بعد الحرب. ويمر أن يساعد تطوير المشاريع في جنوب السودان على إعادة بناء وسائل المعيشة والمجتمعات والعلاقات بينها. فللتدريب والخدمات الصحية كلها عوامل حاسمة للأهمية في الفترات التي يتخذها المهجِّرون بشأن عودتهم إلى أراضيهم، وكذلك في تنمية جنوب السودان. ويطلب دعم المشاريع إنشاء مؤسسات تركز على التدريب بشكل عام وعلى المهارات المتخصصة، التي تستهدف على إعادة دمج المهجِّرين والمقابلين السابقين وأخرين غيرهم من أثروا عليهم الحرب. ويرغبون في المشاركة في تنمية مجتمعاتهم، كما يتطلب تطوير قدرات التمويل بالصغر للسكان في جنوب السودان خاصة المجموعات المهيمنة مثل المهجِّرين داخل البلاد وال مقابلين السابقين.

فيما يتعلق بجنوب السودان ينبغي تطوير مشاريع تشرك النساء بفعالية وبأمان، لكن هذه المشاريع ينبغي أن تتماشى الرجال. ويرجح أن المهجِّرين داخل البلاد والمقابلين السابقين هما الجماعتان المستهدفتان فيما يتعلق بتطوير المشاريع المستدامة على مستوى القاعدة، إلا أنه ينبغي بالقدر نفسه شمل المجتمعات التي سيستقرن فيها وذلك لزيادة الروابط الاجتماعية وفرص تحويل النزاع، بدلاً من الفصل والتنمية غير المتساوية الذين يؤديان إلى مقاومة التوتر والنزاع. كما ينبغي تطوير أنظمة قياس فعالة وحاسمة لتحديد أي من المشاريع يوفر فرصاً للتحسين وتمكينا للمجموعات.

بانغ أجنية، سوق القاتر، أيار/مايو 2006.
التحديات

هناك تحديات حاسمة لابد من مواجهتها عند التفكير في تطوير مشاريع على مستوى القاعدة في كل من جنوب السودان ودارفور. وعلى الرغم من أن المعطيات تختلف من الناحية السياسية والتاريخية والثقافية والإثنية، ومن ناحية العادات واللغة والبيئة، هناك أمور مشتركة تتعلق عليها كلها تبعث على القلق، منها البيئة وخصوصاً استنزاف الموارد في مناطق النزاع واعتماد المهجرين داخل البلاد على موارد شحيحة؛ وعدم المساواة بين الجنسين وخصوصاً تهميش الإناث بين المهجرين، وافتقار الرجال إلى القدرة على التنقل والحركة؛ واتخاذ المهجرين إلى الأمن والسلاسة داخل المخيمات وخارجها، ومسألة حمزة الأراضي والحقوق في جنوب السودان والحصول على أراض في دارفور.

لا زال جنوب السودان يعاني في فترة ما بعد الحرب من النزاع والتحديات الأخرى. والمجالات الرئيسية التي ينبغي أن تكون محط اهتمام فيما يتعلق بتطوير مشاريع على مستوى القاعدة وشبكات مشاريع محلية مستدامة في جنوب السودان، هي الفروقات بين المجتمعات والتحدي المتعلق بعودة المهجرين المتحدرين ومفهوم الغرب؛ والمسائل الاجتماعية–اقتصادية، ومن بينها ثقافة التبعية الراهنة ووجود الألغام وكذلك تحديدات حمزة الأرض وحقوق الملكية؛ والوضع المتعلق بنزع السلاح وتسريع الجيش وعملية إعادة الدمج والتأخير في نزع أسلحة المقاتلين.

وفي دارفور أدت هشاشة اتفاقية السلام الشامل واستمرار النزاع إلى المزيد من المعاناة والتشريد والتوترات الإقليمية والدولية. أما المجالات الرئيسية التي ينبغي أن تكون محط اهتمام فيما يتعلق بتطوير مشاريع على مستوى القاعدة وشبكات مشاريع محلية مستدامة، فهي تحديات مساعدة الناس على الاستفادة من استراتيجيات وسائل المعيشة التقليدية التي نجمت عن إعداد المهجرين عن أراضيهم التي هي مصدر رزقهم؛ وتحديات الأمن والسلاسة بسبب وجود طبقات معقدة من الأمن داخل المخيمات وخارجها واستمرار الهجمات على المهجرين؛ وتحديات التمثيل والمشاركة، إذ لا يزال المهجرين غير قادرين على تنظيم أنفسهم وتعبير عن مطالبهم وطموحاتهم، وكذلك التحديات الناجمة عن إقضاء المنظمات السودانية في الغالب عن عمليات الإغاثة والتنمية في دارفور.

الفرص

لقد تبين من العمل السلمي في جنوب السودان أن هناك أموراً إيجابية متعددة تشجع على تطوير مشاريع مستدامة. ومن بين هذه توفر الموارد الطبيعية التي تتيح الإمكانيات لأنشطة مشاريع متنوعة، والرغبة القوية في توفير وسائل معيشة لما بعد الحرب وللتنمية؛ والتشجيع الذي يديدة كافة أصحاب المصلحة من داخل الوطن ومن المجتمع الدولي لعودة
توجه الدراسة
نظمت جامعة أحسان للمرأة (السودان) بالتعاون مع جامعة يورك (كندا) هذه الدراسة. ولا شك أن المقاربة المعروفة باسم "التقنيات الاجتماعية التواصلية" مقارة نوعية (غير كمية) إلى حد بالغ، وهي تقع ضمن نطاق ما يعرف باسم "البحث الفعال التواصل". كذلك فإن إطار الدراسة هو البحث المستند إلى شبكات المشاريع المستدامة المحلية، وهي شبكات تأزيمية قائمة على الإنترنت تقدم منافع إنسانية واجتماعية ومالية وأكولوجية. وتعالج شبكات المشاريع المحلية المستدامة أهداف التنمية المستدامة والعنف من أجل الفقراء، وذلك بدعم العلاقات وبناء القنوات بين الشركاء، ومن بينهم رجال الأعمال وقطاع التنمية والمستثمرون ومعاهد التدريب المحلية وأفراد المجتمع والأعمال التجارية المحلية المستدامة والشركات وأجهزة الحكومة المختلفة (Wheeler et al. 2005).

لقد وجدت أبحاث التنمية الدولية أن هناك روابط واضحة ما بين النزاع والنشاط الاقتصادي. فأزمة الحرب تطلق العنان لرجال أعمال يحققون الربح عن طريق تشجيع العنف وآخرين يصارعون من أجل البقاء في ظل العنف. ويمكن توليد وسائل المعيشة المستدامة من خلال تطوير المشاريع المستدامة، لأن يكون أداة لإعادة دمج أفراد المجتمع الذين شاركوا في الحرب أو شاردوا بسببها. وهذه العملية هي بالفعل عملية تحويل للصراع من خلال توليد وسائل المعيشة المستدامة.

لقد اعتمدت البحوث بشكل واسع على المؤسسات السودانية المحلية للتكثيف اللوجستي والدعم والوصول إلى المجتمعات المحلية، وتعين على الحكومة السودانية وحكومة جنوب السودان توفير الغطاء الأمني والدعم لعملية جمع المعلومات. وقد قدمت جامعة أحسان للمرأة الدعم اللوجستي ووسائل اجتماعي قوي. وقد أدارت المؤسسات المحلية بمساعدة فرق الأبحاث المحلية نقاط التركيز والاتصال في مجتمعات الهجرة داخل البلاد، جامعتها العمل بمشاركة مبادرة سودانية، تشكل جسورًا بسد الفجوات ما بين اللغات والثقافات المتعددة ويساعد على ربط المؤسسات السودانية.
الشمال غرب السودان، وهو المحور الرئيسي لهذا التقرير، من أكثر المناطق نقصاً في تطوره في العالم، ويعد ذلك إلى السياسات المستنذبة عبر التاريخ التي حمرت هذه المناطق من البنية الأساسية للتنمية.

لقد ابتنتت مناطق غرب السودان بالنزاعات الداخلية والخارجية والمجاعات. ويمكن تتبع أصل النزاع المسلح في دارفور إلى ما يطلق عليه جيرارد برونير "الإهمال الكولونيالي الطيف: الزعمات، ونقص التطور" (2005: 25). لقد تعرضت دارفور إلى تهديد سياسي وأقتصادي بالمقارنة مع مناطق وسط النيل، ويعود ذلك إلى الحكم التركي - المصري الذي امتد من عام 1874 إلى عام 1883. وكانت مملكة دارفور قبل الاستعمار قوية وهامة على الأقل مثل جاراتها (Badri:2005)

منذ عام 2003، تحول النزاع المسلح في دارفور يتسارع إلى حالة طوارئ إنسانية أثرت بشكل قاسي على ملايين السكان من النساء والرجال والأطفال في دارفور. وفقاً لما زاد عن 200 ألف لاجئ يعيشون في تشاد (200). وفي كانون الثاني من عام 2003 نبته "صدامات مشوهة" (USAID) على الحدود بين تشاد ودارفور. وحكومة السودان إلى وجود مشاكل في المنطقة، وفي 26 شباط / فبراير 2003 هاجمت حركة الخلد والمساواة، التي لم تكن معروفة في السابق، بالاشتراك مع جيش التحرير السوداني ومركز دارفور قوات الحكومة السودانية وقتل 200 منها (Prunier). وقد أدى الرد الانفعالي الذي شنته الحكومة السودانية وميليشيات الجنوبيات المدعومة من الأوروار إلى أن ينطلق الوزير الخارجية الأمريكي كولن باول أن ما يحدث في دارفور هو "مجزرة" (المصدر الذي سابق). وبالرغم من أن الحكومة السودانية وضعمت منذ ذلك الحين مسافة بينها وبين الجنوبيات، إلا أن دعمها للميليشيات في بادئ الأمر قد بدأ بإفوات اقتصاد الحرب الذي استمر بدوره في إدامة العنف في دارفور.

الهدف

الهدف الرئيسي من هذه الدراسة هو تطوير النقاش بشأن إعادة البناء لفترة ما بعد الحرب من وجهة نظر تطوير مشاريع على مستوى القاعدة والمساواة بين الجنسين، وتحديداً عوائد المهاجرين من دارفور وجنوب السودان ونزع سلاح المقاتلين السابقين في جنوب السودان وإعادة مجاهي في المجتمع كجزء من عمليات نزع السلاح والتسريح وإعادة الدمج. وينبي تعزيز تأمين السلام المستدام، إعداد المجتمعات التي هُمت بسبب النزاع باحتياجاتها الأساسية. ومن حاسم الأهمية لهذه الدراسة تفصيل خطط التنمية التي وضعتها الحكومات المختلفة في السودان والمنظمات الدولية والمؤسسات غير الحكومية المحلية لفترة ما بعد الحرب، وكذلك أيضاً تقييم القدرات الموجودة، بما في ذلك المهارات والبنية التحتية واستعداد المجتمعات المستهدفة لتطوير القطاع الخاص.
النظام والتسهيلات في جنوب السودان والمجال الاقتصادي والاجتماعي والتعليمي؛ وأنشطة المشاريع/السوق
رغم أن ارتفاع المجزريين منها لإزالة محدود؛ وانخفاض القطاع الخاص المحلي في التنمية. أما في
دارفور فقد واجب النواحي مظاهرة إيجابية متباينة تتعلق بتطور المشاريع مستدامة، منها روح
الريادة والانوال على النفس; والمهارات الموجودة التي يمكن استخدامها في مشروع واسعة
التنووع والفهم للتسهيلات التي تتعلق بالمشاريع مثل الإنتاج والتضيي; والرغبة القوية
في الإتكال والتحرر من الاعتماد على الإغاثة; وجود الأسواق في مخيمات
المهاجرين، وبعضها كبير ونضال.

لقد فاقم الصراع المستمر بين الحكومة السودانية ومجموعات المعارضة في دارفور والتحديات
التي تواجهها خطأ السلام الشامل بين الحكومة السودانية وحكومة جنوب السودان من سوء أحوال
مجتمع المهاجرين من السودانيين. ومع استمرار تراكم التحديات الإنسانية والسياسية والتنموية،
يعتبر على المنظمات والمجتمعات المحلية في السودان أن تعثر بالقدرات الموجودة وتسعيف
منها وتقربها من أجل تطورها الخاص. وإداكا بأن هذا يمكن تحلية معاً وتطبيبة جهد
كافة مستويات المجتمع السوداني، يطرح هذا التقرير أول دراسة أساسية معروفة تعمد مباشرة
على تنظيم القدرات الموجودة على تطوير المشاريع المستدامة في مجتمعات المهاجرين داخل
البلاد من دارفور وجنوب السودان وضع التوصيات بشأنها.

خلفية
السودان أحد أكثر البلدان تناعاً؛ فهو يضم ضمن حدوده صحارى وسلاسل جبال ومستنقعات
وغابات استوائية. وتميز السودان وجود ثلاث مناطق مناخية عامة: منطقة صحراوية في الشمال
و حزام من الأراضي شبه الجافة في الوسط، ومنطقة استوائية ممطرة في الجنوب. وهو غني أيضًا
بترابات طبيعية مترابع عليها تقع بشكل رئيسي في الجنوب. وتضمن هذه الموارد النفط والأحمر
والنحاس والكروم والزئبق وتبغيسة ميكا والفضة والذهب. والإلهمة التي نسبت من
خصائص القرن الماضي بين حكومة السودان وحركة/جيش التحرير الشعبية تنازع على ملكية
هذا الموارد والسيطرة عليها مرتبطة ارتباطاً مباشرًا بسلاط التغيير، بفعل القوة العسكرية وتفاقم
هذا التغيير في مناطق النفط في جنوب السودان وفي الوقت الراهن أيضاً في منطقة دارفور في
غرب السودان.

تفسر الأحداث التاريخية في السودان تفسيراً ذاتياً وكثيراً ما تكون موضوع نزاع شديد. لقد نجم
النزاع في جنوب السودان عن شكل متجمعته وشد الصراع والاضطهاد وعدم السماوة والاستبعاد. وينسب
النزاع، من الناحية التاريخية، إلى اندماج التوازن في التنمية بين الشمال والجنوب وانعدام السماوة
بين الجنوبين وانعدام الوضع الاجتماعي والاقتصادي والدبلوماسية. ويعود حجم كبير من النزاع
السحالي إلى الجذور التي وجدت بشكل رئيسي في الجنوب في أواخر القرن التاسع عشر، لكنه
ارتباط في الوقت ذاته بالتطور الاقتصادي في كل من الشمال والجنوب. وترتفع النشاط في جنوب
السودان وفي مناطق دارفور مباشرة بالصراع الأولسع ما بين الحكومات المركزية المنتجة في
مقدمة

تهدف هذه الدراسة، وهي جزء من مشروع أكبر بعنوان "تحويل الصراع: تشجيع وسائل المعيشة المستدامة وتطوير المشاريع على مستوى القاعدة في دارفور وجنوب السودان", إلى تشجيع تبني وسائل المعيشة المستدامة التي تساعدها على التكامل على النفس بعد انتهاء الحرب في السودان والموضوع والدراسة كلاهما شراكة تأزرية بين جامعة أحد للمرأة (السودان) وجامعة بورك كندا)، وهما يزودان فيما استراتيجيات وسائل معيشة المجتمعات السكانية التي شهدت من أماكن عيشها في دارفور وجنوب السودان إلى مناطق أخرى داخل البلاد قبل الصراع وبعدة. وتركز الدراسة بشكل أساسي على التنمية على مستوى القاعدة والقطاع الخاص ونتبجج مبدأ المساواة بين الجنسين بحيث يصبح تطوير المشاريع المستدامة أدناة لتحقيق وسائل معيشة مستدامة للجماعات المستهدفة.

اكتشف الباحثون أثناء الدراسة الميدانية نشوء جدل بين موظفي الوكالات الدولية والمنظمات السودانية المحلية بشأن تدابير الإغاثة والاحتياج إليها مقابل تحسين فرص التنمية في السودان. في حالات كثير من الحذر المستمر والأوضاع السياسية المتغيرة والبرامج والسياسات التي تركز على الإغاثة والتنمية في الحقيقة أو الإقراض إلى نماذج المشاريع المستدامة المحلية في المجتمعات المستهدفة على القدرة و Newly Available Resources إعداد البناء بعد الحرب. وتنبج الوعي في اكتشاف وتنفيذ القدرات الموجودة في المجتمعات التي عانى من تأثيرات الحرب في دارفور وجنوب السودان من القناعة بأن هذه القدرات موجودة بالفعل، وأنه ربما سيكون لها الدور الأعظم في إعادة البناء في فترة ما بعد الحرب.

هناك من الأمور الإيجابية ما يشجع على تطوير المشاريع المستدامة في جنوب السودان منها توفر الموارد الطبيعية التي تتكون الدوائر الاسمية تلخيص مشروعات مملوءة، والرغبة القوية في توفير وسائل معيشة لما بعد الحرب والتنمية، والتشجيع الذي يبدع كفاءة أصحاب المصلاحة من داخل الوطن ومن المجتمع الدولي لعودة المهجّرين، والقدرات الموجودة في المجتمعات المهجّرين على إنشاء المشاريع والقطاعات المالي. 

ينعم الناس في مخيم أوبيل، قرب مالاكال، أيار/مايو 2006.
بحث في القدرة على إنشاء مشاريع: تقييم اجتماعي تشاركي في دارفور وجنوب السودان

سامر عبد النور، د. بابكر بديري، د. أماني الجاك، د. دافيد ويلر، د. سوزان ماجرات، د. أونا براتزي